TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....................................................................................................
xi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................
1
Corporate Status...................................................................................................................
3
The Corporation’s Programs..................................................................................................
3
Domestic Volunteer Service Act Programs.......................................................................
3
National and Community Service Trust Act
Programs.......................................................
4
Origins of the Study...............................................................................................................
6
CNCS Improvement Initiatives..............................................................................................
7
Study Methodology...............................................................................................................
8
Organization of the Report.....................................................................................................
9
CHAPTER 2: CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS.............
11
Board Membership..............................................................................................................
11
Types of Boards..................................................................................................................
12
Governance Boards.......................................................................................................
12
Advisory Boards...........................................................................................................
13
Evolution of
CNCS’ Board of Directors...............................................................................
13
Disparate Views of the Board’s Role.............................................................................
14
The Need for Role Clarity..............................................................................................
15
Supporting the Board and Meeting Its
Information Needs.....................................................
16
Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................................
16
CHAPTER 3: STABILIZING SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND
IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTION OF THE CORPORATION’S
PROGRAMS....................................................................................................................
19
CNCS’
Headquarters Structure...........................................................................................
20
Turnover and Extended Vacancies in Senior
Positions
Have Weakened
CNCS’ Management Capability..........................................................
21
Organizational Responsibilities for Managing
CNCS Programs.............................................
23
Senior Corps and AmeriCorps*VISTA Programs..........................................................
23
AmeriCorps*State/National Programs...........................................................................
24
Learn and Serve............................................................................................................
25
AmeriCorps*National Civilian Community
Corps...........................................................
26
Coordinating
Efforts to Promote National and Community Service........................................
27
Cross-Program Interaction and Coordination
in the Field................................................
28
Coordination between CNCS Program Offices
and with State Offices............................
30
The Need for Better Program Coordination and
Potential Barriers..................................
31
New Efforts and Opportunities to Increase
Program Interactions..........................................
32
New Protocol for AmeriCorps and the State
Offices......................................................
32
New Organizational Model for AmeriCorps
Program Officers........................................
32
State Service Plans........................................................................................................
33
The Role of the Area Managers...........................................................................................
34
Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................................
35
CHAPTER 4: RESTRUCTURING HEADQUARTERS FOR BETTER
MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................
41
Organizational Entity Needed for Management
Analysis and Other Key Activities................. 41
Responsibility for CNCS’ Grants Function is
Scattered........................................................
43
Responsibility for Grants Policy......................................................................................
44
Responsibility for the Fiscal Aspects of
Grant Operations...............................................
44
Roles, Relationships, and Organizational
Alignment of CNCS Program and Grants Officers 45
Comparison of CNCS’ Program and Grants
Officers’ Roles, Relationships, and Organizational Alignment with Other
Agencies..............................................................................................................
46
New Role for AmeriCorps Program
Officers..................................................................
47
Restructuring Opportunities for CNCS’
Member
Training and
Support Functions......................................................................................
48
Conclusions and
Recommendations......................................................................................
49
CHAPTER 5: IMPROVING FINANCIAL AND GRANTS
MANAGEMENT...............
53
Administration of
the National Service Trust.........................................................................
53
Trust Operations............................................................................................................
54
Trust Reporting..............................................................................................................
55
Trust Reserve................................................................................................................
55
Administrative
Funds Management.......................................................................................
56
Administrative Control of Funds.....................................................................................
56
Budgeting and Internal Funds Management.....................................................................
57
Cost Allocation Methods for Budgeting and
Accounting.................................................
58
Systems That Support CNCS’ Financial
Management Activities and Management Reporting—Current and Planned...........................................................................................................................................
60
Primary Systems and Applications..................................................................................
60
Other Corporation Systems...........................................................................................
61
Management Reporting Capabilities...............................................................................
62
Work-In-Progress
to Improve CNCS’ Financial Systems and Reporting........................ 63
Strategic Management of CNCS’ Information
Technology Resources...................................
64
Role of the Chief Information Officer..............................................................................
64
Information Technology Planning....................................................................................
65
System Ownership and Priority Setting...........................................................................
65
Grants Management Processes in CNCS.............................................................................
66
Life Cycle of Competitive Grants...................................................................................
66
Other Process Improvements for Grants
Management....................................................
71
AmeriCorps*State/National Grant Matching
Requirements.............................................
72
Education and Training for Program Officers
and Grants Officers....................................
72
Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................................
73
Financial Management...................................................................................................
73
Grants Processes...........................................................................................................
76
CHAPTER 6: OPTIMIZING CNCS’ HUMAN RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES.....................................................................................................................
79
Summary of the
Academy’s Operational Human Capital Studies...........................................
81
State Office Position Management Study........................................................................
81
Grants/Program Management Position
Management Study.............................................
83
HR Team Findings and Suggestions................................................................................
83
Compensation Consistency Study..................................................................................
84
Optimizing the
Alternative Personnel System.........................................................................
88
CNCS Employee Status................................................................................................
89
Conversion of GS Employees to APS............................................................................
89
Leadership Development and Succession
Planning..........................................................
90
Workforce Planning and Analysis...................................................................................
91
Finalizing a Human Capital Strategy................................................................................
92
Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................................
93
CHAPTER 7: TOWARD A STRATEGY-CENTERED,
RESULTS-ORIENTED CORPORATION
97
Strategic
Planning Requirements...........................................................................................
98
Status of
Planning at CNCS.................................................................................................
98
CNCS’ Strategic Plan.................................................................................................
101
Planning Issues............................................................................................................
102
Strategic Planning Opportunities...................................................................................
104
Performance
Measurement and Management.....................................................................
106
Metrics Development Activities....................................................................................
106
Challenges to Developing Metrics................................................................................
107
Conclusions and
Recommendations....................................................................................
109
CHAPTER 8: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE...................................................................
115
Legislation.........................................................................................................................
115
Legislative Proposals Recommended by the
Panel........................................................
116
Additional Administrative Legislative
Proposals............................................................
117
Follow-Up Work by Academy Staff..................................................................................
118
Additional Areas for CNCS Review..................................................................................
120
Member Relations and Member Management..............................................................
120
Training.......................................................................................................................
120
Knowledge Management.............................................................................................
120
Grants Management.....................................................................................................
122
Procurement Office......................................................................................................
122
Conclusions and Recommendations....................................................................................
123
CHAPTER 2
CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
Government corporations are not
required to have boards of directors.
The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the Federal Housing
Administration, and the Government National Mortgage Association are examples of
government corporations without
boards. However, in keeping with
congressional interest to portray CNCS as a business-like entity, the
Corporation’s legislation directs that CNCS have a 15-member, bi-partisan Board
of Directors, with members appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate for 5-year staggered terms.
The Board must meet at least three times a year, which is its current
practice. In addition, the Board’s
three committees—Strategy, Management, and Governance; Communications; and
Program—meet regularly between Board meetings.
Because of its bipartisan
make-up, the Board has been an important vehicle for explaining and advocating
the Corporation’s mission to persons having different service philosophies. It also has been called upon to assist
periodically with management issues when Congress, the inspector general, and
others have raised concerns over program costs, financial system failures, weak
internal controls, and other matters related to management effectiveness.
During the Academy’s 1998 review
of the Corporation,
the Panel examined the role of CNCS’ Board of Directors, and recommended that
the Corporation propose legislation to enhance the Board’s role in policymaking
and discontinue its operational role in the grant approval process for
AmeriCorps*State/National and Learn and Serve grants. The Board’s role has continued to evolve
these last seven years, but its scope and focus are not clearly documented or
understood by Corporation staff, Board members, or Corporation
stakeholders. Disparities between
the Board’s current role and what people believe its role should be add to the
ambiguity surrounding CNCS’ Board of Directors. This chapter discusses the evolution of
CNCS’ Board of Directors, and identifies changes needed for it to oversee more
effectively the work of the Corporation.
The Corporation’s Board
membership has always fluctuated.
Since the Corporation’s creation in 1993, it has never had the full
complement of 15 members. The average number of Board members has
been about 10, but during any given year, membership has often been less. Filling Board vacancies has always been
a problem because presidential nominations are generally slow in coming.
Table 1 shows the number of Board
members as of October 1 for every year since the Corporation’s inception.
Table 1
CNCS Chronology of Board Members
As of October 1 Each
Year
|
|
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
|
Members |
2 |
10 |
13 |
10 |
10 |
7 |
12 |
13 |
11 |
10 |
7 |
|
Vacancies |
13 |
5 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
8 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
Of the seven Board members as of
October 2004, five were recess appointments that extended the appointments of
members already serving on the Board.
In November 2004, the Senate confirmed the appointment of nine members—3
new members, the 5 recess appointments, and 1 other individual who had
previously served on the Board—raising the number of Board members to 11 and
reducing the number of vacancies to 4.
There are two common genres of
boards—governance boards, which are
ubiquitous in the private and nonprofit sectors, and advisory boards, which are
found in the public and private sectors.
One of the principal differences between these two types of boards is the
locus of power and the resulting assignment of authority and responsibility for
the organization’s performance. The
typical governance board in the
private sector is powerful because it represents the equity holders (that is,
the owners), and has the authority to hire and fire key executives; establish
levels of management compensation; approve budget and major financial
transactions; and determine the organization’s focus and strategic
functions. The balance of power is
reversed in the case of advisory boards in the federal government because they typically serve at the
pleasure of the President or the head of the agency that establishes them.
Governance boards have a wide
range of responsibilities.
Observers with a legal bent typically mention board functions that
include representing the interests of stakeholders; selecting and replacing the
CEO; and ensuring that the corporation does not break the law. Observers with a management bent tend to
emphasize the responsibility of the board to provide strategic advice to top
management and promote the reputation of the firm externally.
Boards of nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) are typically more limited than corporation boards in their range of
decisionmaking because the mission of the nonprofit is often historically
defined, as is true of the Boy Scouts and the Red Cross, for example. In contrast, for-profit corporations
must transform themselves to accommodate changing markets and technology. Also, the NPO board is responsible to
the members of the organization rather than stakeholders. Nevertheless, like corporation boards,
NPO boards usually select the CEO and establish strategic polices for the
organization. And the primary
activities of NPO boards are typically carried out by subcommittees, just as
they are in corporate boards. For
example, a personnel subcommittee sets the compensation level for the
organization’s top executives. In
contrast to corporate board members, however, NPO board members do not have
access to stock, and many serve without compensation.
Advisory boards are frequently
used in the private sector for wholly-owned subsidiaries. The typical advisory board shares two
important characteristics with CNCS: (1) the board does not select the CEO and
(2) the board does not dictate the primary business of the subsidiary.
Advisory boards and board-like
entities (commissions, committees, etc.) also are widely used throughout the
federal government to accomplish a
variety of ad hoc and ongoing activities.
Many of these entities are specifically designed to provide advice to the
organization’s decisionmakers. For
example, the Defense Science Board advises the secretary of defense and other
senior department officials on scientific, technical, manufacturing,
acquisition, and other matters of special interest. The National Institutes of Health have
numerous advisory boards. The
National Cancer Institute alone has several committees and panels in addition to
three entities that are specifically called advisory boards—the Board of Science
Advisors, the National Cancer Advisory Board, and the Board of Science
Counselors. There also is an
advisory board that provides counsel to the leadership of the Pension Benefits
Guarantee Corporation.
CNCS’ Board of Directors fits
neither the governance nor advisory
board model. The Corporation’s
legislation established the Board of Directors with a mix of advisory, policy,
oversight, and operational responsibilities.
Although the term
“governing” does not appear in the
legislation, the CNCS Board has two key attributes of a governing board—it is responsible for reviewing and
approving the CEO’s proposals regarding regulations and other standards,
policies, procedures, programs, and initiatives for carrying out the national
service laws; and it reviews and approves the Corporation’s strategic plan. Since November 2004, the
newly-constituted Board has been examining its policy-making function, and it
has been actively involved in revising the Corporation’s strategic plan, which
CNCS leadership and the Board want to use to drive the annual budget formulation
process.
On the other hand, there are
three key attributes of a governing
board that the CNCS Board does not possess. First, the Board does not approve the
Corporation’s budget. Rather, it
approves the notices of funds availability (NOFAs) and the operating plan, which
are how CNCS executes its budget.
Second, the Board cannot shape the organization’s focus and scope of
endeavor. These attributes are
dictated by legislative mandate.
Finally, the Board cannot hire or remove the CEO, as these activities are
the prerogatives of the President.
However, the current CEO has created a performance management plan, and
the Board will evaluate the CEO annually against the plan and submit the
evaluation to the White House.
The Corporation’s legislation
also includes responsibilities for the Board that are more advisory or
operational in nature. For example,
the Board is authorized to:
- review
and advise the CEO on actions affecting Corporation personnel and such
standards, policies, procedures, programs and initiatives necessary to carry
out the national service laws
- review
and approve the CEO’s plan for evaluating the Corporation’s programs, and
ensure effective dissemination of information about Corporation programs and
initiatives
- review
and approve the CEO’s proposal for the issuance of grants and allotments,
contracts and other financial assistance, and the designation of national
service positions needed to carry out the national service laws
In his paper (circa 1999), Politicizing the AmeriCorps Program,
former CNCS Board member Christopher Gallagher describes the CNCS Board of
Directors as a “work in progress.”
As the CEO, Board membership, and issues have changed over the years, so
too has the role of the Board. The
first CEO, Eli Segal, sought the Board’s “experience and special knowledge,” but
only on an as-needed basis. During
the tenure of the second CEO, Harris Wofford, the Board became more involved in
CNCS’ day-to-day operations and stepped in to help address management issues,
such as the lack of internal controls.
According to Gallagher, “…the activity behind the scenes around these
management issues had engaged the Board’s direct attention and involvement
throughout the Corporation.” These
management problems and their perceived threat to the very existence of the
Corporation helped shape the Board as a unit, engaged the Board as a partner
with the CEO, and elevated the Board’s utility within the Corporation’s overall
management scheme. In 2002, under
the third CEO, Les Lenkowsky, when the Corporation was in violation of the
Antideficiency Act in the National Service Trust,
the Board once again stepped in to help the Corporation resolve its problems and
serve as a buffer between the Corporation and some in Congress who saw this as
an opportunity once again to challenge the existence of the Corporation.
The Panel found significant
disparities between the (1) Board’s current role, (2) the role people believe
the Board should be performing to help govern the Corporation, and (3) the Board’s ability
to assume additional responsibilities.
Congressional doubts about CNCS’
ability to manage itself have existed since the Corporation was created, and
Congress has monitored CNCS’ activities especially closely. Congress appears to expect that CNCS’
Board will perform as a governing
board; exercising management oversight of the Corporation’s activities. However, without the key attributes of a
governing board, the Board faces
significant obstacles in meeting these expectations. Although the Board does approve the
Corporation’s strategic plan and has some policy-making responsibilities,
without the ability to manage the CEO who runs the business, CNCS’ Board is,
according to an expert on boards, only “a paper tiger.” It does not have the authority needed to
be a governing board.
Board members interviewed are
aware of the Board’s limited authority and potential impact, and see their role
as primarily advisory. Everyone
interviewed was in favor of giving the Board more of a policy-making role and
involving it in strategy development, and Board members appear to be interested
in moving in this direction. For
example, at its September 2005 meeting, the Board eliminated its detailed review
of NOFAs and will now perform only a policy review.
Individuals interviewed also
generally agreed that the Board should reduce its involvement in operational
decisionmaking, and the Board has taken steps to do that. Prior to 2004, the Board received for
its concurrence all documentation for NCSA grant applications that Corporation
staff recommended for approval. The
revised procedure implemented in 2004 calls for the Board to develop yearly
guidelines for awards that establish areas of emphasis for national
service. The CEO then submits a
list of the applications he recommends for funding with only a brief description
of each grant, and certifies to the Board that these applications meet the
Board’s guidelines. This new
procedure delegates to the CEO greater authority and reduces the Board’s
hands-on involvement in the Corporation’s grant-making activities. It is supported by everyone Academy
staff interviewed. However, Board
members interviewed believe that they should retain the ability to rescind this
delegation of authority and step back into an operational role if they believe
such action is warranted.
The Panel found that observations
made by board experts during the Academy’s study of the National Science Board
(NSB)
are relevant to the discussion of the Corporation’s Board. The experts unanimously believe that one
of the most common causes of problems and tensions that reduce board
effectiveness is the lack of clarity about the board’s roles and
responsibilities vis-à-vis other components of the organization. The experts agree that when roles and
responsibilities of the board and CEO are not clear, a tension develops beyond
the normal creative tension that enhances a board’s performance. One expert defines creative tension or
constructive interaction as “… a culture and a relationship of mutual trust and
respect between two individuals who understand that there are two separate and
distinct roles to play.” According
to another expert, “Trust problems virtually always stem from a Board not being
clear about what it wants and does not want.” To solve this problem, organizations
must clearly document the roles and responsibilities of the board, management,
directors, and committees in governance guidelines that are regularly reviewed and
updated and made publicly available.
The CNCS Board of Directors does
not have governance guidelines that
define its roles and its relationship to CNCS management. The Panel believes that the lack of such
guidelines is the main reason why, when asked, the majority of people
interviewed said they did not have a clear understanding of what the CNCS Board
of Directors does.
A question that surfaced during
the study is whether or not the Board needs additional support and information
to perform its functions. The
answer to that question depends largely on the Board’s role. Typically, an advisory board has little
need for staff support other than routine logistical support and information
preparation to facilitate discussion at the board’s meetings. A governing board, however, may have additional
resource needs. “Timely, valid,
comprehensive information is essential to the effective functioning of boards,
and this information frequently comes from management. Experts on corporate and non-profit
boards also agree that boards should have the ability to get information from
other sources when necessary.”
Academy staff found that other
public and nonprofit organizations with boards have approached this subject in
different fashions. The Legal
Services Corporation’s Board of Directors has a budget in order to retain
independent experts or consultants.
For example, when the Board conducted a presidential search, it hired a
consulting firm to help with that effort.
The Red Cross’ Board has a budget and three or four staff to conduct
research on governance issues and to
plan meetings. Its president/CEO
has primary responsibility for providing the information that the Board needs in
order to operate, but the Board can hire consultants.
The NSB relies on the director
and staff of the National Science Foundation for information. However, the NSB also has its own staff
to gather data and analyze issues.
The Academy’s 2004 study of the NSB found that a downside to the Board
having a staff was that the staff were tempted to interject themselves between
the Board and the CEO. With time on
their hands, the Board’s staff tended to get overly involved in the day-to-day
management of the organization.
The nearly universal practice in
the private sector is that boards receive the information and support they need
from the corporation’s management.
An expert on boards consulted during this study supported this practice
when he commented, “If the board had its own staff, you would have a company run
with two heads—an untenable situation.”
If the requested support is not provided, the board corrects the matter
by working through the CEO who is under its direction and control.
When the Corporation’s
legislation was introduced, proponents were very interested in portraying the
new organization as a business-like entity, on the cutting edge of the movement
to reinvent government. These desires likely gave rise to
designating the organization as a corporation and establishing the Board of
Directors. However, the CNCS
Board’s role lacks clarity, and defining what its role should be is a complex
issue.
Many in Congress expect CNCS’
Board to act as a governing
board. But given its limited
authority, this expectation seems unrealistic. The Board has none of the critical
levers of power available to effect change: the power to hire and remove the
CEO, set levels of compensation, and substantively change the programmatic focus
of the organization. These powers
are reserved for Congress and/or the President. A governing board and the CEO must work together in a
collaborative fashion. Without the
authority to hire and remove the CEO, the ability of the CNCS Board and CEO to
work together depends largely on personalities and the interests of the
CEO. The Corporation is fortunate
because its current CEO and Board enjoy a collegial relationship, and are
working together closely to bring about positive change throughout CNCS. But this has not always been the case
during the Corporation’s brief history, and the current working relationship
between the CEO and the Board may not be predictive of the future.
The CNCS Board has matured and
coalesced as a decision-making body, and it has demonstrated its ability to help
set policy and corporate direction and oversee the Corporation’s activities when
necessary. It plays a critical role
in the Corporation’s interactions with Congress, and members have served as
advocates for the Corporation, its mission, and programs. All Board members interviewed have
confidence in the Board’s ability to perform these functions effectively. They also believe that the Board should
not be involved in operational decisions.
The Panel concurs that the Board
should be more involved in setting the strategic direction for the Corporation
and developing corporate policies.
The strategic plan, which the Board approves, should determine the
Corporation’s budget priorities.
The Panel also believes there are opportunities for the Board to
strengthen its fiduciary oversight of the Corporation and to be a source of
generative thinking that shapes CNCS’ policies and advances its mission. Yet, there remains a question of whether
the Board can effectively carry out these functions if it does not have some
role in developing the organization’s budget or the power to hire and remove the
CEO, who is charged with implementing the Board’s policies.
The Panel believes that action is
needed to enhance the Board’s ability to operate more like a governing board. The Board needs some form of leverage
over the CEO if it is to play an effective role in policymaking. The Board’s review of the CEO’s
performance management plan is a step in that direction. But the review is not mandatory, and the
Panel does not believe it is sufficient.
Legislative action is needed to formalize a meaningful role for the Board
in the selection and retention of the CEO.
The Panel also believes that formalizing the Board’s role in the budget
formulation process would strengthen its fiduciary oversight of the
Corporation. The Board should set
its expectations for CNCS’ budget prior to its formulation, and review the
budget submission to OMB and Congress.
Operational detail, however, as in the execution of the budget, should
not normally go before the Board.
The Panel recommends that CNCS submit a
legislative proposal that (1) requires the Board to review the CEO’s performance
annually and to forward to the President its recommendation to retain or remove
the CEO, and (2) requires the Board to review CNCS’ budget in advance of
submission to OMB and Congress.
Unless the CNCS Board is given
this authority, it cannot be an effective player in the governance of the Corporation. The Panel believes that if Congress opts
not to grant this authority, it should consider re-designating the Board as
advisory. Alternatively, Congress
should consider whether or not the Corporation needs a board, in light of the
fact that a government corporation is
not required to have one.
If Congress believes that CNCS
should retain its Board of Directors, the Panel believes that CNCS needs to
follow the advice of board management experts who have analyzed successful board
operations, and clearly define and document the Board’s roles and
responsibilities and its relationship to CNCS management. The nature of the Board’s roles and
responsibilities will depend on Congress’ determination regarding the type of
board the Corporation should have.
In any case, the Panel believes that the process to define the Board’s
specific roles and responsibilities would benefit from having CNCS stakeholder
involvement.
The Panel recommends that (1) the Board of
Directors, in conjunction with interested stakeholders, develop a realistic set
of governance guidelines that define
its roles and responsibilities and its relationship to CNCS management and (2)
the Board review and update the guidelines regularly.
Appointments to the CNCS Board of
Directors have not kept pace with the vacancies. And while it may not be necessary for
the Board to have the full complement of 15 members, when membership drops to
less than half, as it did in 2004, the Board’s ability to function is
weakened. The Panel believes that
the Board of Directors would be more effective if Board members were permitted
to serve in the absence of an appointed successor. Such a policy would be consistent with
the basic laws governing other boards
that the Academy staff examined.
The Panel recommends that the Corporation
propose legislation allowing Board members to serve until the Senate confirms
their successors.
A board’s primary source of
information should be the organization’s management team. Internal and external audits provide
checks and balances to the information supplied by management and enable a board
to perform its monitoring responsibilities. If a board has its own staff, the
organization is at risk of being directed by two heads, which is untenable.
A board’s information needs are
apt to change over time. Depending
on the issues facing an organization, a board may need expertise in strategic
planning, effective communications, recruitment, metrics, etc., in order to
inform its decision-making process.
Academy staff found numerous references to boards’ use of experts to meet
specific board needs at various times.
This allows a board to have the expertise it needs when it needs it. Within CNCS, the CEO should provide
these resources when required to inform
the Board’s decisionmaking.
However, the Panel does not believe the CNCS Board should require
additional resources on an ongoing basis to execute its responsibilities. Therefore, a permanent staff for the
Board is not needed, and any resource requirements should not require a separate
line item in the Corporation’s budget.
CHAPTER 3
STABILIZING SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND IMPROVING
THE MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTION OF THE CORPORATION’S
PROGRAMS
The senior leadership of any
organization must effectively balance both external and internal managerial
demands. In many federal agencies,
the top executive assumes responsibility for personally handling those aspects
of the business dealing with Congress, the Administration, and the agency’s
other key stakeholders, and the next in line has primary responsibility for
managing the agency’s internal operations.
In CNCS, the CEO is at the organization’s helm. There is no deputy to the CEO. Managing internal operations is the
responsibility of the chief operating officer (COO) and the chief financial
officer (CFO).
The current CEO, David Eisner,
has devoted a great deal of his time and attention focusing on the Corporation’s
external stakeholders, and congressional staff have praised him for his efforts
to actively engage them. However,
during most of his tenure at the Corporation, the CFO and COO positions have not
had permanent leaders in place.
Since August 2004, the deputy CFO for planning and program management has
assumed the financial management duties of the CFO. And for over a year, the COO position
remained vacant, with CEO Eisner performing the role of the COO. While an arrangement such as this can
function temporarily, it is not sustainable for a long period of time, as it is
not possible for any one individual to navigate the entire ship effectively and,
at the same time, run the engine room.
This chapter examines the need for strong, stable leadership in the
Corporation’s senior management positions.
CNCS’ headquarters offices are
responsible for setting policy and direction for the Corporation’s
programs. However, selecting,
overseeing, and monitoring the service providers who ultimately receive CNCS
grant funds to run programs within communities is, for the most part, the task
of a large network of CNCS state offices and state agencies located in every
state. The two pieces of
legislation that govern the
Corporation—the Domestic Volunteer Service Act (DVSA) of 1973 and the National
Community Service Trust Act (NCSA) of 1993, as amended—dictate CNCS’ field
structure and the roles and responsibilities of its staff, the state agencies,
and other entities that oversee the implementation of CNCS’ programs. The Corporation’s five major programs
differ significantly in how their programs are managed, due, in large part, to
basic design flaws in the 1993 legislation, as discussed in Chapter 1.
Since Mr. Eisner assumed the CEO
position, he has spearheaded numerous change management initiatives throughout
the Corporation. CNCS is looking at
how to improve everything from its recruitment and grant-making practices to its
automated systems and customer service mechanisms. But, despite some efforts, there have
been few changes resulting from a strategic examination of how the programs are
managed and implemented, and whether opportunities exist for change that would
help CNCS more effectively support the local communities it is trying to
serve. This chapter also examines
how CNCS manages and implements its programs; the roles and responsibilities of
its staff; and how the Corporation oversees and integrates the vast network of
field organizations responsible for managing its programs.
The Corporation’s authorizing
legislation states that it shall have a CEO as the agency head reporting to a
Board of Directors, two managing directors, and a CFO, all of whom are to be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Over the years, the composition of this
senior leadership team has evolved.
Currently reporting to the CEO are two major organizational units—the
CFO’s office and the COO’s office.
The COO position is a CEO appointment rather than a presidential
appointment. Also reporting to the
CEO are the chief information officer (CIO),
the chief human capital officer, and several other small staff offices. In addition, the inspector general (IG),
who is appointed by the President, is under the general supervision of the
CEO. Figure 2 on the next page
shows the CNCS organization chart for its headquarters operations.
The COO position is a 5-year term
appointment. The COO supervises the
five major program offices (AmeriCorps*State/National, AmeriCorps*VISTA,
AmeriCorps*NCCC, Senior Corps, and Learn and Serve); the Office of Field
Liaison, which is responsible for the Corporation’s state offices; the Office of
Leadership Development and Training; the Office of Grants Policy and Operations;
and the Director of Award Oversight and Monitoring. The directors of the five program
offices are discretionary appointments. A new director of VISTA reported to CNCS in August 2005. The other four program office directors
have been with CNCS for several years.
The CFO’s organization is
comprised of two offices. The
deputy CFO for financial management is responsible for accounting and financial
reporting, procurement, administrative services, and five service centers that
are located in the field. The
deputy CFO for planning and program management is responsible for the budget
functions and grants management.
That position is a discretionary appointment.
The CEO, COO, CFO, and heads of
the major offices comprise the Corporation’s executive team. They meet regularly to share
information, discuss issues facing the organization, and participate in the
corporate decision-making process.
Figure 2
CNCS ORGANIZATION CHART
Like many federal organizations,
CNCS has experienced a high incidence of turnover in its top management
positions. The average tenure of
its four CEOs has been about two-and-a half years. For its three CFOs, the average tenure
was less than two years, and for the two COOs it was about two-and-a half
years. Although the time needed to fill the CEO
position has been relatively short—10 months or less—and it took only 6 months
to replace CNCS’ first COO, it took 17 months to hire the current COO who
reported to CNCS in July 2005.
Likewise, the time needed to fill the CFO position has often been
lengthy. After the first CFO
departed, it was 16 months before the next CFO arrived at the Corporation. When he departed, it took a year and
eight months before the last CFO reported for work.
For the past year-and-a half, the
Corporation’s top leadership has been particularly shorthanded. When the prior COO departed in February
2004, the then CFO, who arrived at CNCS in September 2002, was appointed as the
acting COO. But she left CNCS in
August 2004. Since then, the CEO
has delegated to the deputy CFO for planning and program management the
authority to perform major financial management functions. However, for the next 11 months, the CEO
made no such delegation for the COO position, and the CEO and other members of
his immediate staff performed the COO’s duties. This has had some negative managerial
consequences. With no one in the
COO position, everything generated by the COO’s organization went to the CEO for
final approval. Before reaching the
CEO, grants packages, memos, guidance letters to grantees, etc. were generally
circulated for review among various members of the executive team and the CEO’s
personal staff. This process placed
an additional managerial burden on the CEO and those involved in these
reviews. In addition, these reviews
were generally performed consecutively, which lengthened the timeframe for
getting things completed.
Perhaps even more important,
without a leader at its helm, the COO program and office directors have not been
functioning as a management team to address issues and priorities that affect
the COO’s organization. The CEO has
worked with offices individually to address issues within program areas. But there is little evidence that the
senior managers in the COO’s office have collectively focused their attention on
the overall operations and management of the office.
On the business side of the
house, the Antideficiency Act violation
has dominated the Corporation’s agenda for the past couple of years. The last CFO and the CEO directed
considerable energy and resources toward improving the management of the
National Service Trust, the Corporation’s overall budget and financial
operations, and its grant-making activities. Although the acting CFO is moving
forward with improvement efforts, the financial management work of the CFO’s
office continues to command much of the CEO’s time and attention. Academy staff have observed a need for
greater focus and leadership for the other administrative functions within the
CFO’s office that provide critical support to the primary business of the
organization.
Filling these two critical
management positions has been a lengthy process. The CEO did not advertise to replace the
COO until almost one year after the vacancy occurred. As noted above, the new COO reported in
July 2005. For the CFO position,
CNCS has had to work through the political appointment process. The White House personnel office has
offered names of possible candidates to the CEO, but the individuals either
accepted appointments in other agencies or did not have the experience the CEO
believed was needed to handle the financial management challenges facing the
agency. The White House has
provided CNCS with the names of additional candidates, and the CEO hopes to fill
this position in the near future.
For the most part, CNCS fulfills
its mission by awarding grants
and providing training and technical assistance (T/TA) to organizations that
oversee or directly run national and community service programs. The resulting organizational structure
includes a myriad of organizations at the federal and state levels located
across the country that award, manage, and oversee these grants. All of the CNCS program offices and
state offices that make grant awards or provide other assistance to grantees and
program sponsors report to the COO.
The older DVSA programs—Senior
Corps and AmeriCorps*VISTA—are managed through
a distributed system of CNCS state offices. Both programs have headquarters offices
that are responsible for policymaking and overall program management. But CNCS’ state offices are responsible
for awarding Senior Corps grants and allocating VISTA service years (VSYs) to grant and project
applicants, and the state offices monitor the performance of the service
providers.
The 1993 legislation required
CNCS to designate one employee for each state or group of states to serve as the
Corporation’s representative for that state or group of states. The field structure must include a CNCS
office for each state that is located in or in reasonable proximity to each
state. The result has been the
creation of 48 state offices (including offices for Puerto Rico and the
District of
Columbia), each headed by a state office director. Seven states are part of combined
offices (Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Maine; North Dakota and South
Dakota; Maryland and Delaware). If the state offices were fully staffed
to their 163 staff allocation, office size would range from 1 (District of Columbia, Nebraska, Alaska,
Hawaii, Wyoming) to 10 (California), with an average of three
employees. CNCS has divided the
states into five clusters and appointed area managers for each cluster to
provide management and direction at a regional level. In FY 2005, CNCS has 170 of its 636
permanent positions (over 25 percent) allocated to the state offices.
The 1998 Academy Panel
recommended that the Corporation eliminate its state office structure and create
regional offices in order to strengthen the Corporation’s field presence and
improve its ability to plan and use its workforce effectively. As a step in that direction, the
Corporation tried to consolidate some of its state offices, but was prevented
from doing so by congressional action, reflecting member concerns that certain
states would not receive appropriate levels of service.
Within the CFO’s organization,
the Corporation has five service centers that provide the clusters with grant
award and management services for VISTA and
Senior Corps programs. In addition
to grant management activities, the service centers also provide to the state
offices administrative support, e.g., processing timesheets, travel vouchers,
and procurement requests. For some
of these activities, such as processing timesheets, the centers perform a
pass-through function, i.e., they collect and forward timesheets to
headquarters. Figure 3 is a map of
CNCS’ field operations.
Figure 3
FIELD STRUCTURE MAP
Unlike the DVSA programs, which
have policy offices in headquarters and use CNCS state offices for program
implementation, the locus of CNCS program management and oversight for the
AmeriCorps*State/National programs is in CNCS headquarters. Staff in the AmeriCorps Direct unit of
the AmeriCorps program office award AmeriCorps*National grants directly to
service providers, and AmeriCorps program officers are responsible for
monitoring and providing technical assistance to those grantees.
Under the 1993 Act, states are
required to establish independent, nonpartisan commissions or alternative
administrative entities (AAEs) to receive and distribute AmeriCorps*State grants
from CNCS. In effect, the
commissions/AAEs act as agents for the federal government in approving and monitoring
AmeriCorps*State projects. The
Corporation approves the designation of a state commission or AAE participating
in the AmeriCorps*State program.
The commissions are to include
from 15 to 25 bipartisan members who are appointed by the state’s chief
executive officer for 3-year staggered terms, plus each state’s school
superintendent, which is not a staggered term. A CNCS state representative—usually the
state office director—also serves in an ex officio capacity. The legislation provides criteria and
identifies sources for commission members, such as expertise in youth education,
training, and development; and experience in promoting older adult involvement
in service and volunteerism. In
addition to commissioners, state commissions are staffed with an executive
director and additional staff as determined by each state. In some states, the governor appoints the executive director. In others, the commissioners select that
individual. Commission staff may be
political appointees or civil service employees, depending on the state. The authorizing statute gives the
Corporation no voice in the composition of the commissions or in the selection
of the commissioners or the commissions’ staffs.
AmeriCorps program officers in
the AmeriCorps
State unit are responsible
for monitoring the commissions’ performance by conducting administrative
standards reviews. In recent years, the AmeriCorps program
office has increasingly called upon state office staff to participate in the
administrative standards reviews.
The state offices also help monitor AmeriCorps Education Awards Program
grants and sites of AmeriCorps*National grants, and have performed work for
other NCSA grants, including the assumption of program officer responsibility
for half of the Corporation’s Next Generation Grants, and reviewing applications
and answering applicants’ questions for Disability Outreach Grants.
State education agencies (SEAs)
administer the formula-based K-12 funds of the Learn and Serve program. They apply for school-based K-12 grant
funds on behalf of local education agencies and other grant recipients. The Learn and Serve program office
competitively awards funds for community-based K-12 programs to state
commissions, national nonprofit organizations, and other grant-making entities,
which then manage those funds for CNCS.
The Learn and Serve program officers monitor the SEAs, state commissions
and other recipients of its school-and community-based K-12 funds. The headquarters office also awards
Learn and Serve higher education program grants through a national
competition. Higher education funds
go directly to individual colleges and universities or consortia of colleges and
universities. The Learn and Serve
program office manages these grants.
CNCS state offices are not involved with managing or overseeing Learn and
Serve grants.
NCCC was established as a
demonstration program to determine, among other things, whether residential
service programs administered by the federal government can significantly increase the support for
national and community service, and expand opportunities for young men and women
to perform meaningful acts of community service that enhance their own skills
while contributing to their understanding of civic responsibility. The NCCC authorizing legislation
requires the Corporation to conduct an analysis of NCCC’s effectiveness as a
service model. To date, CNCS has
not performed the required analysis.
Unlike CNCS’ other programs where
CNCS provides resources to grantees to recruit and supervise volunteers and
manage volunteer programs, NCCC staff at its five residential campuses actually
run service projects. They recruit
volunteers to live and train at the campuses; work with communities to develop
service projects; and serve as team leaders to supervise and work with the
members on projects. Each campus is
responsible for developing and managing projects within certain geographic
areas, but the areas do not correspond with the geographic boundaries of the
clusters, which manage the DVSA programs.
Figure 4 shows the NCCC regions.
NCCC funds less than 2 percent of
the Corporation’s total volunteer programs but is allocated 103 positions out of
a total of 642, representing 16 percent of the Corporation’s staffing. With its provision of housing, food,
clothing, subsistence, etc., in addition to an educational award for its
members, NCCC has the highest cost per member of all CNCS programs.
Figure 4
NCCC FIELD STRUCTURE MAP
CNCS’ strategic plan has as its
first strategic goal “meeting critical needs in local communities.” The Corporation’s multiple program
delivery mechanisms provide many avenues for its funds to enter a
community. Within any given
community, particularly in larger metropolitan areas, it is possible to find
numerous CNCS grant recipients, some of whom are pursuing similar programmatic
goals using different CNCS funding streams. During this study, Academy staff found
that grantees have different levels of understanding of the Corporation’s
programs, and many levels of interaction and working relationships exist between
the Corporation’s grantees.
Likewise, the degree of collaboration and the working relationships among
the Corporation’s program offices, and their interactions with the numerous
organizations charged with managing the Corporation’s programs are equally
diverse.
Some grantees interviewed said
they were having no difficulty accessing CNCS’ multiple funding streams and
working with the various CNCS offices.
They saw no need for greater coordination between CNCS’ programs. Other grantees who received resources
from a single CNCS program indicated that they were aware of CNCS’ other
programs but were not interested in obtaining funding from them. They did not believe CNCS’ other streams
of service met their needs, or they just wanted to focus on what had been
successful. Likewise, some grantees
believed that they had adequate coordination with and knowledge of other program
in their geographic areas.
Grantees cited joint training
events as the activities most likely to bring CNCS grantees together. When CNCS programs provide annual
grantee training, they try to open such events to grantees from all CNCS
programs. In order for states to
obtain Senior Corps training dollars, they must provide cross-stream
training. However, statutory
restrictions on using funds appropriated for one program to train grantees of
another program have limited such joint activities. Many grantees and CNCS staff have
commented that this is a problem.
Currently, CNCS has only one small fund under Subtitle H of the 1993 Act
that can be used for cross-program training. Most training dollars come from program
funds. Because of the statutory
restriction, T/TA providers for an event that is funded by more than one program
must account by each funding source for their deliverables and who they
trained. One CNCS official
commented that this has created an “accounting nightmare” for the trainers, and
that the administrative money in the T/TA grants is not adequate for that level
of administrative effort.
Many state commissions and CNCS
state offices co-sponsor joint training sessions and conferences for all
grantees, sponsors, and other participants in service and volunteerism
activities. For example:
·
In Virginia, the state commission, CNCS state
office, and SEA work together to host an annual conference that brings together
all streams of service.
·
In FY 2004, the Iowa State Office and the Iowa
Commission on Volunteer Service sponsored its first super conference for all
program streams.
·
The Oregon State Office and Oregon Commission for
Voluntary Action and Service annually conduct or coordinate many joint
opportunities for members, including the NW Service Symposium, NW Leader Corps,
and civic engagement training. They
also conduct joint training for AmeriCorps, AmeriCorp*VISTA, and Senior Corps project directors—Network NW—that
includes participants from four states and CNCS headquarters staff.
·
Each year, the New Hampshire State Office, which
serves the states of Maine, NH, and Vermont, works with the
commissions of those states to plan a Tri-State National Service
Conference. Over 160 people attend
the conference each year from all CNCS programs.
·
In Missouri, the CNCS state office has partnered
with the state commission and SEA to sponsor a one-day, pre-application workshop
to educate potential grantees about the Corporation and its programs and to
encourage joint venturing. The
state office sent information about the workshop to anyone it could identify to
stimulate attendance. The goals of
the workshop are to promote higher quality projects and, therefore, better
project outcomes, by encouraging organizations to work together.
Until recently, current
information on CNCS-funded activities has not been easily accessible. Each entity responsible for awarding
CNCS grants—the state commissions, SEAs and the CNCS offices—had information on
its programs, but there was no one place to obtain information on other
CNCS-funded programs. However, the
Office of Public Affairs obtained FY 2004 year-end funding to redesign the
Corporation’s six websites, link them, and make them more user-friendly. As part of the redesign, Public Affairs
updated on the website the state profiles for 2004-2005. The profiles provide an overview of CNCS
activities in each state, including the total number of projects, participants,
and program funding for each CNCS program type. For the AmeriCorps*State/National,
AmeriCorps*VISTA, Senior Corps, and Learn and
Serve programs, the profiles also include a list of the name, sponsor
organization, primary city, and number of participants/members for each grant
award. In addition, the website
provides contact information for each of the Corporation’s programs.
At least some level of
collaboration between the CNCS state offices and state commissions was evident
in the states the Academy staff visited.
The degree to which state offices interact with SEAs, however, is
noticeably less. Academy staff also
found examples elsewhere of collaboration in the field among CNCS’ streams of
service. For example:
- Many
of the states Academy staff visited indicated that the state commission and
state office collaborate for their states’ Martin Luther King (MLK) Day
activities. In
Oregon in FY
2004, MLK Day mini-grants were awarded for local projects demonstrating
collaboration between at least two streams of service.
- In
Oregon, the state commission includes
AmeriCorps*VISTA and Senior Corps projects on
its website.
- Several
states, including Iowa, Oregon, and Ohio have joint staff retreats. In Iowa, the SEA also participates in the
retreat.
- In
Montana, the state office helped the
commission obtain $30,000 to expand civic engagement and volunteerism
activities throughout the state, and over $50,000 in matching resources that
allowed all Senior Corps directors and VISTA
supervisors to attend training events without charge.
- When
the New Hampshire commission was struggling
to develop its Citizen Corps Council because of insufficient funding and
staffing, the CNCS state office offered VISTA
support. State office staff
worked with the local chapter of the American Red Cross to develop a regional
VISTA project that included one member
assigned to the Citizen Corps Council.
That collaboration provided the necessary resources to jumpstart the
commission’s efforts, and today, the commission has established over 30 local
Citizen Corps Councils. In the
summer of 2004, when FEMA asked Citizen Corps to provide volunteers to help
with hurricane disasters, the State of New
Hampshire was able to recruit more than 50 percent of the nation’s
FEMA disaster volunteers, all of whom were screened and recruited by the
VISTA member and state commission.
Of the states the Academy staff
visited, Ohio’s field service delivery system provides
the most notable example of close collaboration and coordination between the
state office and state commission.
The offices are colocated in the same space, and the staffs interact
daily with one another. They hold
monthly joint staff meetings and have three committees—administrative, program,
and communications. Every staff
person is on a committee. The
staffs work together to plan joint retreats, volunteer programs to support the
activities of both organizations, and an annual statewide conference; examine
issues such as joint monitoring and information sharing related to potential
grantees; and identify opportunities to improve communications. Their efforts are continually focused on
pulling together as many program sponsors as possible in the events they
host. The staffs report having a
good understanding of each others’ programs and close working
relationships.
With respect to program
management, Academy staff found that, historically, interaction among CNCS
offices has been relatively minimal.
There has been little coordination between NCCC and other CNCS
programs. One CNCS official
reported that in the early years, program coordination was actively discouraged
due to concerns about mixing program funds. One NCCC official commented that NCCC is
a catalyst. It is “the flint to get
things started in a community.” But
NCCC is often an afterthought, and not perceived as a resource by the rest of
the organization.
In the past couple of years, NCCC
leadership reports that it has encouraged more cooperation and coordination with
other programs. NCCC has increased
its efforts to coordinate with the state offices. It sends its campus directors to cluster
meetings of the state office directors and to training offered by state
offices. The North Central area
manager directed his state offices to make more effective use of NCCC
teams. In FY 2004, each state in
the cluster had at least one NCCC project deployed via a state office
initiative.
The Corporation’s Learn and Serve
activities are not well integrated with the rest of the Corporation’s
programs. Academy staff found
instances where service learning programs are being funded by AmeriCorps*State
grants. But there is no mechanism
to share that information with the Learn and Serve office or to inform the
grantees of each other’s programs.
At one time, CNCS had a service learning working group that included
members from various CNCS offices who met to coordinate service learning
programs, but it no longer meets.
This lack of coordination results in missed opportunities for programs to
network with one another, share best practices, and leverage their resources at
the grassroots level.
Until recently, there has been
relatively limited cross fertilization between state office staff and AmeriCorps
and Learn and Serve program officers with respect to program management. Some state office employees interviewed
commented that the state office staff do not routinely hear about what happens
in non-DVSA programs. They also
report that staff from those headquarters offices have sometimes visited their
states and not informed the state office.
Until recently,
AmeriCorps*State/National, Learn and Serve, and AmeriCorps*NCCC rarely
participated in the area managers’ monthly cluster conference calls. Without such interaction, it has been
difficult for them to understand each other’s programs and identify ways in
which the various streams of service can be better coordinated. Some program officers with whom Academy
staff spoke believe they have a good understanding of CNCS’ programs and are
comfortable with the idea of assisting grantees in designing a program that
might include more than one CNCS program, but most are not.
In the last few months, there has
been a noticeable increase in the interaction between state office and
AmeriCorps staffs. NCCC campus
employees and AmeriCorps staff participate more regularly on the cluster
conference calls.
Despite the examples of
successful program coordination in the field, cited above, Academy staff also
found evidence that grantees were not satisfied with the level of coordination
between CNCS programs. One CNCS
official noted that at a recent meeting of AmeriCorps*State and
AmeriCorps*National grantees, participants discussed how much they could gain
from collaborating with one another.
During their field visits, Academy staff heard similar comments from
grantees who wanted to know more about other service programs in their
areas.
Many grantees interviewed said
that would like to have more interaction with other CNCS grantees. They also expressed a desire to learn
more about other CNCS programs and how these programs might enhance the
grantee’s efforts. For example, a
Senior Corps grantee running a service learning program was not aware of the
SEA’s work with the Corporation’s Learn and Serve programs. One grantee suggested that perhaps CNCS
needed to have an information session on its streams of service. During their interviews, Academy staff
often found themselves providing grantees with information about CNCS’ programs,
how other grantees were using multiple streams of service in their programs, and
who to contact for more information.
Still other grantees, who were aware of or used multiple CNCS funding
streams, found the different application processes, timetables, and program
requirements to be cumbersome and restrictive. One grantee with an AmeriCorps*State and
AmeriCorps*VISTA grant noted that having to report to two different entities—the
state commission and CNCS state office—sometimes makes it complicated to run the
dual service streams.
Academy staff also learned that,
although much improved since the Academy’s 1998 study, problems still exist in
the working relationships between some CNCS state offices and state
commissions. A senior CNCS official
informed Academy staff that in one state where the two entities are located in
the same building, there is not much collaboration. The official attributed this partly to
the personalities of the individuals involved. Several CNCS staff commented that the
ability of some state offices and state commissions to build strong working
relationships also is affected by the high turnover among commission staff who
often serve at the pleasure of the governor.
CNCS staff interviewed generally
agreed that the Corporation has not coordinated well across its streams of
service, and they were unanimous in supporting the need for better coordination
among CNCS’ programs—for both the organizations responsible for managing CNCS’
programs and CNCS’ grantees.
However, Academy staff identified barriers to effective program
coordination. One barrier stems
from the lack of a uniform philosophy on how to conduct business. Several CNCS staff believe that the
Corporation sends a mixed message as to whether coordination and collaboration
are the desired way of doing business.
Others believe there is still staff resistance to breaking down the
program stovepipes. Several state
office staff commented that it appears that people in headquarters “don’t even
know what the person down the hall is doing,” let alone have an understanding of
what is taking place in the field.
Other barriers stem from programmatic differences in policies and
procedures. One state office that
did some joint monitoring with the state commission found that it was not very
successful because the monitoring protocols for AmeriCorps and DVSA programs are
different. In trying to do joint
programming with AmeriCorps*State and AmeriCorps*VISTA, they found it difficult to integrate the grant
cycles of the two programs.
In the past year, CNCS has made
changes in its operations that present opportunities to improve interactions
between its programs.
There have been recent efforts to
increase interactions between the AmeriCorps program office and the state
offices. At the CEO’s urging, the
director of AmeriCorps and director of the Office of Field Liaison are
developing new protocols for AmeriCorps program officers and state office staff
to work together more closely and to strengthen the connections between their
offices. For example:
- The
AmeriCorps programs officers are to notify the state office prior to visiting
a state, and are being encouraged to visit the CNCS state office during those
visits.
- State
office staff coming to headquarters are expected to contact their states’
AmeriCorps program officer in advance to arrange a meeting.
- The
AmeriCorps*State program officers are to call each of their state offices on a
biweekly basis to share information of mutual interest.
- The
director of AmeriCorps, or one of her two deputy directors, will participate
during the weekly area manager conference calls.
The offices have formed a task
force of AmeriCorps and state office staff to further develop and refine the
protocols.
The AmeriCorps*State/National
program was created as a headquarters-managed program. Unlike the DVSA programs (Senior Corps
and VISTA), which have policy offices in
headquarters and use CNCS’ state offices for program implementation, AmeriCorps
staff in headquarters are responsible for policy development and program
implementation.
With the dissolution of its
Recruitment Office in October 2004,
CNCS reassigned to the AmeriCorps program office five of the recruitment
officers who were located in service centers (two in Chicago, one in Atlanta, and two in Dallas).
These individuals have remained in the field but are now AmeriCorps
program officers. Four of the
out-stationed program officers carry a portfolio of state commissions. The fifth program officer works with
national direct grants. In
addition, CNCS approved a request by an AmeriCorps*State program officer working
in headquarters to relocate in California. She is now located in the service center
in Oakland.
The out-stationing of AmeriCorps
program officers to the field presents additional opportunities to increase the
DVSA and NCSA staffs’ understanding of the other’s programs, and to establish
new working relationships to meet states’ needs. Another of the new protocols between the
AmeriCorps office and the Office of Field Liaison provides that the state
offices can/should invite the out-stationed AmeriCorps program officers to join
in DVSA compliance review visits and to participate in monthly cluster
conference calls.
Having AmeriCorps staff located
in the field will make them more accessible to the state commissions and closer
to the work on the ground. But some
state commissions have expressed concern about not having their program officers
located in headquarters. They see
the locus of power for the AmeriCorps program being in Washington, DC, and are
concerned that their interests will not be as well represented if their program
officers do not have what they perceive to be ready access to the
decisionmakers. AmeriCorps senior
managers must become proficient in managing a virtual office in order to address
these concerns. Technology allows
organizations to have effective supervisory relationships from a distance. But having a virtual office requires
both supervisors and staff to change how they operate to ensure that the office
runs as a single entity, and that all staff are informed and engaged in the
office’s operations.
The 1993 Act appears to recognize
the value of collaboration among service providers in its requirement that every
three years, each state commission submit a service plan for its state and
update it annually. The commissions
are to develop plans using “an open and public process” and providing “for
maximum participation and input from national service programs within the state
and other interested members of the public.”
Starting in 1998, the Corporation
required each state to develop a unified state plan (USP) that links all
Corporation programs and provides avenues for collaboration among all service
streams. Unfortunately, CNCS’
momentum for the 2002-2005 USP process waned. All state commissions submitted plans,
but CNCS did not follow through to review them and provide feedback to the
commissions. It was not until May
2004 that CNCS started to send letters to the state commissions regarding the
plans submitted in 2002. One state
commission executive director commented that CNCS appears to have shifted its
focus away from coordination among the streams of service.
The Corporation is taking steps
to refocus on the states’ need to coordinate their service programs. It now requires that state commissions
develop a state service plan, and has formed a task force to develop new
guidance to the state commissions for submitting those plans. The plans, which are to be submitted as
part of each state commission’s administrative application for FY 2006, are to
provide information regarding ongoing efforts or special initiatives that
involve collaboration with key stakeholders, including the Corporation’s state
office, the SEA, and other service partners. Unlike its predecessor, the USP, the
state service plan is not intended to be a comprehensive strategic plan or an
in-depth implementation document.
The state service plan must
address three areas:
1.
the specific programmatic areas the state is focusing
on
2.
the ongoing efforts or special initiatives that involve
collaboration with the Corporation state office, SEA, state networks of
volunteer centers, Campus Compacts, national grantees and/or other service
organization in planning for and implementing the state service plan
3.
technical assistance needed from the Corporation to help
implement the plan
To address the issue of
timeliness, CNCS has established a timeline for reviewing the plans. Upon receipt, the plans will be
forwarded to the area manager who oversees the Corporation’s activities in the
state. The area manager is
responsible for assembling a team to review the plan and providing feedback to
the state. The team is to consist
of a state program director or state program specialist from the cluster, but
not from the state that submitted the plan, the AmeriCorps program officer
responsible for the state, and a representative from Learn and Serve (at the
discretion of that office). The
team will evaluate the plan against established criteria and draft a response to
the commission. After an internal
review process, the area manager is to send to the commission the final letter
on behalf of the Corporation within 8 to 10 weeks of receiving the plan.
At the time of the 1998 Academy
study, state office directors rotated through the area manager positions for
two-year terms. Since that time,
these positions have been established as continuing positions into which
incumbents have been recruited.
When CNCS decided to make the area manager positions permanent
assignments, the city where the state office directors chosen for those
positions were located became the site for the area managers’ offices. Staff at the California state commission noted that the commission has
very little contact with the area manager for the Pacific Cluster who is located
in Utah. They believe that given the size and
level of CNCS activity in California, the area
manager should be located in California.
None of the area managers are
full time. Four area managers, by
their choice, also are state office directors. However, they spend little time
performing state office director duties.
In these blended positions, the area managers rely more heavily on their
state program specialists to handle the state office workload, and they
sometimes struggle to focus on their combined responsibilities. The fifth area manager is not a state
office director, but she has other national responsibilities as the field
liaison for tribal programs. None
of the area managers carries project portfolios.
Academy staff found that for the
DVSA programs, the area managers act like virtual regional administrators with
respect to assigning work, detailing staff across state lines, and reallocating
among the states resources, such as VSYs and travel dollars. Although there is some sensitivity in
Congress surrounding this subject, area managers have not experienced push back
when these decisions are made.
As noted earlier, state office
staff are increasingly becoming involved in NCSA programs. But the area managers have had no
defined role for CNCS’ non-DVSA programs.
This has begun to change with the new procedures for developing state
service plans, which make the area managers responsible for communicating to the
state commissions the Corporation’s assessment of their plans. The new protocols between AmeriCorps and
the state offices also recognize some of the state offices’ NCSA activities,
such as state office staff participation on commission administrative standards
review teams and assistance with AmeriCorps*National grants monitoring. But these responsibilities are not
reflected in any Corporation organizational manual. There also is nothing that documents the
state office directors’ and area managers’ responsibility and accountability for
the work their staff perform for NCSA activities.
The Corporation’s top leadership
team has evolved from what the authors of the Corporation’s authorizing
legislation originally envisioned.
The CEO and CFO positions remain, but the two managing director positions
have been replaced with a COO. The
Panel believes that this top management structure can work effectively for the
Corporation. For this to happen,
CNCS needs a strong top leadership team composed of individuals with a
commitment to the organization’s mission and the managerial and technical
expertise to effectively manage the work of the offices they supervise. Lengthy delays in filling both the COO
and CFO positions have hampered the CEO’s ability to effectively manage the
organization effectively and to initiate the change management efforts needed to
make CNCS a high-performing organization.
When vacancies arise, the Corporation must fill these positions more
expeditiously.
The Panel believes that the
requirement for a presidentially-appointed CFO hinders CNCS’ ability to fill
this key position in a timely manner.
In addition to the expected delays any organization faces when it has to
rely on the political appointment process, CNCS is handicapped in the hiring
process by its size and stature within the federal bureaucracy. High-quality candidates for presidential
appointments are likely to accept positions in larger, more prestigious federal
departments and agencies, rather than in a small organization such as CNCS. When this happened recently, it delayed
the hiring process for the CFO position.
The Panel believes that CNCS needs the ability to recruit nationwide for
this key position in order to expand its pool of high-quality candidates.
Having a presidentially-appointed
CFO also creates a lopsided balance within the top management team. The two key managers running the
organization’s internal operations—the COO and CFO—do not have parallel
appointments, which can affect the dynamics of their working relationship. The CFO’s office is responsible for
providing the administrative support the COO’s office needs to perform its
job. And the COO’s office must
cooperate with the CFO’s office and provide the information necessary for the
latter to do its work. The Panel
believes that parity between the leaders of those two organizations is important
to creating a good working environment within the management team and throughout
the organization.
The Panel recommends that CNCS submit a
legislative proposal to eliminate the Corporation’s two managing director
positions and the requirement that the President appoint the Chief Financial
Officer. If CNCS is not able to
eliminate the presidential appointment of its CFO, the Panel recommends that it
(1) limit the CFO’s responsibilities to the financial management functions
outlined in the Corporation’s legislation, and (2) establish a Chief
Administrative Officer position, appointed by the CEO, to manage the
Corporation’s other administrative functions that currently report to the
CFO.
The biggest management challenge
the Corporation has had to cope with during the past year and a half has been
the lengthy vacancy in the COO position, which provides leadership and oversight
to the Corporation’s programs. The
Panel believes that the absence of this key management official has negatively
impacted the management and operational effectiveness of the COO’s office, and
handicapped the organization and the CEO’s efforts to improve CNCS’
operations. Although the CEO and
other key staff have worked hard to move the organization forward, without
strong dedicated leadership in the COO’s office, the change management process
has been difficult. The Panel is
pleased that the Corporation has recently hired a new COO. However, she faces numerous
challenges. The Panel believes that
a priority for the new COO must be a comprehensive assessment of her
organization that examines organizational structures, roles, responsibilities,
operating procedures, and staff capabilities.
The organization and management
of CNCS’ programs and service delivery systems create unique challenges to the
Corporation achieving its goals to promote national and community service. The complex network of federal and state
offices, each with authority and responsibility for some aspects of program
implementation, presents a confusing picture to organizations wishing to
participate in the Corporation’s programs, and inhibits integrated service
delivery. While the Panel
recognizes that CNCS’ programs are designed for different purposes and try to
reach different constituents, there are significant areas where CNCS’ programs
overlap and complement one another.
The Panel found numerous examples in the field of coordination and
collaboration among CNCS’ various service streams. The Panel believes that the
Corporation’s organization and management need to support these efforts further
if CNCS is to use its available resources most effectively. To do so, the Corporation must address
some issues that were identified during the Academy’s 1998 study.
CNCS’ programs are still managed
in stovepipes. Although all CNCS
program offices report to the COO and are headquartered in Washington, DC, the Panel found few management mandates to
promote program interaction. In the
field, the organizational structure and management hierarchy of CNCS’ service
delivery organizations are not conducive to integrating programs and
establishing cohesive management teams.
The organization is still split
along the lines of old versus new programs. The management focal points for DVSA
programs are the state offices. The
area managers provide a regional perspective to those activities, and the
cluster structure gives CNCS’ small state offices an avenue to collaborate and
work with one another as a management team. The clusters also facilitate the sharing
of resources, and provide a forum where state office staff can have a voice in
the Corporation’s policies, explore new ways of doing business, and develop
professionally. However, there is
no comparable regional structure for the AmeriCorps*State/National and Learn and
Serve programs, which are managed by their headquarters offices. The program officers for these programs
are not assigned responsibility for states/programs based on location. Therefore, there is no group of
AmeriCorps and Learn and Serve program officers that works exclusively within
each cluster with whom the area managers can collaborate at a regional
level. Although AmeriCorps*NCCC has
a regional structure, the geographic boundaries of the NCCC campuses do not
conform to the cluster boundaries.
As an example, the Denver campus’ geographic boundaries overlap
three clusters. In addition, the
Corporation has not established operational linkages between the NCSA program
officers and state office staff, all of whom are integral to making CNCS’
programs successful, to help overcome the structural barriers between the
programs. For the most part,
headquarters program officers and state office staff are not well versed in each
other’s programs, even though the programs often work side by side in a
community and program members perform similar services.
Add to CNCS’ structural
complexities the statutory authorities of the state commissions and SEAs for
CNCS’ programs, and the management quandary becomes even more daunting. The state offices are expected to
provide assistance and work with the state commissions. But there is no mandate for the
commissions to collaborate with the state offices. The quality of state office/state
commission working relationships is largely dependent on personalities, a
situation which is complicated by the frequent turnover among state commission
staff. When asked, most people
agreed that the Corporation’s service delivery structure is problematic. As one state commission executive
director commented, “The overall structure of CNCS is a relic of history….The
infrastructure should be built around the delivery of national service programs
in the way that makes the most sense.”
The Panel agrees with this
assessment. While changing the
infrastructure for managing CNCS’ programs may not be a viable avenue to pursue
in the near term, if the organizational complexity is not addressed, CNCS will
continue to be hampered in its efforts to manage its programs effectively. The Panel believes that the nature of
the Corporation’s mission calls for a stronger field presence to promote,
develop, and institutionalize national service nationwide. To do so, CNCS needs to set a goal to
build a more comprehensive field structure—one that includes all of its
programs. Movement towards the
creation of a regional structure for NCSA programs would help managers
responsible for all of CNCS’ programs build relationships and linkages among
each other, and strengthen the interactions between the Corporation’s programs
on the ground.
The Panel believes that having
out-stationed AmeriCorps program officers in four cities across the country
offers the COO an opportunity to develop a regional style of operations for
AmeriCorps. By having staff in
closer proximity to the state commissions and CNCS state offices, the
Corporation can pilot test new approaches to accomplishing its overall
mission. The Panel also believes
that the findings from these pilot projects will have direct applicability to
the Learn and Serve program.
The Panel recommends that the COO use the
out-stationed AmeriCorps program officers for pilot projects to begin the data
gathering, dialogue, analysis, and planning needed to develop a field structure
proposal for the AmeriCorps and Learn and Serve programs.
The 1993 Act recognized the need
for collaboration among service providers with its requirement that state
commissions develop a state service plan in consultation with other service
providers and interested parties.
The Panel is pleased to see that the Corporation is renewing its efforts
to have the states develop state service plans, and believes that CNCS should
work towards making these plans key documents that help guide national and
community service efforts within each state. The Panel also believes that the
Corporation needs to mirror the intent of the service plans in how it manages
itself.
The Panel believes that CNCS’
program offices remain too focused on their own programs, i.e., they operate
from a constituency base and not a Corporation-wide perspective. As a result, CNCS misses opportunities
to help states and other grantees implement effective national and community
service programs. Particularly in
times where budgets do well just to stay flat, the COO needs to explore
alternative ways of doing business to ensure that CNCS provides resources and
other assistance that best meet the needs of its grantees. Part of each program offices’ efforts to
improve how they operate should involve looking throughout the organization to
see where other programs/resources can add value to their operations.
AmeriCorps and the Office of
Field Liaison are taking small steps in that direction. In the past, the geographic separations
between DVSA and NCSA staff and their lack of knowledge about each others’
programs have been barriers to program coordination. The new AmeriCorps program officers
located in the field provide an opportunity to reduce those barriers, giving
CNCS a more fertile environment within which to improve operations and better
achieve its mission. The Panel
believes that these types of exchanges should continue and expand to include all
CNCS program offices, and that the new COO needs to set clear expectations and a
mandate for better coordination within her organization.
The Panel recommends that the new COO
determine how/if new program coordination mechanisms can enhance her
organization’s operations, and hold program directors accountable for managing
accordingly.
The headquarters program office
directors have not had authority commensurate with their positions. For almost a year, the program office
directors have had little authority to issue even program-related
documents. The COO needs to
determine appropriate delegations of authority for the program office directors
and hold them accountable for their decisions.
The Panel recommends that the Chief
Operating Officer examine the nature of program office director positions to
determine appropriate delegations of authority.
The role of CNCS’ field staff is
not properly defined or recognized.
CNCS’ state offices are no longer exclusively dedicated to managing DVSA
programs. Resource constraints and
workload demands have caused the NCSA programs to call repeatedly on state
office staff to help with NCSA work.
As CNCS develops new ways of doing business, such as risk-based
monitoring, state office staff may have even more time to devote to NCSA
activities. If that occurs, CNCS
needs to capitalize on opportunities to utilize available staff resources in a
way that enhances the Corporation’s ability to meet its overall mission.
The Panel believes CNCS needs to
recognize that its state office staff are no longer devoted solely to DVSA
activities, and change the official functions of those offices. Refusal to recognize the state offices’
growing role in NCSA programs impacts resource decisions, continues to foster
the Corporation’s stovepipe approach to program management, and obscures
opportunities for program integration that can benefit its grantees. Just going through the process of
formally recognizing the role of state offices in NCSA programs may help break
down the stovepipes that characterize CNCS’ program offices. In addition, having a well-defined
planning process to assess work on an annual basis would better enable the
Office of Field Liaison to develop a workplan for the state offices.
As CNCS formally recognizes the
state office staff’s role in NCSA programs, it also must address the issues of
responsibility and accountability.
Staff who work on NCSA activities can and should be evaluated and held
responsible and accountable for that work.
CNCS also needs to address whether/how the state office directors and
area managers should be held responsible and accountable for their staffs’ NCSA
activities.
The Panel recommends that CNCS formally
define and recognize the role state office staff play in NCSA programs, and that
it establish an annual process to determine the state office staff resources
needed to perform those activities.
The Panel also recommends that CNCS define state office director and area
manager roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for holding them accountable
for NCSA activities performed by their staffs.
Navigating through CNCS’ various
streams of service to find programs that best suit their needs can be a
challenge for potential grantees, particularly small entities that are
unfamiliar with the Corporation.
While the Panel recognizes the valuable role the state commissions play
within CNCS’ service delivery infrastructure, it believes that CNCS needs its
own focal point in each state for information on all CNCS programs. The Panel believes CNCS’ state offices
are the logical choice for that function.
With that designation, state office staff may need some training so they
are capable of providing the necessary assistance to grantees and potential
grantees. As state office staff
continue to expand their involvement in NCSA activities per the new protocols
being developed by the AmeriCorps program office and the Office of Field
Liaison, the state staffs’ knowledge of CNCS’ programs will grow, increasing
their ability to help grantees better understand CNCS’ programs and navigate its
funding streams. They also will be
able to coordinate better with the state commissions, whose role is undiminished
by this action. And as CNCS moves
more towards risk-based monitoring, the state offices may have within existing
resources the capacity to assume this responsibility.
The Panel recommends that CNCS designate
the CNCS state offices as the Corporation’s focal points for information on all
CNCS programs, and provide state office staff with the necessary training,
materials, and resources needed to assist the Corporation’s grantees and
potential grantees.
The area manager positions are an
integral component of effective field office management. It is apparent that these positions
command essentially the full-time attention of the incumbents. The Panel believes CNCS should make all
five positions full time.
The Panel recommends that CNCS make the
area manager a full-time position.
Although the Panel cannot point
to a specific problem associated with the current physical locations of the area
managers, it believes that deciding where to locate these key field managers
should be based on some well-thought-out criteria, and not be determined by the
home towns of those who successfully compete for the positions.
The Panel recommends that CNCS determine
the optimal geographic locations in each cluster for its area managers and, in
the future, require the successful candidates to relocate to those
locations.
NCCC operates fairly autonomously
from the rest of the organization.
By all accounts, NCCC projects and its members appear to be valued by the
communities they serve. At the same
time, the NCCC service delivery model has the highest cost per member of any
program. The Corporation needs to
comply with its statutory requirement to evaluate the NCCC service model so that
it can determine the effectiveness of the model and ensure that the program is
appropriately resourced in relationship to CNCS’ other programs.
The Panel recommends that CNCS satisfy its
statutory obligation to evaluate NCCC as a service delivery model.
The limited funding for
cross-stream training activities inhibits the Corporation’s ability to bring
together grantees of its various programs to engage in activities that help them
better address local community needs.
In addition to restricting such activities, the need to maintain strict
controls by program for the use of training funds has imposed an unusual
administrative burden on Corporation staff who attempt to use funds in a
coordinated manner. The Panel
believes that the Corporation should pursue legislation to allow training funds,
regardless of their source, to be used across program lines.
The Panel recommends that CNCS propose
legislation that would enable it to use training funds for cross-program
training.
CHAPTER 4
RESTRUCTURING HEADQUARTERS FOR BETTER
MANAGEMENT
To be successful, agencies that
use grants to achieve their missions must have well-functioning grants
management operations. Within the
past two years, the Corporation’s headquarters office structure has changed, in
part, to correct weaknesses in CNCS’ grants functions. The result is that CNCS has multiple
offices sharing responsibility for portions of the Corporation’s grants policy
and operational activities, which diffuses authority for these functions and
impacts staff utilization and workload management.
The ultimate service providers
for the Corporation’s national and community service projects are the thousands
of members who volunteer their time to these endeavors. The Corporation recognizes that its
members require support and training during their terms of service, particularly
the young adults who are AmeriCorps and AmeriCorps*VISTA volunteers.
Currently, the responsibility for member support and training functions
is spread among several offices in headquarters and all of the state
offices. Opportunities to
restructure these activities could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
providing these services.
While grants management and
member support and training functions have multiple offices sharing
responsibility for pieces of those functions, CNCS has no office responsible for
other critical management functions, such as management analysis, policy
issuance, and the creation of an organization manual.
This chapter continues the
discussion in Chapter 3 on the Corporation’s management, and raises
organizational structure issues, which also impact on the Corporation’s
effectiveness.
To be effective, leaders of
organizations need the ability to collect data and analyze options as part of
the decision-making process. CNCS
has no office with the responsibility and capacity to perform these types of
analyses. Currently, the CEO must
rely on personal staff, consultants, GAO, or the IG for this critical analytical
assistance. Recently, the CEO asked
the general counsel to compile information on CNCS’ programmatic reporting
requirements and procedures for developing, clearing, and disseminating
policies; tasks typically assigned to a management analysis office.
Academy staff found several areas
where CNCS would be a stronger organization if it had an ongoing management
analysis capability. One area is
the development of workload justifications for the budget process. Academy staff found the support for
CNCS’ FY 2006 administrative budget to be unpersuasive and in need of better
analytic support. A management
analysis office typically can help develop workload-related data that can be
used for budget formulation and defense purposes. The result is an improved budget
justification that helps Congress better legislate.
The business practices of CNCS’
program offices are another area where analysis is needed. Currently, each program office has
developed its own way of doing business.
For example, each has its own grant applications, timelines, reporting
requirements, monitoring protocols, and in some cases, automated systems. This lack of uniformity stems, in part,
from the Corporation’s management style and organizational culture, as discussed
in the Academy’s 1998 report. CNCS’
programs tend to be administered in stovepipes, with little consultation or
collaboration between them. In
addition to wasted effort as each office “reinvents the wheel,” grantees and
stakeholders doing business with more than one of the Corporation’s program
offices are forced to deal with these different ways of doing business. Some grantees are able to negotiate
through the sometimes bewildering array of CNCS programs. However, other grantees advised Academy
staff that the program offices’ divergent business practices are a deterrent to
accessing CNCS’ multiple streams of service. A thorough analysis could help
standardize and streamline CNCS’ business practices.
As noted in Chapter 1 of this
report, CNCS is undertaking numerous organizational improvement
initiatives. The change management
efforts that are likely to result just from the Deloitte Consulting and Academy
studies will require a mechanism to identify, prioritize, plan, and track
them. Such a mechanism is essential
for ensuring that everyone in the organization has a clear understanding of what
top leadership is trying to accomplish.
It also is needed to enable management to assess the organization’s
capacity to address the issues identified and to prioritize the work to be
done. At present, there is no one
place within CNCS responsible for tracking the status of change management
initiatives, the responsible officials, project timetables, and the estimated
resources needed for these initiatives.
As a result, it is virtually impossible for CNCS’ top leadership to have
a complete picture of the efforts underway and a systematic way to determine if
the Corporation’s resources are being optimally used to address the most
critical issues. A management
analysis office could oversee the Corporation’s improvement initiatives and help
CNCS bring these efforts to fruition.
A management analysis office also
could manage other management activities that do not now have organizational
homes. CNCS has no organization
manual, and no office is responsible for developing/updating one. In addition, no mechanism exists in CNCS
to ensure that all documents presented to the CEO for decision are reviewed,
cleared, and/or commented on by all affected Corporation offices. Not all documents require the same level
of review and approval. For some
documents, concurrent reviews can be as effective as consecutive reviews,
provided there are mechanisms in place to ensure that all input is properly
assessed and incorporated.
A management analysis office
could provide much-needed management oversight to the Corporation’s
policy-making activities. CNCS has
no policy issuance system. Program
offices often disseminate policy direction using the Internet. For example, CNCS policy changes to the
no refill policy
for the AmeriCorps*State/National program was transmitted via e-mail to the
state commissions with the subject line, “Pilot AmeriCorps Member Refill
Policy.” Also transmitted via
e-mail were AmeriCorps’ new directions for the use of carryover funds, an issue
with potentially large financial implications for the state commissions.
While expedient, communicating
policy via e-mail has created problems for CNCS grantees and staff. Often, there is no follow-up from the
program offices to ensure that grantees received the new policy directives. The importance of e-mails is sometimes
overlooked by the intended recipient.
For example, one state commission interviewed does not remember receiving
the e-mail on the new refill policy.
The commission first heard about the new policy from one of its
grantees. Some CNCS staff report
that they are not always certain of the latest policy direction in a given
area. In order to determine the
current policy, they have had to find and read through several e-mails on a
topic.
In order to develop comprehensive
policy documents for its program, the AmeriCorps program office hired a
contractor to go through its e-mails to identify all policy-related
issuances. Also, as a result of the
Panel’s discussions with CNCS leadership on this subject, the CEO has directed
the general counsel’s office to perform a “policy gap analysis” to review CNCS’
published policies, prioritize those that need updating, and identify where
additional policy direction is needed.
In most federal agencies, this work is typically performed by a
management analysis office.
Grants management has two very
distinct yet integrated pieces—programmatic and fiscal. The programmatic aspect of grants
management deals with the technical content of the grant, i.e., whether the
grantee’s program is accomplishing the goals outlined in the grant award. The fiscal aspect of grants management
includes the creation of the grant award document and oversight of the financial
terms and conditions of the grant award.
When he arrived at CNCS in 2003,
CEO David Eisner was faced with problems in the Corporation’s grant-making
operations. The pause in
AmeriCorps, which occurred before Mr. Eisner’s arrival, had raised doubts among
CNCS’ grantees and stakeholders about the Corporation’s ability to manage its
programs. While the pause did not
affect other programs, it cast a broad shadow over the Corporation’s entire
grant-making operations.
Another problem was that
programmatic grants policies were not standardized. Unlike the fiscal side of grants
management, where the Office of Grants Management is responsible for all fiscal
grants policymaking, there was no corporate-wide policy that addressed the
programmatic aspects of CNCS’ grants management operations. At the front end of the process, each
program office had it own policies and procedures for the grant application
process, peer review, and selection.
The grant-award process was almost unanimously criticized for taking too
long. Post award, the program
offices also had their own monitoring and oversight practices, and the breadth
and depth of those activities differed widely by office. External reviews criticized CNCS’
oversight and monitoring practices, and CNCS’ Office of Inspector General listed
it as a reportable condition.
Resolving problems in CNCS’
grant-making operations has been one of the CEO’s top priorities.
In February 2004, the CEO created
the Grants Policy and Operations Office within the COO’s organization to
normalize across program offices their processes for peer and staff review of
grant applications; the process for executive team review of grant applications;
and the engagement of the Board of Directors in the grant review process. In addition to developing consistent
policies for these programmatic aspects of the grants management function, the
office has operational responsibility for managing and overseeing these
activities for all grant competitions. Three staff members perform this
work.
More recently, the CEO created a
new position reporting directly to the COO,
the Director of Award Oversight and Monitoring, to standardize CNCS’ risk
assessment and monitoring processes and address other weaknesses in the
Corporation’s monitoring activities.
The director, who reported to CNCS in June 2005, is a one-person office
and is working with an Award Oversight and Monitoring Council, whose members
represent all COO and CFO offices and the general counsel. It appears that their work will focus on
the fiscal and programmatic aspects of CNCS’ grant monitoring activities, with
the greatest emphasis on the latter.
With the creation of these two
new offices, responsibility for portions of CNCS’ fiscal and programmatic grants
policymaking rests in three different offices with different reporting
chains. The shaded boxes in Figure
2 highlight this fragmentation.
Some CNCS program staff have raised questions and concerns about the
division of responsibility for grant functions among these offices, citing the
potential for confusion and the need to respond to three different offices
during the lifecycle of a grant.
Responsibility for the fiscal
grants management operations is not consolidated in one office. It is divided among two different
offices, and the grants officers in those offices report through two different
chains of command.
·
Grants for DVSA programs are awarded by the
service centers, which report to the deputy CFO for financial management.
·
NCSA grants are awarded by the Office of Grants
Management (OGM), which reports to the deputy CFO for planning and program
management.
·
Learn and Serve formula grants are awarded by the
service centers and the rest of their grants are awarded by OGM.
Although the DVSA and Learn and
Serve formula grants awarded by the service centers are less complicated than
the AmeriCorps and Learn and Serve competitive grants awarded by OGM, all grants
involve the same basic work subject to the same federal financial policies and
procedures. Service center staff
reported that there are biweekly conference calls with OGM to help standardize
business practices. Nevertheless,
they identified conflicting policies emanating from OGM and the office of the
deputy CFO for financial management.
Service center staff report that the centers are not always adequately
consulted about proposed changes, and some policy changes issued by OGM do not
adequately take into consideration how the service centers operate.
Workload and staffing appear to
be an issue for both OGM and the service centers. OGM has called upon the service centers
to help it close out some of its grants because of a lack of resources. The Learn and Serve formula grants were
assigned to the service centers because OGM needed to reduce its workload. However, CNCS field staff have expressed
concerns about the capacity of the service centers’ grants officers to handle
the workload. When grants officers
in the service centers have left CNCS, the positions are often left
unfilled. There is a general sense
among field staff interviewed that the grants officers in the service centers
are spread too thin to perform effectively all of the duties required of
them.
Agencies use different models to
assign programmatic and fiscal grant management responsibilities. CNCS has separated those
responsibilities by position and organizational structure. Grants officers working for OGM and the
service centers have fiscal grants management responsibilities. Program officers working for the program
offices and the state offices have programmatic grants management
responsibility. The Grants Policy
and Operations Office also has programmatic responsibilities. It is responsible for administering
CNCS’ special initiative grants, including the Next Generation and Challenge
Grants.
There has been some overlap in
responsibilities between the program officers and grants officers. Program officers perform some basic
fiscal oversight of grantees and may answer both programmatic and fiscal
questions raised by grantees.
Historically, there have been
problems in the working relationship between program officers and grants
officers. Although some CNCS staff believe these
issues have diminished, others report that they continue to exist. Academy staff learned of a recent
instance where a grants officer visited a state commission for a week but did
not inform the program officer responsible for that state. Given the limited travel funds for
face-to-face visits, such operating protocols should be standard, giving program
officers the opportunity to have grants officers raise programmatic issues with
the grantee. When problems with a
grantee arise, the program and grants officers sometimes point to one another as
the reason why the problem is not promptly addressed.
Academy staff met with
representatives of several other federal agencies and eight state commissions to
learn how they are organized and manage their grant-making operations. Some of those findings are reported
below.
- The
National Science Foundation is structured similarly to CNCS. The grants officers in the Division of
Grants and Agreements handle the fiscal aspects of grant making. The program officers are located
almost exclusively in the program offices and do not have fiduciary
responsibility.
- The
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) of the Department of
Energy has separate offices for program officers and grants officers, but they
report within the same chain of command at the Golden Field Office. The Golden office is a dedicated field
implementation capability that provides common management services (project,
financial, legal, procurement) for EERE programs. The Golden office staff work with the
headquarters program offices to define project requirements in terms of work
required, cost, and timelines. It
implements projects by soliciting and evaluating proposals, awarding grants,
administering the awards, taking any corrective action required, and reporting
status and milestones until project completion.
- In
the Department of Education, the program officer is responsible for both the
programmatic and the financial aspects of grants management. The Finance Office makes the actual
grant awards.
- In
the Legal Services Corporation, grants and program officer responsibilities
are organized similarly to the Corporation. Program counsels, program analysts,
and financial specialists handle pre-award and post-award grant
activities. The counselors and
analysts, who report to the Office of Program Performance, work on the
programmatic aspects of the grants—equivalent to CNCS’ program officers. The financial specialists, who work
for the Office of the Comptroller, handle the financial status reports,
budgets, and other financial-related documents from grantees—equivalent to
CNCS’ grants officers. There does
not appear to be a concern about the delineation of programmatic and financial
aspects of grant functions because most staff have legal backgrounds.
- Of
the eight state commissions visited, seven had both program officers and
grants officers with responsibility for the programmatic and fiscal aspects of
grants management, respectively.
Clearly, there is no one way of
structuring the grants management function. Each of the other agencies contacted
reported no disadvantages to its way of doing business. Agencies with both program officers and
grants officers report that there is ongoing interaction between the two.
Academy staff asked several CNCS
staff their thoughts about combining the program and grants officers’ functions
into one position. Most responded
that they had some misgivings.
These staff members believe that the nature of the work performed by the
two existing positions is very different and requires individuals with different
backgrounds and skill sets. Many
believed that while the program officers need to have the ability to determine
if a grantee is in compliance with financial requirements, they do not have the
knowledge to do the technical aspects of grants management (making the awards,
doing financial audits, reconciliations, and close-outs).
One senior CNCS official noted a
significant disadvantage to CNCS’ current structure for program and grants
officers. Because the program and
grants officers report through separate organizational structures, the “right
people” are not always included in decision-making meetings. From an operational perspective, OGM
gets involved in the grant award process at the point where the program staff is
close to making final funding recommendations to the CEO. Once the program offices have identified
the pool of recipients, OGM examines each applicant’s proposed budget and
identifies for the program offices any budget issues related to compliance. Because their involvement in the grant
award process does not occur until the process is well underway, grants
management staff are not always included in program office meetings at earlier
stages in the process to help feed the discussion from a fiscal
perspective.
CNCS has announced its intent to
have AmeriCorps*State/National program officers be the all-around customer
service representatives at the Corporation for AmeriCorps’ partners, not just
for specific program activities, but for all aspects of their interactions with
the Corporation. Some of the state
commissions interviewed have questioned whether the new protocol will add a
layer of bureaucracy because program officers cannot answer technical grants
questions. When this is the case,
the program officer will have to go to a grants officer for answers.
The Corporation has not yet
clearly defined what this new program officer role entails, or developed a
strategy for how the change will occur.
Implementation of the new concept was on hold pending the hiring of an
associate director of policy for AmeriCorps, who will be responsible for
defining, in consultation with the other offices affected, the new roles and
responsibilities of the program officers.
The position was filled in July 2005.
The new program officer role will
undoubtedly affect CNCS customer relations. It also will impact the program
officer/grants officer working relationship. However, the extent of that impact
cannot be determined until the new roles and responsibilities are clearly
defined.
The Academy staff did not examine
in depth the Corporation’s volunteer member support and non-staff training
activities. These activities are
decentralized throughout CNCS’ program offices and the state offices, and each
office handles these functions differently. For training, the Office of Leadership
Development and Training (OLDT) is available to work with the program offices to
identify their learning needs for members, grantees, state commissions, etc.,
and to help develop strategies to meet the program offices’ objectives. When it was first formed, OLDT worked
primarily with the NCSA programs.
More recently, its responsibilities have expanded to include all CNCS
programs. However, the support OLDT
provides to each office depends on the program offices’ desires and their
internal capabilities to perform those functions themselves.
The Academy’s human resources
team’s position management studies
revealed opportunities to restructure member support and training activities for
AmeriCorps*VISTA, which could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these
activities. In the AmeriCorps*VISTA
program office, an 11-member Training/Member Support Office is responsible for
VISTA member recruitment, training, and support
activities. The current structure
and staffing for this unit is shown in Figure 5 on the next page.
The two vacant positions in the
Member Support Unit provide VISTA member transactional support (i.e., providing
information on VISTA member entitlement issues and helping resolve VISTA members’ benefit-related issues). The state office staff perform similar
administrative work for VISTA members. Academy staff found that this workload
contributes to CNCS concerns about the high administrative workload in the state
offices. The Office of Field Liaison and
AmeriCorps*VISTA have formed a working group to
examine how this work might be performed more efficiently.
Interviews revealed that the
current incumbents of the VISTA Training Coordination unit primarily perform
training event coordination functions, and are not involved with curriculum
development. Further, as currently
designed, these positions do not perform VISTA
member/sponsor training needs assessments, which management officials believe
are needed. If the unit were fully
staffed, the cyclic nature of VISTA member
training makes it doubtful that all five positions would be fully employed.
Figure 5
CURRENT AMERICORPS*VISTA
TRAINING/MEMBER SUPPORT OFFICE
The Academy staff’s examination
of the VISTA Training Coordination unit led to a fundamental question of why the
VISTA program office has its own training positions when OLDT performs a very
similar function for CNCS’ other programs.
While it is important to maintain the substantive differences between
VISTA and AmeriCorps member training, it appears that reassigning the VISTA positions to OLDT would:
- provide
OLDT with additional staff depth by allowing the positions to support other
member training needs when the VISTA member
training workload is low
- provide
more possibilities to enrich the positions and increase developmental
opportunities by assigning the positions to an organization that shares common
competency requirements
The possible realignment of this
work is the subject of current discussions within the Corporation.
The Panel believes that an
in-house management analysis capability would make the Corporation a stronger,
more effective organization. CNCS
needs more analytic rigor to support its budget justifications and to inform its
management decisionmaking. The CEO
and program offices must have the ability to look at management issues within
individual offices, and the CEO needs to be able to examine management issues
that cut across the Corporation.
The Panel believes that enabling CNCS to look across the organization and
develop more uniform business practices will help “thin” the walls of the
stovepipes that characterize the program offices. These types of activities have the
potential for doing more to eliminate the barriers between programs than any
restructuring might accomplish.
CNCS also needs an organizational
home for other management activities, such as issuing policy; developing and
maintaining organizational handbooks; and managing and driving change management
initiatives throughout the organization.
In addition, it needs an organizational entity responsible for overseeing
a process to review/clear Corporation documents to ensure that those affected by
decisions are appropriately involved in the decision-making process.
The Panel recommends that CNCS establish an
Office of Business Management Systems within the CFO’s office to be responsible
for management analysis activities and other business management functions,
including an executive secretariat function to ensure that documents are
reviewed timely by affected parties.
If the Corporation is
unsuccessful it its attempt to eliminate the presidential appointment of the
CFO, the Panel believes this office should report to a Chief Administrative
Officer, as recommended in Chapter 3.
The Grants Policy and Operations
Office has created more standardized grant application policies and processes,
but needs to continue to identify areas where further improvements are
needed. Similar efforts are
required in CNCS’ oversight and monitoring operations. While the Panel applauds CNCS’ efforts
to correct weaknesses in the programmatic aspects of its grant-making functions
and to standardize policies, it finds CNCS’ decision to create new
offices/positions to address these issues to be a troublesome trend. Parsing out to two separate offices the
responsibility for programmatic grants policy requires program offices, and
perhaps grantees, to interact with two different offices. This structure can blur roles and
responsibilities, result in conflicting directions, and leave the organization
vulnerable to problems of accountability.
It also creates artificial structural barriers to developing a seamless
grants management operation for the Corporation.
The Panel recommends that CNCS consolidate
into one office reporting to the COO the functions of the Office of Grants
Policy and Operations and the Director of Award Oversight and
Monitoring.
The Panel believes that CNCS’
grant operations would be more effective and efficient if all grants officers
were organized in one office.
Consolidating CNCS’ grants officer resources under a single
organizational entity could lead to more effective utilization of resources,
more consistent operations, improved professional development of staff, and a
synergy of creative thought. Both
OGM and the service centers appear to be struggling to manage their
workloads. The Panel believes that
CNCS would be better able to manage its grants workload if all grants officers
worked for the same office, where the head of that office can prioritize the
Corporation’s entire grants workload and has the flexibility to adjust work
portfolios among staff as needed.
Having all grants officers in the same organizational unit also would
provide increased opportunities to cross train the grants officers to handle all
of the Corporation’s grants. This
would allow them to diversify their portfolios, thereby offering opportunities
for staff development. Finally,
there are intangible benefits associated with having staff that perform common
work feel like they are part of the same team, with the same opportunities for
input and advancement. Currently,
these benefits are difficult to attain because of the structural barrier created
by having the field and headquarters grants officers in different organizational
units.
The Panel recommends that CNCS reorganize
its service centers to have them report to the Office of Grants
Management.
The Panel recognizes that the
service centers perform administrative work in addition to their grant-making
activities. Under this
recommendation, those functions also would report to OGM. However, in the longer term, the Panel
believes that additional reorganization is needed.
There are no data demonstrating
that CNCS needs five service centers to perform either its grants functions or
administrative functions. Most of
the state offices have few face-to-face dealings with the service centers to
address grants and administrative matters.
They rely on automated systems, phone, e-mail, and other forms of
communication to perform their work.
Thus, the geographic location of the service centers is not a factor in
performing either grants work or administrative operations. The Panel believes that the management
efficiencies to be gained by having all grants officers report to one
organization can be further enhanced if all grants officers are consolidated at
one location. Likewise, experience
in other federal agencies indicates that consolidating backroom processing
operations into one location can improve operations and reduce costs.
The Panel recommends that once CNCS
reorganizes its service centers under the Office of Grants Management, it
consolidate its grants officer positions at one location. The Panel further recommends that CNCS
consolidate in one location the administrative functions performed by its
service centers.
The Panel acknowledges that this
recommendation cannot be implemented immediately. Any reorganization that involves
consolidating offices needs to be carefully planned to minimize disruption to
staff and workload. CNCS also will
need to develop a budget proposal prior to implementing this recommendation
because consolidating offices will cause costs to rise in the short term, even
though costs will go down in the longer term.
The Panel believes that its
recommendations on the Corporation’s structure will improve organizational
effectiveness and efficiency. But,
even an organization with a problematic structure can be successful given the
right leadership. And an
organization with a classic textbook structure can fail if its leaders are not
up to the management challenges they face.
The Corporation’s effectiveness depends on how well its various offices
work together to award and manage CNCS’ numerous grants.
In CNCS, program officers and
grants officers need to work together closely, but there is evidence that
long-standing problems in those working relationships continue to exist. The Panel believes that these problems
can be resolved in CNCS’ current organizational structure, as modified by the
Panel’s recommendations. However,
to be successful, the COO and CFO must exercise strong leadership and be held
accountable for how well their offices work together.
Given the vacancies in VISTA’s
Member Support unit and concerns about the high proportion of administrative
workload performed by state office staff, CNCS has a unique opportunity to
reorganize its VISTA member support functions
in a manner that will enable the Corporation to manage this workload more
efficiently. This work can be
handled from any location, and does not have to be located in headquarters to
function effectively. Therefore,
the Panel believes CNCS should consider a service center approach for these
activities, using the two vacant positions in the VISTA Member Support unit to
form the core of such a unit. This
unit could be staffed with CNCS employees or outsourced, and could assume
responsibility for responding to all VISTA members’ requests for technical
assistance and performing clerical support now being provided by the
administratively-overburdened state offices. The Panel further believes that CNCS
should examine whether this consolidated function is a candidate for inclusion
in the administrative service center, recommended above.
The Panel recognizes the need to
tailor training for the VISTA and AmeriCorps
members in order to meet their specific needs. However, the Panel questions the
assignment of member training positions to AmeriCorps*VISTA when OLDT currently provides similar member training
services to AmeriCorps and other CNCS programs. Having this work performed in two
offices creates opportunities for duplication of effort, results in an
ineffective use of staff, and limits developmental opportunities for those
positions. The Panel believes OLDT
should provide to AmeriCorps*VISTA training
services similar to those it provides to other CNCS programs, in order to attain
greater organizational synergy.
The Panel recommends that CNCS use the
vacant positions within the VISTA Member Support unit to form the core of a
consolidated unit responsible for all VISTA
member administrative support. The
Panel also recommends that CNCS reassign to the Office of Leadership Development
and Training the VISTA member training
functions similar to those already performed by OLDT for the rest of the
Corporation.
CHAPTER 5
IMPROVING FINANCIAL AND GRANTS
MANAGEMENT
As discussed in Chapter 1 and
Appendix B, an Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation set off a series of events
that prompted this study. The
congressional report language that mandated this study listed “financial
management” as one of the key areas that the Academy should review. Because the Corporation functions,
primarily, by making grants, the language also asked the Academy to look at
CNCS’ grant-making operations.
The Academy formed a team to
review selected activities in CNCS’ financial and grants management
operations. The team reviewed the
management of the National Service Trust (the Trust)—the account involved in the
ADA violation—as well as matters pertaining to how the Corporation manages,
controls, and reports on the use of its funds; the systems the Corporation uses
as part of that process; and the processes involved in making grants. In doing so, the team built upon work
already performed by GAO, CNCS’ IG, and Deloitte Consulting.
During the course of this study,
the Corporation has made improvements to its financial and grants management
operations. This chapter discusses
the current state of those operations and identifies areas where the Panel
believes further improvements are needed.
The National and Community
Service Trust Act of 1993 established the Trust to fund education awards for
eligible participants who complete AmeriCorps service. Funding for the Trust comes from
appropriations, interest earned, and proceeds from the sale or redemption of
Trust investments. The Trust also
is authorized to receive gifts or bequests, although it has not received any
donations to date.
While the bulk of the funds are
used for the AmeriCorps*State/National program, education awards also are
available for AmeriCorps*VISTA and
AmeriCorps*NCCC members. In
addition, the Trust is used to fund Presidential Freedom Scholarships, where
each high school in the country may select up to two students—juniors or
seniors—to receive scholarships for specified service. Under the Act, funds are available to
repay qualified student loans, pay educational expenses at a qualified
institution of higher education, pay expenses incurred from participation in an
approved school-to-work program, and repay eligible interest expense on student
loans.
For several years, Congress, GAO,
and others have raised questions about the manner in which the Trust is
administered. There have been
questions about the accuracy of the Trust database, the model used to estimate
funding needs, and the adequacy of reserves maintained for Trust
operations. When the Corporation
reported the ADA
violation, the Trust received more attention than ever.
Since the ADA violation, the
Corporation has made several reforms to the Trust’s management. The Corporation has adopted procedures
to ensure that it cannot allocate more Trust funds than are available in the
annual grant cycle.
Responsibilities and procedures have been delineated to ensure that funds
are obligated in the Trust prior to awarding grants. The Corporation also has adopted a
model, developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2001, that provides service award
liability estimates, Trust fund balance projections, and estimated funding needs
for each program year through 2011.
In addition, CNCS has improved the Trust’s accounting and reporting
systems.
The Trust Office, a 14-person
office reporting to the director of accounting and financial management
services, manages the Trust. A
costly and time-consuming part of Trust operations is reconciling member
information with social security records, and reconciling member data currently
maintained in two systems, the Web-Based Reporting System (WBRS) and the
Electronic System for Programs, Agreements, and National Service Participants
(eSPAN).
In order for the Trust to pay an
education award, it must have the member’s correct name and social security
number. Grantees and members
interviewed noted problems with the accuracy of that data. Member names and social security numbers
are initially entered into WBRS, either by the member, the grantee, or the
sub-grantee, and then transferred electronically once daily into eSPAN. The Trust Office verifies that
information with the Social Security Administration (SSA) on an annual
basis. Some grantees do extensive
verifications to ensure that member names and social security numbers are
recorded accurately. Where
verification efforts are less conscientious, the Trust Office gets involved in a
reconciliation process, which is often time consuming.
CNCS currently is developing
plans to integrate WBRS and eSPAN to eliminate the need to re-enter member
information into eSPAN, and to develop an automated link with SSA that will
enable the Trust Office to do an on-line verification of member names and social
security numbers. This systems
upgrade is expected to be completed in calendar year 2005. In the interim, Academy staff have
suggested that the Trust Office send periodic reminders for grantees to verify
member data, in order to keep the cost of Trust operations to a minimum.
The current process for paying
educational awards is labor intensive.
Members send hard copy information to CNCS requesting their awards. All incoming documents arriving via
surface mail are irradiated, which turns the paper yellow and brittle. A CNCS staff member must carefully
unfold the member’s correspondence and photocopy it in preparation for data
entry into a stand-alone system that is read by eSPAN. CNCS is proceeding to automate the Trust
payout process. The CFO’s office
has awarded a fixed price contract for the effort. A CNCS official estimates that it will
take about two years to fully implement the new system.
