|
Testimony of Richard
L. Thornburgh
before the House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies
June 21, 2002
I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before the Subcommittee today to discuss the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's (FBI's) reorganization plan. I am speaking
today as Chair of the National Academy of Public Administration's
Panel on FBI Reorganization. The Academy is an independent
non-profit organization chartered by Congress to assist public
institutions in improving their performance. Other members
of the Academy's Panel include Robert Alloway, Kristine Marcy,
Robert O'Neill, and Harold Saunders.
On June 4, 2002, Chairman Wolf
and Representative Young, Chairman of the full committee,
asked the Academy to review the reorganization proposal submitted
on May 29, 2002, to the Subcommittee under Section 605 of
the FY 2002 Appropriations Act for Commerce, State, Justice,
the Judiciary and Related Agencies. Since then, the Panel
has met with Director Mueller and Chairman Wolf to discuss
this plan, and reviewed numerous studies
and reports identifying difficulties facing the FBI, especially
those associated with its organization and management. Among
the most important are:
- the March 2002 report on FBI security,
led by former FBI Director Webster
- the report of
the National Commission on Terrorism, led by Ambassador
Bremmer, and former Governor Gilmore's report on domestic
response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction
- the Hart-Rudman
Commission Report on the National Security in the 21st Century
- a 2001 management
study of the FBI performed by an independent consultant
at the request of the Attorney General
- recent FBI and Department of State reports
on terrorism
OVERVIEW OF THE
FBI REORGANIZATION
Based on this review and our discussions
with Director Mueller and his staff, the Panel concludes that
the FBI reorganization plan clearly is a step in the right
direction. The proposed organizational and personnel changes
are designed to address deficiencies that Director Mueller
identified after he assumed his position in September 2001.
Of considerable importance, Director Mueller expressed his
intent to be flexible in implementing the reorganization and
open to modifications as it evolves and as he gains experience
with the new structure. For example, he is exploring the co-location
of the Financial Records Section of the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division with the Department of Treasury's FinCEN (Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network), which tracks financial transactions
associated with potential criminal and terrorist activities.
In addition, Director Mueller is formulating the role of "flying
squads" based at FBI headquarters. He envisions their
role as providing FBI field units with both specialized expertise
in counterterrorism investigations and a better understanding
of the capabilities of, and inter-relationships among, other
federal agencies - particularly those with intelligence, national
security and international connections.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, this reorganization
builds on the Director's December 2001 actions establishing
four Executive Assistant Directors, a move that addressed
concerns about the Director's span of management control.
Before I proceed to discuss the Panel's
reactions to the key FBI organization changes, a few caveats
are worth noting.
First, the Panel had a very brief time to devote to this expedited
review. We did not have the opportunity to obtain perspectives
from other federal agencies or state and local law enforcement
organizations. Nor did we have the opportunity to seek greater
detail about various aspects of the reorganization plan.
Second, this reorganization seeks to commence
a long-term process of institutional and cultural change.
This process must include finding the right personnel, reassigning
them, recruiting additional staff with new skills, developing
or adapting administrative processes and procedures, and reallocating
resources in line with changing priorities and changed organizational
assignments. The reorganization itself cannot correct deficiencies
in records management, security, analysis, and coordination.
However, it can provide an overarching framework within which
other personnel, institutional, and operational changes can
be accommodated.
Third, this week, the President submitted
legislation proposing the creation of a new Department of
Homeland Security. In many respects, it may have been more
orderly to enunciate a homeland security strategy, then assess
cabinet-level organizational changes based on an agreed upon
strategy, and, finally, address changes in subordinate component
activities, including the FBI. Moreover, many details of the
President's proposal will no doubt be modified prior to final
Congressional approval. What affect this legislation will
have in areas such as counterterrorism analysis and infrastructure
protection and how changes will affect the FBI reorganization
is difficult to predict.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FBI'S ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGES
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to review
the Panel's perspectives regarding the five major changes
to the FBI's organizational structure. These are:
1. Forming a new Counterterrorism Division
and allocating increased resources to headquarters and the
field for this function. This change is the centerpiece
of the FBI's reorganization proposal. Re-allocating 480 field
agents to counterterrorism, primarily from drug investigations,
affirms the increased priority given to the Bureau's counterterrorism
function. Similarly, strengthening the headquarters' investigative
management capabilities by 150 personnel and building an all-source
analytical capability are extremely critical to enhancing
the focus on counterterrorism. The Panel supports this restructuring
and resource realignment, but, at the same time, the Panel
has two reservations about it:
First, counterintelligence and counterterrorism
are very different disciplines. Counterintelligence entails
extensive precautions and compartmentalization. Yet, these
very same attributes might hinder counterterrorism operations
where the dangers of penetration are not as great. Therefore,
combining these two activities under a single Executive Assistant
Director may inhibit the best possible performance for each
in the long run. Experience may show that an additional Executive
Assistant Director may be beneficial.
Second, fewer agents assigned to drug cases
will result in decreased FBI emphasis on foreign cartels and
drug trafficking. The Panel believes this is a realistic choice
in light of existing staffing and priorities. Nevertheless,
the FBI will continue to devote substantial resources - an
estimated 1,000 agents - to counter-narcotics activities.
The proposed consolidation of border control activities within
the new Department of Homeland Security may improve the overall
effectiveness of drug interdiction activities. As the new
Department of Homeland Security structure and FBI plans evolve,
the Panel believes it will be important to examine the nation's
drug control strategy and reassess the combination of foreign
and domestic efforts needed to execute it. This may dictate
personnel increases in the FBI to restore the previous level
of effort. On the other hand, it may dictate the assignment
of increased responsibilities to the Drug Enforcement Administration
for investigative activities formerly performed by the Bureau,
coupled with further reductions in FBI counter-drug activities.
2. Formally establishing a separate Records
Management Division as part of FBI's Management and Administration
activities. The Oklahoma City bombing and other cases
have exposed certain of the Bureau's record keeping difficulties.
Records management had received inadequate attention as part
of the FBI's information and automation unit. A separate,
free-standing unit can best address these deficiencies. The
Panel endorses this approach and notes that centralized records
also provide a valuable data resource for headquarters analysts
and field investigators as they research past case files for
terrorism information and patterns.
3. Creating a new Security Division to
handle all aspects of FBI personnel, document, physical, computer,
and communications security. This division would pull
together various FBI components that previously had responsibility
for different aspects of security, but were not guided by
a comprehensive strategy or approach. The Robert Hanssen case
provides ample evidence of the need to structure a Bureau-wide
security program. The Panel believes this reorganization is
indispensable in fostering enhanced information sharing with
the FBI by the intelligence community and the national security
apparatus. It also is critical to improving the Bureau's internal
safeguards against foreign intelligence penetration and to
instilling confidence in other agencies that their information
will be protected when it is shared with the Bureau.
4. Establishing a new Cyber Division
to coordinate investigations of Internet and computer network
crimes and threats to the electronic infrastructure that underpins
the nation's economy, transportation systems, utilities, and
government operations. Much of this work entails sophisticated
investigations into the theft of intellectual property, copyrights,
and trade secrets as well as Internet fraud. However, many
infrastructure protection efforts are more similar to conventional
security and information protection approaches, which are
proposed to be transferred to a Department of Homeland Security.
Regardless of the precise split between the FBI and a new
department, the Panel believes that consolidation of all cybercrime
investigations in a separate Cyber Division has merit.
5. Putting portions of the existing Laboratory
Division into a separate Investigative Technologies Division.
The new division will be responsible for the development and
application of advanced investigative technologies. The residual
forensic laboratory functions will remain in the Laboratory
Division. Changes in threat and FBI priorities may require
greater reliance on these investigative technologies, particularly
when dealing with counterterrorism threats, and the Panel
supports this change.
The proposed FBI reorganization affects
less than 5 percent of the Bureau's total resources and personnel.
Thus, many other on-going activities are not directly involved
in the reorganization, including the bulk of the FBI's field
offices and resident agent field structure.
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
Again, I want to emphasize that this reorganization
plan is the beginning - not the end - of a process of change.
It is truly a work in progress, as Director Mueller recognizes.
The Academy Panel believes that additional steps are needed
that go beyond the announced actions to improve the Bureau's
long-term management and the prospects of preventing and countering
terrorist activities.
The Panel notes that Director Mueller's
restatement of FBI priorities includes eight programmatic
priorities ranging from counterterrorism to combating violent
crime. Also included on the Director's list are support for
FBI law enforcement partners and upgrading FBI technology.
Both of these support the first eight program priorities.
At this point, I would personally note that Congress has assigned
the FBI substantial new responsibilities in recent years for
drive-by shootings, deadbeat dads, carjackings, and other
crimes. I would encourage the Congress to take note of the
observations of the Chief Justice and the American Bar Association
that many investigations of these offenses could be relinquished
to state and local authorities.
What's missing from the statement of FBI
program priorities is an equally clear list of management
priorities. The Panel believes that the institutional change
and redirection on which the FBI has embarked
require a clear articulation of management priorities. Many
are implied in the Director's comments about the reorganization,
such as:
- improving headquarters accountability
for counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations
- improving internal information sharing,
both between headquarters and the field and among field
offices
- increasing information sharing with other
federal agencies, state and local law enforcement entities,
and international partners
- reassigning personnel and acquiring new
personnel, such as analysts, with different competencies
to fill gaps in the current and revised structure
- improving analytical and managerial training
- upgrading the inefficient and outdated
computer infrastructure
- developing evaluation and personnel systems
that reward innovation and specialized expertise
We are confident that the Director recognizes
the importance of management-related activities. At the same
time, the reorganization would benefit from a formal statement
prioritizing explicit management objectives and a commitment
to management training programs within the Bureau.
The Subcommittee asked the Panel to identify
possible future approaches to measuring how well the reorganization
accomplishes its objectives. The Panel paid particular attention
to this request, and recommends a three-step strategy for
measuring the Bureau's performance. This approach would allow
the Subcommittee to monitor the pace of implementation and
the agency's success in meeting its objectives, but would
also need additional follow-up work to develop specific measures.
These steps include:
Step One: There should be an explicit
time schedule for and measures of the progress the FBI is
making in implementing the reorganization. These measures
should focus on the reassignment of personnel from field to
headquarters; recruitment of analytical and other skills required
by the realigned substantive priorities; redesign of training
programs to expand awareness of counterterrorism targets and
activities; re-drafted policies and procedures; and increased
information sharing between headquarters and field and with
other federal agencies and state and local entities. Similar
schedules and measures should be developed and monitored for
the records management, security, and cyber divisions.
Step Two: The FBI should develop
performance measures that stakeholders, including this Subcommittee,
can agree upon to assess how well the FBI is meeting the goals
of the reorganization plan. Some of the questions that should
be addressed are: How will the FBI gauge improvements in analytic
products and field reports? Will headquarters analysts grade
field reports and inputs? Will the utility and value of analyst
reports be evaluated by field agents, the Department of Homeland
Security, and other users? How will the impact on field operations
be assessed? What are the criteria by which personnel recruitment
goals and improved technologies will be measured?
Step Three: An external review should
be done annually to add an independent perspective to assess
the FBI's progress in reaching its organizational goals. Expert
and peer review can provide insight into the successes or
difficulties associated with reorganization, and offer perspectives
that enable the FBI to adapt its objectives and approaches.
Information technology (IT) is a particular
area of concern acknowledged by the FBI and illustrated in
internal reports and Congressional findings. The FBI is engaged
in a massive effort to automate its case management file system
through Project Trilogy. This effort will help move the Bureau's
IT into the 21st Century. However, progress must be closely
monitored given the problems associated with introducing major
IT systems into federal agencies. Schedule, performance, and
cost criteria must continue to be established and monitored.
While Trilogy clearly merits continued support, it does not
address critical counterterrorism functions that the Panel
believes must also be automated. These functions include electronic
source data capture by field agents, support for local databases,
and a headquarters analysis system searchable by the field.
Efforts in these areas must be developed and implemented.
More broadly, the Panel is concerned with
the apparent fragmentation of management control over IT resources.
The Chief Information Officer reports to the Director, but
has no direct line control over IT resources. The Trilogy
program manager also reports directly to the Director. A separate
Information Resources Division manages other computer systems,
but some of the most important IT support systems are operated
separately by the Criminal Justice Information Service under
the Executive Assistant Director for Support Services.
In addition, major improvements in information
sharing are critical. The Panel doubts that yet another "joint"
task force or analytic center will adequately addresses this
deficiency. The FBI and the intelligence agencies must be
encouraged to develop new and innovative approaches to information
sharing internally, with a new Department of Homeland Security,
and with federal, state, and local users.
Finally, we should all remember that the notion of prevention,
rather than prosecution, is properly given priority in the
field of terrorism. Public expectations may be disappointed
in some cases where terrorist acts are thwarted by effective
intelligence gathering that did not produce legally admissible
evidence that would support a criminal prosecution or when
prosecution is deemed to be unwise because of the potential
exposure of informants or sophisticated intelligence-gathering
techniques. The public and the media must understand that
not all bad guys will be prosecuted.
Mr. Chairman, the task facing the FBI is
substantial. The reorganization plan is designed to provide
an improved organizational structure, refocus mission priorities
in a new and important direction, upgrade analytical capabilities,
and initiate technology enhancements to better support the
workforce. The Director and his colleagues are to be commended
for this ambitious effort to transform the FBI.
But, as we all know, there are inherent
challenges in undertaking major culture change, such as this
one. In many respects, the toughest job of all - effectively
implementing the change - still lies ahead. Bringing this
job to a successful conclusion will require continued leadership
commitment; an implementation strategy and plan; and managers
and employees who are engaged, know their jobs, and are held
accountable.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared
statement. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer
any questions you and other members may have.
|
