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Congressional Testimony

 

Hearing on Small Business Administration Transformation Plan

July 16, 2002

Testimony by Herbert N. Jasper
Executive Committee
Standing Panel on Executive Organization
and Management
National Academy of Public Administration
on Principles to Guide the Structuring or Restructuring of
Large Organizations Before the House Subcommittee on
Workforce, Empowerment, and Government Programs

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to offer comments on principles to guide the structuring or restructuring of federal agencies.

You requested testimony from the National Academy of Public Administration ("Academy," or "NAPA"), a Congressionally chartered organization established to assist government at all levels, with special emphasis on the federal government. The more-than-500 elected fellows of the Academy rarely take a position on legislative issues, but its panels often do upon request. This statement was prepared in consultation with members of the Academy's Executive Committee of the Standing Panel on Executive Organization and Management ("Executive Committee"). The committee believes that it is consistent with the views expressed in previous panel projects, reports and testimonies. It is based in large part upon previous publications of the panel or of its members.

My biographical statement is attached. But I'd like to review briefly some of the assignments and projects that shape my views: experience in management and organization in the Government Organization Branch of the former Bureau of the Budget; service as a Senate Committee Chief Counsel and an employee of two Congressional staff agencies; as a public management consultant; and as an Academy Fellow. I was Executive Secretary of the 1964 White House Task Force on Government Reorganization (the "Price Committee"); the project director for the Academy's series of Presidential Transition Memoranda in 2000-2001; a staff member in the design of the Congressional budget process and the creation of the Congressional Budget Office; the project director for the Academy's study of the National Ocean Service; and a staff member of the Academy's 1988 study of the Executive Presidency and the 1994 study of the General Accounting Office (GAO). I have also been a chair or member of Academy project panels on such subjects as management of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and Congressional oversight of regulatory agencies, and have published articles on federal management.

GAO's October 2001 report on the current structure of the Small Business Administration (SBA) identifies a number of challenges that it poses. As requested, I shall begin with general comments on guiding principles regarding organization of federal agencies. Then, I shall review several of the challenges facing SBA, especially the ones relating to organization, in the light of the principles.


Principles of Federal Organization. The Academy published a paper (Principles of Federal Organization, NAPA, January 1997) prepared by the Standing Panel that listed 10 principles and 14 corollaries to those principles. Following is an adaptation of those items that appear most pertinent to this hearing:

  • An executive department should be charged with major public purposes, which serve all the people of the nation and should not be created to represent, or serve as an advocate for, a special group of Americans. (Independent agencies, such as SBA, often serve a narrower clientele.)
  • Organization by major purpose is preferable to organization according to clientele or process.
  • Each department and independent agency head should be held accountable for the quality of its management and be assisted by a senior official to whom the Secretary assigns responsibility for providing advice on all aspects of internal management.
  • Legislation establishing departments or agencies or addressing aspects of general management should avoid prescribing statutory detail and should empower the agency head to make the internal arrangements best suited to the effective execution of the laws.
  • Legislation that lodges functions in officers other than agency heads or restricts their authority to make adjustments to improve program management will increase costs, impair the achievement of legislative objectives, and make it harder to hold the agency head accountable.
  • The President and the Congress should maintain an institutionalized capacity to keep informed of the manner in which agency heads exercise authority over internal organization and management.
  • Effective program administration depends on competent, motivated public service employees who respond to the policy direction of the political leadership but are selected, retained and advanced on the basis of merit.
  • Employing third parties (including state and local governments and for-profit and nonprofit contractors) to manage and operate government facilities and deliver public services does not eliminate the need for public management, it merely changes its character.

Principles Relating to the Establishment of Departments or Agencies. While the status of SBA as an independent agency is not specifically a subject of this hearing, the Chairman's invitation to testify states that "The focus of the hearing is the application of sound management principles … in the structuring or restructuring of a large … governmental … entity…." Accordingly, it may be appropriate briefly to review criteria for establishing departments, as proposals to move SBA to a Cabinet department have been made from time to time. In 1988, an Academy panel issued a report for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Evaluation of Proposals to Establish a Department of Veterans Affairs, NAPA, March 1988). It set forth criteria by which one could evaluate proposed cabinet status for any candidate agency. The panel listed and discussed 14 criteria as they would apply to the Veterans Administration (VA), criteria that may be too specific to the VA case for general application. Other guidelines for evaluating reorganization proposals can be found in a book by Harold Seidman (Politics, Position and Power, fifth edition, Oxford University Press, pp.219-220, 1998).

I believe that the following selection of Seidman's and the Academy panel's criteria would apply to considerations of department status for a group of programs:

  • Are there now in one agency, or can we combine in it, programs that are closely related in terms of achieving broad national goals?
  • Would combining related programs improve service delivery and help to achieve the results intended by the President and Congress; would it save money, either for the taxpayers or for those affected by the programs, and would it prevent the domination of the agency by one constituency group or by one professional discipline?
  • Would Cabinet status improve the leadership, visibility, and public support for the programs?
  • Does the agency warrant independent status, whether in the Cabinet or not, as compared to other agencies; does the public interest require that it remain in the government or should it be devolved or privatized?
  • What is the nature of the agency's constituency and how much will it be able to influence policies and program administration?

Principles Relating to the Organization and Management of Departments or Agencies. Alan L. Dean recently prepared a revised version of a paper on the organization and management of Cabinet departments (Organization and Management of Executive Departments, NAPA, March 2001). Most of that paper applies equally to independent agencies. Following are a number of observations in that paper that are relevant to SBA:

  • Legislation dealing with agency management should avoid excessive detail in assigning functions and prescribing internal departmental structure.
  • To improve accountability and program oversight, secretaries must be the real -not nominal - managers of their departments.
  • The quality of departmental administration depends heavily on the field organization's design.
    • Experience favors decentralized departmental management, often through the program administrators who delegate much of their operational authority to field officials. When field officials can take final action, services can usually be provided more quickly and with a better understanding of local conditions.
    • Successful decentralization depends upon clear policies and standards to guide field officials and upon reporting, audit and evaluation systems to ensure that delegated authority has been properly used.
  • No department can function well unless it relies heavily on an experienced cadre of career civil servants. Principal field officials usually should be from, and remain in, the career civil service.
  • A deputy secretary who is an effective manager and a well-organized secretariat will often reduce or eliminate the need for a chief of staff as an important figure in management matters.

Additional Guidelines That Relate to Restructuring of SBA. SBA has experienced significant growth in number, size and complexity of its program responsibilities. Concurrently, the size of its work force has declined. It is probably time for a program review addressing the possibility of eliminating or combining programs.

As noted by Thomas H. Stanton in a recent paper (Moving Toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, June 2002), "Reorganization is not a substitute for inadequate resources in areas such as budget, staffing, or systems." Further, as I pointed out in an Academy paper (Making Reorganization of the Executive Branch Work, NAPA, January 1997),

  • Reorganization is always costly and disruptive and should be undertaken only when the perceived benefits clearly outweigh the costs.
  • Reorganization is a way to emphasize certain values or goals, but this means downgrading other values or goals.
  • Reorganization, per se, seldom saves money.

Stanton also noted in the paper mentioned above that, as in architecture, "…in organizational design, form should follow purpose." It is not clear that SBA had previously changed its structure in response to the changes in programs and methods for carrying them out. But its transformation plan (still a working document) proposes to make some such changes now.

With the theoretical principles and guidelines that I have outlined in mind, I shall now turn to a number of organizational challenges for SBA. Most are set forth in GAO's report and possible corrective actions are described in SBA's transformation plan. I begin by applauding SBA's efforts to date. Of course, the plan is a work in progress and identifies a number of additional topics yet to be addressed. So what follows is intended to fill in some gaps that I perceive and to encourage early attention to the remainder of the agency's transformation agenda.

Field Organization. SBA's plan is designed to make the organization more responsive to its principal customers - small businesses, rather than to its lending partners. But the first phase of the plan does not go very far in rationalizing a complicated field structure with 10 regions, 70 district and 16 branch offices, more than 1,100 centers, plus six area offices. As GAO pointed out, the last reorganization that created an Office of Field Operations did not reconcile that action with a clear re-definition of the role of the Regional Directors and their relation to the Office of Field Operations.

Substantial delegation of operating responsibility and authority to the field is desirable. However, for the various program offices at headquarters to deal directly with this large number of field offices carrying out delegated authorities is guaranteed to cause confusion and conflicts. Perhaps, creation of the Office of Field Operations was a mistake. I believe that the Regional Directors ought to be in the chain of command from Washington to the district offices. That should go far toward clearing up two challenges mentioned by GAO, viz., overlapping organizational relationships and ineffective lines of communication. Additionally, the number of district offices appears excessive and some of the area offices no longer have a significant workload.

Number of Appointees. SBA, with up to 60 appointees, has a far higher proportion of such positions than any other agency that I can think of. Successive national administrations and Congresses have steadily enlarged the number of appointive positions in many agencies, partly in response to the popular sport of "bureaucrat bashing," and partly because of a mistaken belief that these positions will help the current administration "get control." In reality, political appointees, most of whom owe their appointments to the political parties, interest groups, or Members of Congress, are more likely to resist direction from the White House and their agency heads than are the career civil servants. Further, such appointees often serve only a short time, and all have to be replaced with a change in national leadership. To begin with, I'd urge that SBA seriously consider making the Regional Directors career positions. A substantial number of the other appointive positions should also be eliminated or converted to career status.

Congressional Influence Over Relationships and Locations. Congress should avoid unnecessary prescriptions about internal management matters and hold the Administrator accountable for results. I was not surprised to see that the transformation plan failed to address these issues that were mentioned in the GAO report. But the Congress, in creating or chartering such organizations as GAO and the Academy, seeks additional input on many matters that the agencies might not feel comfortable addressing.

The four most significant matters appear to be: 1) the number and location of field offices; 2) the requirement that there be an Associate Administrator for Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) with specified reporting channels; 3) the constraints on limited combination of funding for servicing disaster loans and other direct loans of the agency; and 4) the establishment of a large number of offices at headquarters.

Field Offices. Congress has not mandated the number and location of the various field offices that I think are too numerous. However, some seem to have been established in response to Congressional pressures and their termination will probably require acquiescence by Congress.

SBDCs. Constraining the Administrator's ability to integrate the SBDC program with closely related functions of the agency is a good example of why such statutory prescriptions are undesirable. If the Administrator is to be held accountable for results, he must be able to organize the delegations of authority and the chain of command from time to time as circumstances and program priorities dictate.

Loan Servicing. With respect to disaster loans, the issue is not whether funding should be separate. It is that servicing of direct loans for disaster assistance once they have been made is often managed by the same personnel who are concerned with certain servicing functions for the few remaining direct loans under other SBA programs. And the current funding constraints complicate the financing of loan servicing centers.

Statutory Positions. At least nine positions, beyond the Presidential appointees, are required by statute. Here, I'm not referring to the programs they are responsible for. Those ought to be authorized by law. But specifying the administrative arrangements locks the positions in and prevents adjustments as programs evolve.

Overlapping Positions at Headquarters. The Chief Operating Officer (COO) concept has recently been imported to the federal government from the private sector. In most Cabinet agencies, the COO is the Deputy Secretary, but it is a separate position in SBA. The Chief of Staff position has been copied in many agencies from the military and the White House. These positions and those of COOs are not statutory.

SBA also has a Deputy Associate Administrator for Management and Administration, currently Dr. Blanchard who is also COO. With the exception of the Inspector General and contracting functions, he has responsibility for the full spectrum of management activities. So it appears that SBA has four positions (two now filled by the same person) that are concerned with agency management and operations.

Typically, the Chief of Staff in a federal agency performs the significant function of "gate keeper," sometimes performed by an Executive Secretariat or an Executive Associate Administrator. The range of internal management and administration functions assigned to Chiefs of Staff varies. I suggest that SBA should now reevaluate whether it could lodge the COO responsibility in the Deputy Administrator. Even if not, it should consider eliminating either the Chief of Staff or COO position, or combining them. But, especially in light of the large number of appointee positions, it is vital that the remaining position, however titled, be filled by a career official in order to provide the needed continuity

Competitive Sourcing. More competition for the performance of federal activities is part of the President's Management Agenda. The transformation plan signals the agency's intent further to expand its already-significant outsourcing. But, in contrast to the planned strengthening of oversight of loan programs, I did not see in the plan any recognition of the need to have sufficient numbers of highly trained staff to manage additional competitive sourcing and, most importantly, to oversee the contractors' performance and to evaluate when outsourcing is no longer justified on a case-by-case basis. (Incidentally, I do not use the words "privatize" or "contracting out" as synonyms for "outsourcing" because I think they weaken the perception that what is contracted remains the responsibility of the agency to assure that taxpayers are getting what they pay for.)

Conclusion. I close by reiterating my strong support for what the transformation plan outlines. However, I urge that careful attention be paid to the rest of the identified agenda, as well as to the matters I have discussed that are not yet addressed. In particular, I urge that Congress work with the agency to minimize statutory prescriptions or other constraints regarding administrative arrangements that should be left to the Administrator.

I'd be pleased to respond to any questions.

 

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