Improving the National Preparedness System:
Developing More Meaningful Grant Performance Measures
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October 21, 2011

Improving the National Preparedness System:
Developing More Meaningful Grant Performance Measures

PANEL

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FOREWORD

Our Nation’s approach to terrorism and all-hazards preparedness changed forever with the events of September 11, 2001, and again in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Now more than ever, all levels of government recognize how critical it is to be prepared for catastrophic incidents that are either man-made or naturally occurring. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) homeland security preparedness grant programs are an integral part of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. These grants enhance the ability of state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to build and sustain prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities.

In our intergovernmental system, the federal government uses an array of tools—including grants—to accomplish its policy objectives while relying on state and local jurisdictions to execute them. A critical strength of the current preparedness system is its integration of efforts across multiple funding sources and jurisdictions—a characteristic that also makes it difficult to measure the specific contribution and effectiveness of FEMA’s grants. Despite the measurement challenges identified in this report, the Panel believes that its proposed performance measures will provide valuable insights to help shape future program priorities and resource allocations.

The Academy is pleased to have had the opportunity to assist Congress and the FEMA Administrator in this critical area of performance measurement. The Academy is unique in its ability to not only convene stakeholders within and outside of government, but also to utilize panels of Academy Fellows and other experts to conduct independent assessments. I extend my appreciation to the Academy Panel members who provided invaluable expertise and thoughtful analysis of the task at hand. I also thank FEMA’s leadership and stakeholders who provided unparalleled experience and context to shape the development of the recommended measures. This report was supported by a dedicated study team that worked diligently to ensure that the Panel had the necessary information to develop a report that helps FEMA improve its understanding and management of these important grant programs.

Dan G. Blair
President and CEO
National Academy of Public Administration
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<td>AAR/IP</td>
<td>After Action Report/Improvement Plan</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Panel Message

After September 11, 2001, the United States made significant investments to strengthen its homeland security organizations and systems. The common purpose of these investments was to increase preparedness. To better prepare our Nation, this new homeland security enterprise promoted connectivity of jurisdictions, agencies, professional disciplines, and individuals to protect, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents and other man-made and natural hazards. This decision impacted every level of government, non-governmental sectors, and citizens.

Congress requested that the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) assist the FEMA Administrator in studying, developing, and implementing quantifiable performance measures and metrics to assess the effectiveness of the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The purpose of the Academy’s nine and one-half-month independent assessment was to (1) develop three to seven quantitative effectiveness measures that demonstrate the grants’ performance and (2) provide advice on how to implement them. The Panel focused on SHSGP and UASI, as they represent the largest share of the Homeland Security Grant Program funds, providing more than $1 billion annually for states and urban areas to enhance terrorism preparedness capabilities.

It is the opinion of this Panel that homeland security preparedness has improved since 9/11 and that SHSGP and UASI have made significant contributions. A keystone of this effort has been establishing and strengthening active collaborations among states, tribes, territories, regions, and local jurisdictions, especially within states and across metropolitan and rural regions. By sharing information, capacities, and capabilities, the Nation’s ability to save lives and property has improved significantly. For example, the 56 states and territories and 64 high-risk metropolitan regions, referred to as urban areas in enabling legislation, have developed and are now implementing homeland security strategies. These strategies are used to focus homeland security efforts and help to coordinate and prioritize efforts regardless of funding source. In the past 10 years, homeland security has matured into an established professional field. Homeland security grants have provided the capital—in whole or in part—to develop this professional cadre through planning, organizing and equipping, training, and exercise and evaluation opportunities. Taken together, these efforts indicate significant gains in preparedness over the last decade.

The Panel’s focus for this study was to determine how to quantitatively measure the outcomes of these grants—a task that poses two challenges. The preparedness system’s greatest strength—conducting efforts in an integrated fashion that blends resources from multiple sources—is also its greatest weakness from a performance measurement standpoint. The Panel finds that this

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1 Section 2023 (d), Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Act (P.L. 111-271).
3 In FY2010, 64 UASIs were allocated funding. In FY2011, 31 UASIs were allocated funding.
tradeoff is inescapable. Although collaboration and integration are needed for a distributed preparedness system, this does not diminish the need to measure performance and it is worth the extra effort required to develop meaningful performance measures.

The other challenge to developing effective performance measures is programmatic. The federal government has not developed measurable standards for preparedness capabilities to guide the performance of the states and urban areas receiving these homeland security grants. Recent efforts under Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) aim to develop these standards. The Panel had been encouraged by the inclusion of national-level, measurable performance objectives in the draft National Preparedness Goal for the response and recovery mission areas, but these were not included in the final document. The Panel finds that the Goal document does not meet the need for clearly defined, measurable outcomes for preparedness capabilities. The Goal document does include preliminary capability targets—performance threshold(s) for each core capability—for which FEMA has indicated that performance measures will be developed to be used to assess both our capacity and our gaps. Without additional clarification by DHS/FEMA, the states and urban areas will need to continue to establish capability levels for themselves which may or may not satisfy the national interest. The Panel strongly recommends that as DHS/FEMA moves forward with PPD-8, it develop more specific or additional capability targets that states and urban areas should strive to achieve and measure progress against.

Against this backdrop, the Academy Panel focused its efforts on developing measures to assess how the grants contribute to preparedness based on the activities allowed, required, or leveraged through the grants. Where the impact of these grants could not be distinguished from other funding sources, the Panel selected measures that demonstrate these shared preparedness outcomes as a proxy for the effectiveness of the UASI and SHSGP grants. The Academy’s approach included extensive discussion and collaboration with FEMA and its primary stakeholders, including Congress. Research for this study included over 75 interviews; multiple, structured meetings with key stakeholders, FEMA, and the Academy’s expert Panel; and a thorough review of the available literature.

The Panel prioritized its measures by identifying those most critical to assessing the preparedness capabilities being built and sustained with these grants funds. The Panel finds that the best way to assess capabilities is through the scoring of capabilities based on actual performance during exercises and incidents. FEMA needs to work with grantees and subgrantees to develop a scoring scale with specific definitions for each grade on the scale, aligned with capability targets, to allow for comparability across grantees and over time.

Finally, the Panel recommends developing measures to evaluate state and regional preparedness collaborations. Developing such measures will first require assessing the variety of planning and governance practices used by states and regions in order to identify successful collaboration and governance models. The results of this should be used to develop quantitative or qualitative measures to drive performance on this critical issue. The Panel finds that collectively this recommended set of measures begins to address the effectiveness of the two grant programs.

The Panel underscores that this effort is only a beginning. Good measurement systems evolve over time as programs and priorities mature and new performance challenges emerge.
Academy Panel Performance Measure Recommendations

These measures are designed to provide important information on the performance of the UASI and SHSGP grant programs and be useful to Congress, FEMA, and grantees. First, Congress and FEMA should use them to address program plans and priorities. Second, FEMA officials should use them to facilitate discussions with grantees about how to ensure the grants meet their goals. Third, grantees should use them to compare their performance with national trends and also use the information generated to shape plans and priorities for future investments and activities. The underlying data may prove to be more useful as a performance driver than the aggregated national data.

The Panel recommends that FEMA formally adopt this set of measures and work with grantees and sub-grantees to implement them. This Executive Summary provides abbreviated information about the measures. Information about the significance of each measure and issues for implementation can be found in Section 4 of the report. Priority measures are highlighted in red and underlined. The set of recommended measures is presented in three parts.

PART 1: EFFECTIVE AND TARGETED GRANT INVESTMENTS
The measures in this section focus on how to achieve targeted, effective grant investments that contribute to desired preparedness outcomes.

Foundational Activities—Homeland security strategies assist states and UASIs to target their investments in preparedness capabilities. In order to develop and maintain a homeland security strategy, many foundational activities are required. Two such activities are a risk assessment (Measure 1) and regular updates to the homeland security strategy (Measure 2).

Measure 1: Number of current, FEMA-approved state and UASI risk assessments.

Measure 2: Number of state and UASI homeland security strategies in compliance with update requirements.

Strengthening Preparedness: Strategies, Investments, and Capabilities—The purpose of the homeland security strategy is to guide efforts to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. Demonstrating the degree to which the measurable objectives within the homeland security strategies are being met (Measure 3) allows FEMA and grantees to understand the progress being made over time. Each state and UASI grant application specifies expected outcomes for that grant cycle, and Measure 4 demonstrates the degree to which those outcomes are achieved. The level and trends of capabilities developed or sustained can be measured through the annual capability assessment (Measure 5).

Measure 3: Percentage and number of measurable homeland security strategy objectives achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.

Measure 4: The percentage and number of proposed grant outcomes achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.

Measure 5: Level and change in each core capability demonstrated by the states and UASIs.
**Preventing Terrorist Incidents**—The prevention mission area was selected for a measure because, unlike the other mission areas (protection, mitigation, response, and recovery), it is specifically focused on imminent terrorist threats (Measure 6).

**Measure 6:** Percentage of achievement of each critical operational capability by the fusion centers.

**Demonstrating Preparedness Outcomes**—Considering the significant investments of public funds in these capabilities, it is important to demonstrate results. Capabilities can best be demonstrated through their use in incidents or exercises (Measure 7) as part of a continuous cycle of improvement (Measure 8). The capabilities should be rated using an anchored, objective scoring system to demonstrate how capabilities perform during exercises and incidents.

**Measure 7a:** Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during incidents.

**Measure 7b:** Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during exercises.

**Measure 8a:** Number of critical task corrective actions identified and completed following grant-funded exercises.

**Measure 8b:** Number of critical task corrective actions identified and completed following incidents.

**Measure 8c:** Number of recurring, critical task failures identified following incidents in the past three years.

**Part 2: Context Measures**
While not performance measures *per se*, these provide meaningful context to help understand and improve the execution of the grant programs.

**Grant Execution**—FEMA’s biennial programmatic and financial monitoring provide opportunities to make continuous improvements in grant execution.

**Measure 9a:** Number of program improvements identified during programmatic monitoring, agreed upon by FEMA and grantee, corrected within the specified timeframe.

**Measure 9b:** Number of financial deficiencies identified during financial monitoring corrected within the specified timeframe.

**Expenditure of Grant Funds**—Measuring the reversion of grant funds demonstrates grantees’ ability to develop grant budgets and activities that they are able to effectively execute within the period of performance.

**Measure 10:** Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI grant funds reverted.
Grant Funding Profile—Measuring the allocation of grant investments between building and sustaining capabilities will help Congress and FEMA understand how funding profiles drive prioritization of investments.

Measure 11a: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to build each core capability.

Measure 11b: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to sustain each core capability.

Part 3: Collaboration Measures

The Panel finds that collaboration is critically important to preventing, protecting, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism. The success of a National Preparedness System requires government jurisdictions, other sector partners, and professional disciplines\(^4\) to work together to plan, fund, and provide services beyond their individual capabilities on all aspects of preparedness. Recognizing the importance of this, enhancing regional collaboration was designated as the first of eight National Priorities issued in 2007 to guide preparedness efforts.\(^5\) The FEMA grants have requirements for collaboration and have provided considerable incentives to facilitate them.

Collaborative efforts are structured in ways that reflect the protocols and traditions of the area, may be established to produce different results, and include both formal and informal relationships. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a single construct to measure against without a greater understanding of what contributes to the success of preparedness collaborations. An assessment of the many different types of collaborations that have been established or strengthened would provide FEMA with an understanding of the factors that contribute to successful collaboration. A key aspect for the assessment is to identify successful state, urban area, and homeland security region governance practices that can serve as models for accountable collaborations. Conducting such an assessment was beyond the scope of this Academy study. The Panel recommends that FEMA conduct an assessment of collaborative approaches, in coordination with local jurisdictions, states, regions, and urban areas, and use the results to develop a scoring system for future quantitative or qualitative performance measures on collaboration and to assist program participants to strengthen their performance on this critical issue.

Additional Opportunities to Strengthen Performance

In addition to the recommendations for performance measures and context measures, the Panel offers several recommendations to FEMA that will strengthen the performance of these grants.

\(^4\) This refers to the array of professional disciplines involved in preparedness including law enforcement, emergency management, public health, transportation, and others.

Some of these, such as the pairing of quantitative and qualitative measures, should lead to the development of additional performance measures. Other recommendations are more programmatic in nature.

**Pairing Quantitative and Qualitative Measurements**

The Panel recommends that FEMA continue to use both quantitative and qualitative information to more effectively capture the performance of its grant programs. In accordance with our charge, the Panel has recommended a set of quantitative measures only; however, many aspects of preparedness could be improved based on lessons learned from qualitative measures. FEMA should work with grantees to pair the Panel’s recommended set of quantitative measures with qualitative measures and information to accurately reflect the efforts of states, tribes, territories, and local jurisdictions. FEMA should explore how best to use case studies and illustrative examples to complement the measures offered in this report and the measurable core capabilities that must be developed under PPD-8.

**The Timing of the Grant Cycle**

The timing of the start of the grant cycle was the challenge most often identified by stakeholders. Grantees need to begin to develop their applications well in advance of when the grant guidance is issued and then must quickly revise them after the guidance is released. This negatively impacts grantees’ ability to present well-developed investment justifications. The Panel recommends that FEMA issue grant guidance in advance of appropriations and make it subject to the availability of appropriations. The grant guidance could be issued soon after the annual DHS budget request is transmitted to Congress to provide grantees time to develop deliberative applications that reflect national, state, tribal, regional, and local priorities.

**Communicating Performance**

The Panel recommends that FEMA share performance results more broadly in a manner tailored to specific audiences—including Congress, public officials at the federal, state, tribal, territorial, regional, and local levels, other sector partners, and the general public. The accomplishments under these grant programs are a shared story of performance that should be communicated by FEMA, except in instances where the data being reported are too sensitive for broad distribution. This is an opportunity not only to demonstrate what has been accomplished, but to engage new partners that can contribute to preparedness.

**Planning**

Preparedness planning is a key element of the National Preparedness System. The Panel finds that collaborative planning prompted by these grants has supported coordinated, multi-jurisdictional execution. Trying to distill the quality of the broad array of preparedness planning efforts into simple quantitative measures is of limited value. Instead of a measure, the Panel finds that a periodic assessment of preparedness plans is a more efficient and effective approach to improve performance. To appropriately assess the value of preparedness planning efforts, the Panel recommends that FEMA institutionalize the Nationwide Plan Review.

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6 Numerous programs across the federal government use such an approach including the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Education.
**UASI Participation and Expectations**
For FY2011, 33 urban areas that had received funding in the previous fiscal year were not included in the allocations. The Panel finds that this situation presents a unique opportunity for FEMA to learn how these homeland security collaborations adapt to changes in funding. The Panel recommends that FEMA conduct an assessment of how states and urban areas adapt to the decrease in number of federally funded UASIs and its impact on preparedness collaboration and capabilities. This should be a phased assessment that examines the transition of the former UASIs out of the program in the short-term as well as a follow-up in 3-5 years. The longer-term assessment would evaluate the degree to which the working relationships and sharing of resources developed under this program have been institutionalized after the incentives provided by the grant funding have ended and there has been some turnover of political leadership and trained personnel. This would provide valuable insights about the level of funding needed to sustain national preparedness priorities within states and UASIs.

**Conclusion**

The Panel recommends that FEMA implement this set of measures and the above additional recommendations to improve the performance of the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. FEMA should evaluate its performance measurement efforts periodically and continually adapt them as programs and priorities mature and new performance challenges emerge.
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF STUDY

The performance of government programs should inform decisions about program structures, functions, and budgets. This is why Congress often establishes regular evaluation and reporting requirements when authorizing programs and appropriating funding for their implementation. Congress set requirements for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to use quantitative performance measurements to demonstrate the effectiveness of the homeland security grants that FEMA administers.\(^7\) FEMA has expended considerable time and effort to improve performance measurement and management across the agency and collects considerable grantee performance data, and Congress requested that the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) assist the FEMA Administrator with this effort.

In consultation with FEMA and Congress, the Academy focused the scope of study on the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), as these are the two largest of FEMA’s homeland security grant programs. The purpose of the Academy’s nine and one-half-month independent assessment was to provide assistance to the FEMA Administrator in studying, developing, and implementing 3-7 quantifiable performance measures and metrics that assess the effectiveness of grants administered by the Agency.\(^8\) As the act that authorized this study also addressed reducing redundant reporting requirements to minimize burden, the Academy Panel was mindful of not unduly adding to that burden, while recognizing that any new performance measures would require some additional effort. This report offers the Academy Panel’s recommendations for a set of quantitative performance measures to assess the grant programs’ effectiveness and how to implement them at FEMA.

APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

The Academy’s research approach included extensive discussion and collaboration with FEMA and its primary stakeholders, including Congress. Research for this study included a significant number of interviews; multiple, structured meetings with key stakeholders, FEMA, and the Academy’s expert Panel; and a thorough review of the available literature. The section that follows describes the research effort taken to develop the quantitative performance measures presented in this report.

Academy Panel
The Academy convened an eight-member, independent Panel of experts to guide the Academy’s professional staff through this engagement. Panel members were selected for their personal and professional expertise in public administration, performance measurement, and homeland security preparedness. Seven members were identified from the Academy’s Fellowship, and one

\(^7\) Section 649, Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295) and Section 2022, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53).
\(^8\) Section 2023 (d), Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Act (P.L. 111-271).
additional member was identified by FEMA. The Panel worked collaboratively with the study team to execute the scope of work; however, the final recommendations contained herein are those of the Panel. The Panel met as a group five times over the course of this study (three in-person meetings and two conference calls) and individually with staff. Some portion of every in-person Panel meeting was open to the public, with time reserved for an executive session limited to the Academy Panel and study team. Appendix A contains information on Panel members and staff.

**Working Group**
The Academy established a “Working Group” that provided the Panel and study team considerable information on the operations, function, and priorities of the UASI and SHSGP programs. The Working Group provided guidance on the refinement and implementation of performance measures, but was not asked to reach consensus on a set of measures. The Working Group was comprised of senior FEMA headquarters and regional staff, grant recipients, and representatives of stakeholder associations. To ensure the candor of the discussion, Working Group members were asked to participate as individuals and not as representatives of their respective organizations. The Working Group met three times over the course of this study. Appendix B contains a list of the Working Group members.

**Interviews**
Interviews were a primary source for collecting data and first-hand experiences about the UASI and SHSGP programs. The Academy interviewed over 75 people. Among these were DHS and FEMA officials, congressional staff, representatives from other federal agencies, UASI and SHSGP grantees and sub-grantees, tribal representatives, and representatives from stakeholder associations. All interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis to ensure candor. A list of those interviewed or contacted is included as Appendix C.

**Roundtables**
To augment the breadth of interviews, the Academy held two roundtables to explore topics in more depth. The Academy worked with FEMA to identify participants. The discussions were used by the Academy to identify major opportunities and challenges for measuring the performance of the UASI and SHSGP programs. A description of each roundtable follows:

- The first roundtable included federal agencies to understand how they measure outcomes for preparedness and capability building, to understand the logic behind their development, and to identify the challenges and opportunities associated with their application. Participants offered their experiences with measuring the impact of grant programs on the development and sustainment of preparedness capabilities. See Appendix D for a summary of this roundtable.

- The second, virtual roundtable included grantees and sub-grantees from geographically dispersed urban areas, states, and local jurisdictions to discuss their experiences with the grant programs including planning, application, execution, and reporting. Grantees shared issues and approaches they found valuable in assessing progress towards preparedness. See Appendix E for a summary of this roundtable.


**Literature Review**

The Academy conducted an extensive review of the research on, and documentation of, the UASI and SHSGP programs. Documents reviewed included congressional testimony and public law; DHS Office of Inspector General and U.S. General Accountability Office reports; DHS/FEMA budgets, reports, and guidance; grantees’ homeland security strategies, investment justifications, capability assessments, monitoring reports, and after action reports/improvement plans; stakeholder reports and fact sheets; performance measurement approaches and examples; and other secondary sources of information. See Appendix F for Information Sources.

A key element of this review was to understand the requirements for each of the two grant programs. This information formed the cornerstone of the Academy’s study. Therefore, a crosswalk was developed outlining the programs’ purposes, requirements, and allowable uses based on statute and guidance. See Appendix G for Grant Program Crosswalk.
SECTION 2
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM AND URBAN AREAS SECURITY INITIATIVE

National preparedness responsibilities are shared by an array of individuals and organizations at the federal, state, tribal, territorial, regional, and local levels. State, tribal, and local emergency response, health, and law enforcement officials serve as the first line of defense against natural and man-made disasters. While their efforts are supported by preparedness programs within multiple federal departments including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), these state, tribal, and local agencies spend significant amounts of their own funds each year to enhance public health and safety.9 As part of its national preparedness mission, DHS operates 13 preparedness grant programs through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These provide financial assistance to states, tribes, territories, and local jurisdictions.

The largest is the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), a set of five grants that fund a range of preparedness activities including planning, organization, equipment purchase, training, exercises, evaluation, and management and administration.10 The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) represent the largest share of HSGP funds, providing more than $1 billion annually for states and urban areas to enhance terrorism preparedness capabilities.11 At the grantee and sub-grantee levels, these investments are combined with other funding streams to support activities that increase recipients’ ability to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond, and recover from natural disasters and terrorist incidents. Figure 1 illustrates how SHSGP and UASI fit within the network of preparedness funding.

The relationship between FEMA and grantees is a performance partnership where all parties are responsible for ensuring that goals are met and desired results achieved.12 SHSGP and UASI provide key support to grant recipients for enhancing terrorism preparedness within their jurisdictions. Terrorism preparedness is still a relatively new responsibility for governments and emergency responders. SHSGP and UASI funding has helped grant recipients adapt to this new charge, and invest in capabilities that increase the preparedness of the nation as a whole. With almost $1.2 billion in FY2011 funding, SHSGP and UASI are tools to achieve “target capabilities related to preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to acts of terrorism, consistent with a State homeland security plan and relevant local, tribal, and regional homeland security plans.”13

10 Fact Sheet: Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) Preparedness Grants Portfolio, May 2011.
12 National Academy of Public Administration, Powering the Future: High-Performance Partnerships, April, 2003, defines a partnership as “a mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationship among entities that share responsibilities, authority, and accountability for results. Partners form a shared infrastructure and decision-making apparatus. The partnership is high performance when it achieves goals and outcomes that are meaningful and could not be reached by an individual partner alone.”
13 In the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, (P.L. 110-53), target capabilities are defined as the guidelines to define risk-based target capabilities for Federal, state, local, and tribal government
While terrorist incidents are largely seen as lower-probability events, it was deemed as being in the national interest to address them with federal funds due to their significant consequences. The SHSGP and UASI grant investments target a blend of federal, state, tribal, territorial, regional, and local priorities and seek to integrate homeland security preparedness efforts. The grants recognize that many capabilities that support terrorism preparedness also support preparedness for other hazards.14

**Figure 1. Network of Homeland Security Funding**

Although the current SHSGP and UASI programs were established in 2003, their origins lie in multiple, older federal preparedness programs. The SHSGP and UASI programs have been shaped by numerous congressional acts, presidential directives, and DHS/FEMA guidance. As threats and available resources change, the SHSGP and UASI programs continue to evolve.

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Figure 2 outlines key legislation and guidance that influenced the evolution of SHSGP and UASI. Additional details can be found in Appendix H.

**Figure 2. Key Legislation and Guidance Related to SHSGP and UASI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legislation/Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1996 | **Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act**  
Established grant programs to increase preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related terrorism at the state and local level. |
| 1999 | **DOJ establishes the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program (SDPEP)**  
A precursor to State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP). |
| 2001 | **USA PATRIOT ACT**  
Set a minimum allocation for state preparedness grantees and broadened the purpose of state preparedness grant programs beyond WMD-related attacks. |
| 2002 | **Homeland Security Act**  
Established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FEMA and the DOJ Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) incorporated into DHS. FEMA’s state assistance programs transferred to ODP. |
| 2003 | **DHS Establishes the State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative**  
Administered through the Office of Domestic Preparedness.  
**Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8)**  
Charged DHS with providing funding assistance to states to develop homeland security capabilities; required the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a National Preparedness Goal by FY 2006. |
| 2005 | **Interim National Preparedness Goal**  
Included seven National Priorities, the Universal Task List (UTL), and the Target Capabilities List (TCL). |
| 2006 | **Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act**  
Transferred DHS’s responsibility for the Preparedness Grant Program to FEMA to be administered by a new Grant Programs Directorate. |
| 2007 | **Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act**  
Provided statutory authority for SHSGP and UASI; reduced the minimum allocation for SHSGP grantees; and required at least 25 percent of SHSGP and UASI funds be used for law enforcement terrorism preparedness activities.  
**National Preparedness Guidelines**  
Included a vision, planning scenarios, the UTL, a revised TCL, and eight National Priorities. |
| 2011 | **Presidential Directive 8 (PPD-8)**  
PPD-8 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a National Preparedness Goal within 180 days that would be “informed by the risk of specific threats and vulnerability—taking into account regional variations—and include concrete, measurable and prioritized objectives to mitigate that risk. PPD-8 also requires the creation of “core capabilities” to guide preparedness investments. The National Preparedness Goal, First Edition, was released September 26, 2011. |
COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF THE SHSGP AND UASI PROGRAMS

The SHSGP and UASI programs are administered by FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate (GPD), whose mission is to “manage federal assistance to measurably improve capability and reduce the risks the nation faces in times of man-made and natural disasters.” Both programs operate on a three-year period of performance, and have similar application, reporting, and monitoring procedures.

By design, SHSGP and UASI are collaborative programs. Authorizing statute requires the use of planning committees, either pre-existing multijurisdictional committees or ones established specifically for this purpose, to assist in the preparation of homeland security strategies and in determining effective grant funding priorities. As major incidents are likely to have impacts beyond a single jurisdiction, the need to expand regional collaboration in order to meet the homeland security mission was designated by DHS as a National Priority. As a result, agreements have been adopted by program participants and mechanisms established to provide effective state and regional collaboration. This has been reinforced in FEMA’s FY2011 grant guidance and the National Preparedness Goal, which both emphasize the importance of preparing across the whole community in order to build and sustain the Nation’s collective capabilities.

As part of their common application process, the SHSGP and UASI programs require applicants to submit a grant application that includes up to 15 investment justifications (IJ). Individual investments may cover multiple projects, and impact multiple capabilities. With each investment, applicants must indicate the amount of funding that will be invested in each capability, and whether it will fund building or sustaining capabilities. Investments must be consistent with the applicant’s homeland security strategy. In past years, applicants were required to identify up to ten milestones in their IJs that would be achieved within the three-year period of performance. In 2011, this was replaced with a requirement that applicants describe the anticipated outcomes that would be achieved by each investment. This is a subtle but important shift in FEMA’s management of grants to better focus on results.

Although the allocation factors are different for SHSGP and UASI, both programs use a risk assessment to allocate a significant portion of their funding. DHS calculates risk through an analysis of three variables: threat (the likelihood of an attack); vulnerability (relative exposure to an attack); and consequence (expected impact of an attack). In calculating risk, DHS considers terrorism’s potential impact on people, critical infrastructure, and economic security.

18 The National Preparedness Goal, September 2011, defines ‘whole community’ as “A focus on enabling the participation in national preparedness activities of a wider range of players from the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction with the participation of Federal, state, and local governmental partners in order to foster better coordination and working relationships.”
SHSGP and UASI permit the use of funding for the program activities included in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). These activities are organized into six categories: planning, organizational activities, equipment purchase, training, exercises, and administration. The FY2011 guidance allows for 65 different activities to be funded through either program. Many of these activities are also applicable to developing capabilities that address other types of hazards. Funding dual-use activities is permitted, provided a terrorism preparedness purpose for the investment can be demonstrated by the applicant. At least 25 percent of grant funding must be allocated to sub-grantees for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities. For additional details, see Appendix G Program Crosswalk.

While the scope of activities covered by the SHSGP and UASI programs and the requirements associated with them are similar, there are programmatic differences that impact their implementation. Both the SHSGP and UASI programs have related, but distinct missions that guide how they fund improvements to preparedness.

STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

The SHSGP program was designed to provide states with grant funding to enhance terrorism preparedness capability at the state and local level. According to FEMA, the purpose of the SHSGP program is to provide states with:

> funding to support the implementation of State Homeland Security Strategies to address the identified planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs at the state and local levels to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events.

Eligibility for direct grants under SHSGP is limited to the designated State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) for the 56 states and territories. Within 45 days of receiving the grant, SAAs are required to pass through at least 80 percent of grant funding to their sub-grantees, including city and county governments, tribal governments, first responders, and non-profit organizations.

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21 The National Preparedness Goal, September 2011, identifies 33 core capabilities. These are expected to replace the target capabilities in the Target Capabilities List for the next round of grant funding.
23 Ibid.
26 For the purposes of SHSGP, “states” includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
27 Tribal governments are also eligible to receive direct funding through the Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP), a competitively-awarded, preparedness grant program administered by FEMA. THSGP was outside the scope of this study.
28 Fiscal Year 2011 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview, May 2011.
In FY2011, the SHSGP program received $526,874,100 in funding. Allocation of SHSGP funding is determined based on a combination of the congressionally-mandated baseline funding, assessed risk, and the effectiveness of the proposed investments. In FY2011, the baseline amount allocated to each state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico was 0.355 percent of the total funds, while American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were each allocated 0.08 percent. Allocation of the remaining 92.22 percent of funding was based on a risk assessment formula created by DHS and the effectiveness of the proposed investments. Figure 3 illustrates total SHSGP funding history by fiscal year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total SHSGP Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$566,295,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,685,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$1,062,285,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$528,165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$509,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$862,925,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$861,265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$842,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$526,874,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Urban Areas Security Initiative**

The UASI program was established to strengthen preparedness capability in those urban areas which were assessed to be at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. According to FEMA, the purpose of the UASI program is to:

> address the unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density Urban Areas, and assist them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.\(^{31}\)

\(^{29}\) Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, May 2011.  
\(^{30}\) Fiscal Year 2011 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview, May 2011.  
\(^{31}\) Fiscal Year 2011 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview, May 2011.
In line with the regional nature of the UASI program, the FY2011 grant guidance strongly encourages urban areas to take an inclusive approach to planning and investment, involving local partners and neighboring jurisdictions to enhance regional preparedness capabilities.\(^{32}\)

Upon receipt of the funding, the SAA is obligated to pass through at least 80 percent to authorities in the urban area within 45 days. Any funds retained by the state after that period must be used for activities in direct support of the urban area.\(^{33}\)

Eligibility under the UASI program is tailored to the focus of the program. Following a FEMA risk assessment of the 100 most populous urban areas in the country, those urban areas with the highest level of risk are deemed eligible to receive funding.

Figure 4 illustrates the change in the number of UASIs and the amount of funding they have received for FY 2003-2011. In FY2011, $662,622,100 was granted to 31 UASIs. This represents a significant reduction from FY2010, when 64 urban areas received UASI funding.\(^{34}\) Unlike SHSGP, the UASI program does not use a baseline allocation for urban areas. Funding allocation is based on risk and investment effectiveness. The UASIs are divided into two tiers based on their risk profile.

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**Figure 4. FY 2003-2011 Number of Eligible UASIs and Amount of Funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th># of Tier I UASIs</th>
<th># of Tier II UASIs</th>
<th>Total # of UASIs</th>
<th>UASI Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$596,351,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$675,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$854,656,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>$710,622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$746,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>$781,630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>$798,631,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>$832,520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$662,622,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{32}\) Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, May 2011.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, Dec 2009.
SECTION 3
THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

WHY MEASURE PERFORMANCE?

Performance measurement is the “regular measurement of the results (outcomes) and efficiency of services and programs.” Executive agencies and legislative bodies alike need information on a program’s performance in order to make informed decisions. Public managers can use this information to:

- evaluate how well a program is doing;
- signal the program’s priorities;
- drive a program to a desired end state;
- ensure the proper controls are in place;
- make decisions about future budget investments;
- motivate staff and partners;
- communicate the values of a program;
- promote and celebrate the accomplishments of a program; and
- learn what is or is not working in order to make program improvements.

Although performance data cannot indicate why a program has or has not achieved its desired results, they provide a starting point to investigate the causes of its performance. Conversations among Congress, managers, grant recipients, the public, or other decision makers about the underlying reasons for the results can be incredibly productive and yield important improvements. When established at the outset of a program, performance measures establish an expectation that managers must be able to understand and explain the drivers of performance. When attempting to apply new measures retroactively, however, agencies face significant challenges in data collection and in determining the reasons for the results. A program can have a range of objectives, and the results against those objectives are important to different audiences.

In order to evaluate existing performance measures or develop new ones, it is necessary to start with the concepts and principles of performance measurement. This section provides an overview of key terms and concepts in performance measurement, offers several effective practices in identifying outcome indicators, and discusses challenges in applying these practices to the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP).

KEY CONCEPTS IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Government programs should use their resources to provide services and/or products that help them achieve their goals. This means converting the program’s resources (inputs) into results (outcomes). Performance measures help managers assess the processes, products, or results of a program.\(^3^9\) When measuring performance, work is divided into discrete categories along a sequence of organizational performance. The analysis of this information can help identify areas in which the program is achieving desired results and areas in which improvement or new approaches may be needed. The types of performance information are described in Table 1.

Table 1. Performance Measurement Definitions\(^{40}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>Resources (for example, funding or employee time) used to produce outputs and achieve outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>Products and services delivered during the reporting period. Outputs do not indicate the results achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Outcomes are what these inputs and outputs accomplish. They describe the results of the work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Outcomes</td>
<td>Outcomes that are expected to lead to a desired end, but are not ends in themselves. Intermediate outcomes usually produce more timely information than end outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Outcomes</td>
<td>The end results sought. A program usually has more than one end outcome.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purpose of this study, the key distinction is the difference between outputs and outcomes:

- **Outputs** consist of the products and services delivered by the organization, and do not consider the end result these products and services have. For example, the outputs of a training program may include classes taught and participants enrolled. However, the program’s desired outcome is increased capability among those taught.

- **Outcomes** are the consequences of the program that result from the program’s activities. They can be more difficult to track because there may not be a causal relationship, factors outside the control of the program could impact results, and/or it could take considerable time to achieve results.\(^{41}\)


\(^{40}\) Table 1 is adapted from Comparative Performance Measurement: FY 1996 Data Report as included in Hatry, Harry P. *Performance Measurement: Getting Results*, 2006.

\(^{41}\) Beyond outcomes, some performance measurement systems strive to determine and measure the program’s impacts, or extent of causation, on the outcome. It is often difficult to discern a causal relationship between
It is also important to distinguish between intermediate outcomes and end outcomes. Intermediate outcomes are expected to lead to end outcomes, but are not ends in themselves. For example, conducting a risk assessment is an important intermediate outcome that allows a jurisdiction to understand how it may be threatened by terrorists, but preventing a terrorist incident is the end outcome it wants to achieve. It can be difficult to measure end outcomes that rarely occur, such as those related to acts of terrorism, or those that can only be seen in the long term, such as research and development. Thus, intermediate outcomes offer a proxy by which outcomes can be estimated, and allow for adjustments to ensure desired outcomes are achieved.42

The categories of performance information are illustrated in Figure 5. While Figure 5 depicts moving from inputs to outcomes as a linear event, in reality, preparedness is a dynamic and ongoing cycle.

**Figure 5. Illustrative Logic Model for Homeland Security Grants Performance Measurement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>Building &amp; Sustaining Capabilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Products</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intermediate Outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Funding</td>
<td>• Planning</td>
<td>• State/UASI Homeland Security Strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Staff</td>
<td>• Organizing</td>
<td>• THRAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facilities</td>
<td>• Equipping</td>
<td>• Special response teams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technology</td>
<td>• Training</td>
<td>• Communication systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipment and supplies</td>
<td>• Exercising</td>
<td>• After Action Reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Resources</strong></td>
<td>• Collaborating</td>
<td>• # of trained personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private-sector and non-profit organization resources</td>
<td>• Engaging the community</td>
<td>• Mutual aid agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual actions</td>
<td>• Collecting, analyzing, analyzing and disseminating information</td>
<td>• Intergovernmental/regional collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enabling Legislation or Policy</strong></td>
<td>• Assessing and evaluating</td>
<td>• Intelligence reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Federal statutes, policy and guidance</td>
<td>• Resource typing</td>
<td>• State/UASI capability assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State statutes, policy and guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Common resource terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local statutes, policy and guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>End Outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- National risk profile
- Investments targeted to address priorities
- A functional National Preparedness System
- Capabilities that prepare the Nation

- Actual incidents prevented
- Loss of life and property damage avoided or minimized
- Community recovered
- An understanding of preparedness based on incidents and exercises

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*This model illustrates categories of performance information and is not intended to be exhaustive.*

government programs and their outcomes due to the complexity of different societal factors involved and the contributions of multiple programs and partners.

43 Figure 5 is adapted from Measuring Program Outcomes: A Practical Approach as cited in Hatry, Harry P. *Performance Measurement: Getting Results*, 2006.
EFFECTIVE PRACTICES IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

In the field of performance measurement, a number of practices have emerged as effective ways to construct measures and analyze performance.44

- **Agencies and their programs need to track, and distinguish between, outputs and outcomes as well as between intermediate and end outcomes.** If the maxim *what gets measured gets done* is true, then a program should measure its performance based on outcomes. While outcomes are not always completely within a program’s control, they should be measured as a way to orient the program’s performance toward desired results. Toward that end, a program should identify and measure intermediate outcomes, which by definition occur earlier than end outcomes and are generally indicative of patterns that would tend to affect a certain result.

- **Program objectives should cascade downward from the program’s mission and overarching goal.** Identifying outcomes to measure begins with the program’s mission and goal. These statements identify what major results the program seeks to achieve, and subordinate objectives with desired outcomes cascade from there. Without this goal and subordinate objectives, determining outcomes to measure is difficult.

  Clear objectives allow for the selection of specific measures that offer meaningful insights into the program’s performance. Vague terms such as “enhanced capabilities” or “moderate progress” allow for different interpretations by the multiple people reporting the data and do not have a clear emphasis on results. This limits a manager’s ability to use them to compare performance over time or across programs. Instead, an objective should specify a clear standard for performance within a precise timeframe. The objectives being measured should be within a program’s ability and authority to achieve. While a program may set ambitious objectives, they should be realistic, and reflect the available resources.45

- **Programs should select and develop performance measures based on their importance for achieving outcomes, not based on how easy they are to measure.** If the program neglects to measure a particular outcome because it is not easy to measure, its analysis of performance data will not convey the appropriate story, and the program’s activities may not orient toward achieving the desired outcomes. Programs need to balance the importance of measuring outcomes with the associated reporting burden and cost when selecting measures.

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44 Adapted from Hatry, Harry P. *Performance Measurement: Getting Results*, 2006, unless otherwise noted.
45 These concepts follow the SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-bound) measurement construct found in various forms in the performance measurement literature and has been adapted by FEMA in *State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy: Guidance on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal*, July 2005.
• **Proxies, intermediate outcomes, or outputs can be measured when the end outcomes are difficult to measure.** It is impossible to measure events that do not occur, such as crime or acts of terrorism that were prevented by program activities. Thus, programs that intend to prevent such events often find it difficult to construct indicators of the end outcome. Therefore, proxy measures may be used to track reductions in risk factors, which would be expected to help diminish the chance of a negative incident.

Similarly, measurement is difficult for programs that involve longer time horizons to achieve results. Programs can use intermediate outcomes as surrogate measures for performance. If even intermediate outcomes are too difficult or costly to measure, a program may consider measuring its activities, processes, or outputs if there is a compelling logic to how these are determined.46

• **Both quantitative and qualitative measures are valuable.** Many performance measurement systems favor quantitative metrics for their analysis potential. Qualitative measures can also provide valuable information on performance, particularly in cases where outcomes are difficult to measure or where quantitative data is not available.47 For example, a qualitative measure might capture the degree to which participants in a preparedness training program, or their supervisors, believe that the training enhanced their abilities. Instructors can use this information to improve the training program, and supervisors can use it to determine whether to send additional personnel.

As previously discussed, measuring end outcomes for prevention activities is difficult, but indicators can be supplemented by qualitative data or case studies that illustrate how a program has made a difference. This might demonstrate, for example, how grant funding was used to pay for training resulting in improved capabilities in a subsequent incident. This has the added benefit of alleviating concerns of program managers, staff, partners, and stakeholders that the quantitative data may not capture the full benefits of a program or may oversimplify truly complex issues. Providing qualitative measures and information in parallel with quantitative measures can allow a program to tell a more complete story of its results.

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In the field of homeland security, many programs have outcomes that are difficult to measure. The SHSGP and UASI programs defy many of the typical practices used in performance measurement described above. The Panel identified major challenges to developing quantitative measures of effectiveness for the UASI and SHSGP programs. These include:

- **UASI and SHSGP fund activities that are also supported by other funding sources.** The UASI and SHSGP programs, by design, do not operate in isolation from other terrorism preparedness efforts at the state, tribal, territorial, and local levels. In order to participate, grantees are required to design and implement a comprehensive homeland security strategy that integrates activities funded through federal grants, state, tribal, territorial, and local funding, and contributions from the private, non-profit, and community sectors. That SHSGP and UASI funds are co-mingled with other sources makes it difficult to discern the outcomes that result explicitly from these grants. Trying to isolate the impacts of these two grants on the desired preparedness end outcomes by segregating the funding would fracture the integrated system that is needed for success.

- **UASI and SHSGP lack measurable standards to guide performance.** In any performance measurement system, objectives for a particular program should cascade from a chief goal. Equally important for preparedness are the measurable capabilities needed to meet these objectives. They should serve as benchmarks to measure against and inform grantees’ preparedness investments. These measurable capabilities have been required by statute, and PPD-8 (issued on March 31, 2011) has established a timeline for their completion. The National Preparedness Goal with associated core capabilities was released in draft for public review on August 22, 2011, and the final Goal was released on September 26, 2011. The Panel is concerned that the Goal does not provide sufficient measurable capability targets to address the challenge—an issue discussed in more detail in Section 4.

- **Baseline data for SHSGP and UASI are incomplete.** Federal funds are meant to fill the gaps between what state, tribal, territorial, and local governments would do on their own and meeting the national interest to be prepared for high-consequence, low-probability terrorist incidents. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there was a strong interest in making additional funds available to state, tribal, territorial and local governments to begin filling those gaps as quickly as possible. Conducting a baseline assessment of the Nation’s capabilities was not a priority at that time.

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48 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. (P.L. 109-295). Section 641(1) defines capability as the ability to provide the means to accomplish one or more tasks under specific conditions and to specific performance standards; Section 646 requires the FEMA Administrator to ensure that the guidelines on target capabilities are specific, flexible, and measurable.

49 The definitions of the core capabilities can be found in Appendix I.
FEMA has expended considerable effort to re-create this baseline by analyzing past grantee reports and other information to determine changes in specific capacities and capabilities. These assessments include, but are not limited to: urban search and rescue coverage; established emergency management standards; improved planning; incident command system training; interoperable communications; intelligence and information sharing; prepositioning of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives equipment caches; chemical response capability; bomb squad capabilities; and SWAT teams. These focused assessments provide a valuable baseline for FEMA to use to demonstrate changes in these capabilities over time. However, the baseline is incomplete due to limitations of the data and the resources available to mine and analyze the data.

- **UASI and SHSGP are delegated to other levels of government.** Funds for these grant programs are passed from the federal government to states and then to local and tribal governments for use on activities that are developed by the grantees and sub-grantees. FEMA is not directly responsible for the execution of the activities funded by the grants, and must rely on reporting by grantees and sub-grantees to measure outcomes. This feature of the program is intended to allow for comprehensive planning and integrated execution at the level of government most appropriate to the task, while also incorporating the priorities of the federal government through guidance, policy, and the review and approval of grants. This structure does, however, pose coordination challenges for the federal government. It creates the need for FEMA to provide clear guidance and execute appropriate oversight on grantees, who in return must demonstrate performance against goals and objectives. DHS/FEMA can validate the grantees’ self-assessed, self-reported information if personnel with appropriate skills and training are available.

- **The effectiveness of prevention activities is difficult to measure.** Many of the activities funded by UASI and SHSGP are intended to boost prevention capabilities. However, prevention outcomes are particularly difficult to evaluate—it is challenging to measure success when success means that an event does not occur. Intermediate outcomes are useful as proxies for the end outcome in this case. For example, the reduction of certain risk factors could be tracked as a surrogate indicator for preventing acts of crime or terrorism. However, a decrease in such risk factors only tends to decrease vulnerability to an unwanted event; it does not indicate progress toward an outcome.

- **Preparedness is dynamic.** Performance measures capture information at the moment of reporting, which provides a snapshot in time. However, operational readiness is not static—risks change; trained personnel turn over; equipment requires servicing; and partnerships are built or dissolved. These factors, along with many others, change quickly.

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50 Tribes can apply directly to FEMA for grants under the Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program and as SHSGP and UASI sub-grantees through the processes established by each state and UASI.

51 Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295) defines “operational readiness” as the capability of an organization, an asset, a system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed.
and impact grantees’ preparedness at any given time. Fortunately, acts of terrorism are not frequent occurrences, and our Nation’s activities aim to prevent them or mitigate their impacts. However, the dynamic nature reduces real-world opportunities to evaluate how well our Nation’s capability-building efforts have prepared us.

**UASI and SHSGP provide longer-term periods of performance.** UASI and SHSGP grants have three-year periods of performance. While this period of performance may be appropriate to the scale and scope of the activities conducted with the grant, it does complicate the development of annual measures of performance. Annual measures for multi-year grants are desirable because they match federal budget and appropriations cycles and provide opportunities to assess performance and make mid-course corrections. This does not mean that appropriate periods of performance should be reduced for ease of measurement.

**Nationally aggregated data has limits.** The outcomes achieved by grantees have a similar purpose—to improve preparedness. However, the appropriate outcomes will vary widely based on the risk, capability gaps, and resources available to each grantee. This makes each set of anticipated outcomes unique to each grantee. The number and complexity of outcomes may be substantially different among grantees; treating them similarly will obscure some of these important distinctions. Therefore, reporting an aggregated national number for several of the Panel’s measures will not produce a useful picture by itself and must be read in conjunction with the underlying data to produce a meaningful picture. Together, these data allow FEMA to provide accountability, drive performance of the grants, and promote understanding among individual grantees and the Congress.
SECTION 4
PERFORMANCE MEASURE RECOMMENDATIONS

OVERVIEW

Congress, all levels of government, and the public want answers to the following questions:

- Is the Nation prepared?
- How much more prepared is the Nation since September 11, 2001?

These are complex questions that involve natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-made disasters. As a nation, we are more than the sum of the towns, cities, counties, states, tribes, territories, and regions of which we are composed. Understanding whether the Nation is prepared requires a precise examination of the threats, vulnerability, and consequences for each jurisdiction and the Nation as a whole. Preparedness relies on efforts and funding at all levels of government. State and urban area preparedness include more inputs than those funded through the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). By design, these programs foster collaborative efforts across levels of government and jurisdictions. This creates a preparedness system that relies on networked resources in order to succeed. It would be incredibly difficult and potentially disruptive to the integrated homeland security efforts of the states and urban areas to separate out the contributions of these two grant programs from the mix of other federal grants; funding and efforts by local, state, tribal, and territorial governments; and contributions from the private sector and community groups.

To answer these questions, the Nation needs established standards. Efforts have evolved over time through the development of doctrine, policies, and guidance. The most recent is the effort underway to implement Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8). The National Preparedness Goal was released on September 26, 2011. The Panel reviewed the document and found its emphasis on collaboration across jurisdictions and levels of government laudable. The Panel had been encouraged by the inclusion of national-level, measureable performance objectives in the draft Goal for the response and recovery mission areas, but these were not included in the final document.

The Goal document does include preliminary capability targets—performance threshold(s) for each core capability—and states that performance measures will be developed to be used to assess both preparedness capacity and gaps. The Goal document states that these are not intended to be targets for any single jurisdiction or agency, and that achieving these targets will require a national effort involving the whole community. However, only having national level, one-size-fits-all capability targets does not communicate to state and urban areas the levels of capabilities they should plan for, build, and sustain to fulfill the desired national capability targets. Without additional clarification by DHS/FEMA, the states and urban areas will need to continue to establish capability levels for themselves, which may or may not satisfy the national interest. Some of this missing specificity may be provided as implementation of PPD-8 proceeds through the development of the National Frameworks, National Preparedness System, and performance measures for capability targets. **The Panel strongly recommends that as DHS/FEMA moves forward with PPD-8 it develops more specific or additional capability targets that states and urban areas should strive to achieve and measure progress against.**
Given these two challenges, the Panel focused its efforts on developing measures that capture how the grants contribute to preparedness based on the activities allowed, required, or leveraged through the grants. Where the impact of the grants could not be distinguished from other funding sources, the Panel selected some measures that demonstrate these shared preparedness outcomes as a proxy for the effectiveness of the UASI and SHSGP grants. These outcomes are the result of performance partnerships where partners are jointly responsible for the achievement of preparedness goals. Many federal agencies use a proxy approach where responsibility for achieving end outcomes is shared.\(^{52}\)

The Panel prioritized its measures, recognizing that some require the aggregation of dissimilar data. Those measures identified as “priority” tie more directly to the results of the grant programs, or their proxies, with fewer concerns about the aggregation of dissimilar data. The Panel finds that collectively these measures begin to address the effectiveness of the two grant programs. The Panel recommends the set of measures described in this section. Some of the measures are new; others are either adaptations of FEMA measures, or current FEMA measures.

Measures are not one-size-fits-all and should be selected with their purpose and audience in mind.\(^{53}\) As this study was directed by Congress, the Panel has developed measures with it in mind as the primary audience. In some cases, the measures capture the results of grant requirements as these are the fundamental activities required by Congress in statute or FEMA in guidance. Reporting on the results of such requirements demonstrates that both the grantor and grantee are executing the grants in the manner intended, and are completing the activities Congress and FEMA had reason to specifically require.

These measures are designed to demonstrate the performance of the two grant programs and be useful to Congress, FEMA, and grantees. First, Congress and FEMA can use them to address program plans and priorities. Second, FEMA officials should use them to facilitate discussions with grantees about how to ensure the grants meet their goals. Third, grantees should use them to not only compare their performance with national trends, but also use the information generated to shape their plans and priorities for future investments and activities. Outcome measurements do not tell why the outcomes occurred, rather they identify what results occurred. This provides a starting point for a program to investigate the causes of its performance. In the end, the measures should give confidence to all participants in the homeland security arena that partners they rely on as part of the National Preparedness System are enhancing their capabilities and will be better poised to provide assistance in future incidents. The Panel recognizes the sensitive nature of the data being reported and that certain information may not be suitable for broad distribution.

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\(^{52}\) For example, the Department of Health and Human Services Safe Schools/Healthy Students Program measures the decrease in the percentage of high school students who have been in a physical fight on school property. The Department of the Interior measures the number and percent of migratory bird species are at healthy and sustainable levels. Both of these measures reflect program results as well as many other external factors.

Although these measures should be useful, the Panel recognizes that they do not tell the complete story and FEMA will need to develop additional quantitative and qualitative program and activity level measures to help manage these grant programs in the future.

This set of measures is presented in three parts:

- **Part 1: Effective, Targeted Grant Investments** – These measures examine the elements that are needed to make sure that grant investments are targeted to priorities and effectively carried out.

- **Part 2: Context Measures** – While not performance measures per se, these provide meaningful context to help understand and improve the execution of the grant programs.

- **Part 3: Collaboration Measures** – This part discusses measures the Panel recommends that FEMA should develop to capture an important facet of grant performance.

**Key to the Measures**

The Panel was charged with assisting the FEMA Administrator with studying, developing, and implementing quantitative performance measures. The measures are presented in a format that provides context to the measure and addresses implementation issues. The description for each measure includes:

- **Significance of Measure** – Each measure is introduced with a description of the significance of the measure. It describes what is being measured and why it is important to measure that aspect of grant performance. It also identifies the type of measure (output, intermediate outcome, or end outcome) and whether the Panel considers it to be a priority measure.

- **Measure** – This is the actual language of the measure. Each measure is numbered and some have multiple parts (e.g. 3a, 3b).

- **Example** – Examples are provided for each measure to demonstrate how the reported results would be communicated.

- **Issues for Implementation** – To assist FEMA with implementation, the Panel has outlined issues the Agency will need to address. These include definitions of terms, how to ensure quality of data, and how the results of the data may be used to improve performance. A potential reporting mechanism is identified, although the Panel recognizes that due to system limitations alternative mechanisms may be preferable. The reporting workload for the measures is also identified.

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54 As noted elsewhere in the report, the Panel finds that qualitative measures are also important, but developing such measures was beyond the scope of this study.
LIST OF RECOMMENDED MEASURES

Part 1: Effective and Targeted Grant Investments

Priority measures are highlighted in red and underlined.

Foundational Activities

Measure 1: Number of current, FEMA-approved state and UASI risk assessments.

Measure 2: Number of state and UASI homeland security strategies in compliance with update requirements.

Strengthening Preparedness: Strategies, Investments, and Capabilities

Measure 3: Percentage and number of measurable homeland security strategy objectives achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.

Measure 4: The percentage and number of proposed grant outcomes achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.

Measure 5: Level and change in each core capability demonstrated by the states and UASIs.

Preventing Terrorist Incidents

Measure 6: Percentage of achievement of each critical operational capability by the fusion centers.

Demonstrating Preparedness Outcomes

Measure 7a: Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during incidents.

Measure 7b: Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during exercises.
Measure 8a: Number of critical task corrective actions identified and completed following grant-funded exercises.

Measure 8b: Number of critical task corrective actions identified and completed following incidents.

Measure 8c: Number of recurring, critical task failures identified following incidents in the past three years.

Part 2: Context Measures

Grant Execution

Measure 9a: Number of program improvements identified during programmatic monitoring, agreed upon by FEMA and grantee, corrected within the specified timeframe.

Measure 9b: Number of financial deficiencies identified during financial monitoring corrected within the specified timeframe.

Expenditure of Grant Funds

Measure 10: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI grant funds reverted.

Grant Funding Profile

Measure 11a: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to build each core capability.

Measure 11b: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to sustain each core capability.

Part 3: Collaboration Measures

The Panel recommends that FEMA conduct an assessment of collaborative approaches, in coordination with local jurisdictions, states, regions, and urban areas, and use the results to develop a scoring system for future quantitative or qualitative performance measures on collaboration and to assist program participants to strengthen their performance on this critical issue.
PART 1: EFFECTIVE AND TARGETED GRANT INVESTMENTS

Introduction

The measures in this section focus on how to get targeted, effective grant investments that contribute to desired preparedness outcomes. These measures target things either required by or leveraged with the SHSGP or UASI grants; they are interconnected and contribute to the effectiveness of the grant programs. These connections are illustrated in a simplified cycle in Figure 6. In reality, this cycle is far more complex.

Figure 6. Targeting Grant Investments to Achieve Preparedness Outcomes

Homeland security strategies help states and UASIs target their investments in preparedness capabilities. In order to develop and maintain a homeland security strategy, some foundational activities are required, including, but not limited to, a risk assessment (Measure 1) and regular updates to the homeland security strategy (Measure 2).

The purpose of the homeland security strategy is to guide efforts to build and sustain preparedness capabilities within states and urban areas. Demonstrating the degree to which the measurable objectives within the homeland security strategies are being met (Measure 3) allows FEMA and grantees to understand the progress being made over time. Homeland security strategies focus preparedness efforts across jurisdictions, within states and urban areas, and across funding sources. The SHSGP and UASI grants are only two of the funding mechanisms
states and urban areas use to implement their homeland security strategies. Each state and UASI grant application specifies expected outcomes for that grant cycle, and Measure 4 demonstrates the degree to which those outcomes are achieved. Capabilities developed or sustained can be tracked through the annual capability assessment (Measure 5). Capabilities for terrorism prevention are unique among the mission areas in that they specifically focus on imminent terrorist threats. Therefore, progress on prevention capabilities should be highlighted (Measure 6).

Considering the significant investment of public funds in these capabilities, it is important to demonstrate results. Capabilities can best be demonstrated through their use in incidents or exercises (Measure 7) as part of a continuous cycle of improvement (Measure 8).

Together, these measures capture important elements of the homeland security preparedness cycle.

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**Foundational Activities**

In order to have effective, targeted grant investments, there are some foundational activities that need to be completed by grantees. It is important to start with a thorough understanding of a grantee’s risk profile. This will be used to create a homeland security strategy that seeks to minimize the vulnerability to those risks by preventing potential incidents, protecting assets, shaping response and recovery efforts, and mitigating against potential damage. It is important to track the completion of these activities and to ensure both timeliness and quality. Measures 1 and 2 report on the achievement of two of these foundational activities.

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**Measure 1: Number of current, FEMA-approved state and UASI risk assessments.**

**Significance of Measure 1:** This is a modified version of an existing FEMA measure. Valid risk assessments, combined with an understanding of the gap in needed capabilities, are part of the foundation states and UASIs need to develop quality homeland security strategies. As these assessments are grant requirements, Congress can expect a high target and actual results for this measure. However, risk assessments are desirable to measure because they are the basis for effective grant investments by grantees. These assessments also provide FEMA with “bottoms up” input that can be used to improve understanding of the national risk profile, and may help FEMA allocate grant funding effectively.56 This is an output/intermediate outcome measure.

**Example:**
FY20XX:
##/56 current, FEMA-approved state risk assessments57
##/31 current, FEMA-approved UASI risk assessments58

**Issues for Implementation:** FEMA included a new requirement in the FY2011 grant guidance for states to conduct risk assessments through a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA).

The FY2011 grant guidance requires only states and not UASIs to complete formal risk assessments. The Panel finds that the same reasoning requiring risk assessments for states also applies to UASIs. **Therefore, the Panel recommends that USAIs be required to complete risk assessments beginning in Fiscal Year 2012.** Many UASIs already conduct risk

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56 Each year, eligible metropolitan areas and states are provided the opportunity to submit information relevant to the risk assessment FEMA uses to determine grant allocations and to review the risk assessment once completed.
57 For the purposes of SHSGP, “states” includes the 50 states, District of Columbia, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
58 In FY2011, FEMA allocated UASI funding to 31 urban areas.
assessments and these efforts may satisfy the new risk assessment requirement. The use of standard assessment requirements by all states and UASIs would provide consistency and comparability.

FEMA indicated in the FY2011 grant guidance that additional guidance on the production of THIRAs will be forthcoming. **The Panel recommends that this additional guidance be very clear about the responsibilities and expectations for the risk assessment.** The guidance should specify the frequency of updating the risk assessment in order to provide relevant information needed to complete the biennial update of homeland security strategies. The guidance should also outline the FEMA approval process for risk assessments. This information would provide the definitions for current and FEMA-approved as used in the measure. If FEMA implements the Panel’s recommendation to also have UASIs complete risk assessments, the guidance should make clear how risk assessments already completed by UASIs may be applied toward or adapted to the new risk assessment requirement.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would submit THIRAs to FEMA for approval through the process outlined in FEMA’s forthcoming guidance.60

**Reporting Workload:** While there was no change in reporting requirements for states from the FY2011 grant guidance, this was a new grant requirement that would require additional work by grantees and FEMA to develop, review, and approve THIRAs. UASIs would need to complete a risk assessment and submit it to FEMA for approval.

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**Measure 2: Number of state and UASI homeland security strategies in compliance with update requirements.**

**Significance of Measure 2:** The risks and threats posed by terrorism change quickly, and so too must terrorism preparedness strategies. State and UASI homeland security strategies are intended to bring focus to all homeland security preparedness efforts, not just those funded by these two grants. Collectively, these strategies strive to make the Nation more prepared. Therefore it is important that homeland security strategies are regularly updated and reflect the most current risk assessments and capability assessments (Measure 5). The FY2011 grant guidance states that updates will now be required every two years.61 As these are grant requirements, Congress can expect a high target and actual results for this measure; however, the strategies are desirable to

59 Testimony by Ron Lane, Director of County of San Diego Office of Emergency Service before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, June 8, 2011; comments by Working Group Members; and comments by UASI participants in the Academy’s roundtable.

60 To minimize burden on grantees, FEMA has indicated that they intend to build on the widely known and understood Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) submission and approval process in developing the THIRA guidance.

measure and report on because they are the basis for effective grant investments. This is an output/intermediate outcome measure.

**Example:**
FY20XX:
##/56 State homeland security strategies in compliance with update requirements.
##/31 UASI homeland security strategies in compliance with update requirements.

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a new measure based on FEMA requirements. The current FEMA guidance on homeland security strategies was issued in 2005.\(^2\) FEMA has indicated that it intends to update this guidance in FY2012. **The Panel recommends that FEMA update this guidance to require that states and UASIs incorporate information from their most recent risk assessments, capability assessments, lessons learned from exercises and incidents, and changes in funding profiles into the measurable objectives and priorities of their homeland security strategies.** The updated guidance will facilitate grantees’ ability to maintain the relevant, quality homeland security strategies needed to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. When reviewing homeland security strategy updates, FEMA must ensure that requirements are met and that measurable objectives are articulated.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would submit updated homeland security strategies to FEMA through their SAA.

**Reporting Workload:** No additional reporting is required.


**Strengthening Preparedness: Strategies, Investments, and Capabilities**

At their core, the grants provide for states and urban areas to develop preparedness strategies, target investments in preparedness capabilities, and assess achievement of those capabilities over time. Together, measuring these efforts creates a feedback loop that can validate progress and highlight disconnects. For example, if a grantee achieves an objective of its homeland security strategy, but does not see the expected change in a capability, FEMA and the grantee can examine “why not?” The components of this feedback loop are captured in measures 3, 4, and 5.

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**Measure 3: Percentage and number of measurable homeland security strategy objectives achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.**

**Significance of Measure 3:** Homeland security strategies are intended to guide all state and urban area preparedness efforts, not just those funded by these two grants. FEMA guidance requires grantees to develop measurable objectives\(^63\) in their homeland security strategies following the SMART construct.\(^64\) States and urban areas must demonstrate in their grant applications how their proposed investments link to the measurable objectives in their homeland security strategies. This requires significant collaboration across jurisdictions, within the states and urban areas, to agree to specific, measurable objectives and to determine each jurisdiction’s anticipated contribution toward meeting these objectives. This measure demonstrates states’ and urban areas’ progress towards achieving the measurable objectives identified in their homeland security strategies. This is an intermediate outcome measure.

**Example:**
Grantees achieved % (##/##) of the measurable objectives in their state homeland security strategies
Grantees achieved % (##/##) of the measurable objectives in their UASI homeland security strategies

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a modified version of an existing FEMA measure. Progress on homeland security strategies will accrue over time and should be reported annually. Grantees are not to be expected to make progress on every objective every year. They need to prioritize their limited resources and sequence activities that build upon one another. To achieve this, objectives may be established over timeframes that span multiple updates to the homeland

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\(^63\) DHS’s guidance on *State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy: Guidance on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal*, July 2005, requires states and urban areas to develop goals, objectives, and implementation steps. The guidance states that an objective “sets a target level of performance over time expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value or rate.”

\(^64\) The SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-bound) construct is found in various forms in the performance measurement literature and has been adapted by DHS/FEMA in *State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy: Guidance on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal*, July 2005.
security strategy. Therefore, targets for this measure will need to change as the strategies are updated.

Achieving the measurable objectives of a homeland security strategy does not necessarily mean that work is complete. Continued investment may be needed to build upon or sustain these results. Updates to the homeland security strategies will need to prioritize efforts based on the availability of funding and reflect any subsequent work as new measurable objectives. It is anticipated that the objectives of each strategy may be revised, added, removed, or otherwise reset when the homeland security strategies are updated.

The Panel recognizes that a shortcoming of this measure is that it treats each objective equally when aggregating the data nationwide. It is important that grantees develop and report on high-quality objectives. The emphasis need not be on identification of a large number of easily achievable outcomes, but on those that address significant results. Addressing these challenges is a shared responsibility between the grantee and FEMA. States and urban areas have a responsibility to select and prioritize objectives appropriate to the scale and scope of their homeland security strategies. FEMA has a responsibility to work with the states and urban areas, as part of their review of the homeland security strategies and the grant applications, to ensure that quality objectives are developed and that grantees’ investments reflect the priorities of their homeland security strategies. FEMA should make this expectation clear when they update the homeland security strategy guidance.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would submit homeland security strategies for review and report on progress through the Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports (BSIR), State Preparedness Report, or the biennial monitoring.

**Reporting Workload:** Grantees are already required to identify in their grant applications how their proposed investments link to their homeland security strategy’s objectives. Grantees would report annually on the completion of objectives. FEMA would report the aggregate percentage completion for the objectives included in all homeland security strategies.

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**Measure 4:** The percentage and number of proposed grant outcomes achieved by SHSGP or UASI grantees.

**Significance of Measure 4:** Key to assessing the performance of the grant programs is the degree to which grantees are achieving what they set out to achieve with each grant. Grantees develop their grant applications through deliberative processes to meet the statutory requirement that grant investments be consistent with homeland security strategies. If grantees do not

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achieve their proposed grant outcomes, they may not make the expected progress in achieving the objectives in their homeland security strategies. Understanding why a grantee may or may not be meeting its proposed outcomes can help FEMA and the grantees improve grant performance. This measure demonstrates the extent to which grantees have achieved their intermediate or end outcomes.

Example:
Grantees achieved % (##/##) of their proposed FY20XX SHSGP grant outcomes
Grantees achieved % (##/##) of their proposed FY20XX UASI grant outcomes

Issues for Implementation: This is a new measure based on FEMA requirements. Each grantee has unique needs and priorities and must choose outcomes appropriate to the scale and scope of their grant. SHSGP and UASI grants have three-year periods of performance. It will take the full three years to achieve all of the outcomes identified in each grant application. It is important that grantees develop and report on high-quality outcomes. The emphasis need not be on the identification of a large number of easily achievable outcomes, but on those that address significant results. FEMA has the responsibility to work with grantees as part of their review of the grant application to make sure that appropriate outcomes have been identified. If either the grantee or the grantor does not meet its responsibility in determining appropriate content and number of outcomes, this measure loses value.

Building and sustaining capabilities is a long-term effort likely to extend beyond the period of performance of a single grant, and therefore the outcomes identified in each grant application are likely to be intermediate outcomes. Achieving an outcome proposed in an individual grant does not necessarily mean that an end outcome has been achieved and that no further work or investment is needed. A legitimate outcome for a grant application may be the demonstration that a capability has been sustained.

As FEMA analyzes the data reported under this measure, it should be cognizant that the range of outcomes achieved by grantees may be more important than the national average. As part of FEMA’s ongoing dialogue on performance with grantees, it will want to consider not just the outcomes achieved, but also the progress made on outcomes that may not have been fully achieved.

Reporting Mechanism: States and UASIs would identify outcomes in their investment justifications and report progress through the BSIR.

Reporting Workload: FY2011 grant guidance requires grantees to propose the outcomes that will be achieved as a result of each investment. Grantees would need to report whether or not they have achieved the outcomes they proposed in their grant application. FEMA would report annually on the grants closed out that year.
Measure 5: Level and change in each core capability demonstrated by the states and UASIs.

Significance of Measure 5: This is a Panel priority measure. The purpose of these grants is to build and sustain preparedness capabilities consistent with homeland security strategies. This measure demonstrates the degree to which grantees have accomplished this. While these grants are an important contribution to the development of capabilities, the outcomes are also the result of significant investments by states, tribes, territories, UASIs, and local jurisdictions. The degree to which the grants contribute to any specific capability vary by grantee over time. It is not feasible to identify the specific impacts of the grant funding on capability levels. It is feasible, however, to track capability level to which these grants have contributed. This is a meaningful proxy for the grants’ effectiveness in building and sustaining core capabilities. For descriptions of the core capabilities, see Appendix I.

Statute requires states to conduct annual capability assessments and report the results. This information can shape many program decisions and drive performance including where to focus grant investments to fill gaps; progress against capability targets; or areas that could benefit from technical assistance. The analysis of this data can help Congress and the Administration begin to answer the question how prepared are we? This is an intermediate outcome measure.

Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capability</th>
<th>Number of States Demonstrating Capability Level*</th>
<th>Average Capability Level</th>
<th>Number of States With Change in Capability Level</th>
<th>Overall Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase Sustain Decrease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td># # # # #</td>
<td>#</td>
<td># # #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Warning and Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and Cultural Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart incorporates the 1-5 scale of the 2011 State Preparedness Report Survey.

A similar chart would be developed to report the results of the UASI capability assessments.
**Issues for Implementation:** This is a modified version of an existing FEMA measure. The Panel finds that how capabilities work when tested through exercises and incidents provides the best evidence of performance; however, this is not the only input into the capability assessment as not all capabilities can be tested every year. This measure supplements this testing data with other assessments to determine whether or not particular components of a capability are in place. Measure 7 addresses exercise and incident outcome information.

A concern about past capability assessments, articulated by many to the Panel, is that they relied on a subjective scoring system. The Panel finds that it is critical that FEMA and grantees use a precise, comparative scoring system. FEMA has updated the capability assessment scoring system used in the 2011 State Preparedness Report survey to provide more specific definitions for each grade on the scale. This is a meaningful improvement to the capability assessment, and it could be further strengthened by aligning the scoring system to the capability targets being determined during the implementation of PPD-8. Consistently applying such a precise scoring system will allow for comparability across grantees and over time. It will take several years of consistent application in order to determine patterns and trends.

An additional concern is that evaluation of capabilities is determined solely through a self-assessment by grantees. **While self-assessment will likely remain an important part of each grantee’s internal assessment, the Panel strongly recommends that at least random samples of the capability assessments be independently reviewed through a process coordinated by FEMA.** FEMA should work with the grantees to establish an independent review process that may include FEMA staff, experts from other agencies, peers from states and UASIs, third-party experts in academia and the private sector, or others. Development of this review process must address how the results of the independent review will be incorporated into the final capability assessment.

The Panel finds the same reasoning that makes a capability assessment desirable for a state also applies to UASIs. Many UASIs already do some analysis of their capabilities. To improve data quality and comparability, UASIs should use the same scoring system as the states. **Therefore, the Panel recommends that USAIs be required to complete capability assessments and report on the results beginning in FY2012.**

Equally important is the communication of these results. FEMA communicates these results to a limited audience. The chart presented above provides a snapshot of the information collected as part of the capability assessment. Presented online, each line of the chart could link to a page with qualitative information describing the contribution of the capability to preparedness and provide examples of how grantees are using the grant funding to build and sustain these capabilities. Brief examples can be provided showcasing grantees putting these capabilities to use. Not only would this better illustrate the importance of investing in these capabilities, it provides a way to reward high performing grantees by recognizing their achievements. This information should highlight range of states and UASIs capability levels as well as their average.

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66 The *National Preparedness Goal*, September 2011, states that the capability targets—performance threshold(s) for each core capability—will serve as the basis for the development of performance measures to track progress.
FEMA data show that there are wide ranges of capability levels across states that are not apparent when focusing exclusively on averages. The Panel recommends that FEMA use the information gained through the assessments to analyze and communicate national and regional trends that can help better focus homeland security strategies and prioritize grant investments.

It is important to note that periodic increases and decreases in capability levels are to be expected as standards, technology, and new practices evolve. Targets for this measure will need to be adjusted as this occurs.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would submit their capability assessment through the existing email process.

**Reporting Workload:** No change for states. UASIs would need to complete the capability assessment and submit the results. FEMA would need to coordinate the review process and analyze results to show capability levels and trends for states and UASIs.
Preventing Terrorist Incidents

Measure 6: Percentage of achievement of each critical operational capability by the fusion centers.

Significance of Measure 6: This is a Panel priority measure. The Academy Panel has selected the prevention mission area for a measure because, unlike the other mission areas (protection, mitigation, response, and recovery), it is specifically focused on imminent terrorist threats.67

According to the National Security Strategy, “...we will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have the capability to share classified information; establish a nationwide framework for reporting suspicious activity; and implement an integrated approach to our counterterrorism information systems.” Key to this effort is the National Network of Fusion Centers. In accordance with guidance,68 fusion centers, in partnership with the Federal Government, have prioritized four critical operational capabilities (COCs)—Receive, Analyze, Disseminate, and Gather—and Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Protections for initial measurement focus. The FY2011 SHSGP and UASI grant guidance include the maturation and enhancement of the National Network of Fusion Centers as a priority. It requires grantees to report progress towards the achievement of the fundamental level of COCs. The Panel finds FEMA’s approach to demonstrating the degree to which fusion centers have achieved COCs is worthwhile and endorses this effort. This is an intermediate outcome measure.

Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Operational Capability</th>
<th>Fusion Center Level of Achievement of Critical Operational Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receive</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminate</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy, Civil Rights, Civil Liberty Protections</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a current FEMA measure. The Academy Panel recognizes that this is a time-limited measure, because it is in the national interest to move beyond baseline capabilities to full maturation of the National Network of Fusion Centers. The FY2011 grant guidance indicates that fusion centers will be required to participate in an annual Fusion Center Assessment Program.\(^{69}\) DHS has indicated that it will work with fusion centers and federal partners to institute a repeatable assessment process and the Panel expects that multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, will participate.\(^{70}\) **The Panel recommends that this assessment process include a validation component as was included in the 2010 Baseline Capability Assessment.**\(^{71}\) Additionally, the guidance states that fusion centers will need to participate in exercises every two years that test their capabilities and inform an overall assessment of their performance. These exercises will provide an important opportunity to demonstrate the performance of the fusion centers and DHS should work with the range of agencies that collaborate in fusion centers to develop and execute quality exercises and a precise, comparative scoring system.

In coordination with federal partners, DHS should continue development of measures for the prevention mission area, in accordance with the National Prevention Framework and PPD-8. This will require it to improve the prevention preliminary capability targets and performance measures being developed under PPD-8. The Panel’s measure focuses on the development of a prevention capability by the states and urban areas that is at least partially funded by these grants. **The Panel recommends that DHS, in coordination with federal partners, include measures that capture end outcomes regardless of funding source or responsible government entity in the annual reporting efforts required under PPD-8.** The Panel recognizes that there may be limits to what can be reported publicly due to the sensitive nature of this information.

**Reporting Mechanism:** Fusion centers would participate in the annual Fusion Center Assessment Program coordinated by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and this information would be shared with FEMA and the respective State Administrative Agencies as appropriate and in accordance with existing reporting mechanisms.\(^{72}\)

**Reporting Workload:** While there is no change in reporting requirements for states from the FY2011 grant guidance, this is a new grant requirement that would require additional work by grantees.

\(^{69}\) This is the updated name for the Baseline Capability Assessment referred to in the Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program: Grant Guidance and Application Kit, May 2011.


\(^{72}\) DHS/FEMA has streamlined the reporting process specified in the FY2011 grant guidance to avoid redundant reporting.
Demonstrating Preparedness Outcomes

Measure 7a: Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during incidents.

Measure 7b: Scoring of state and UASI preparedness capabilities based on performance during exercises.

Significance of Measure 7a and 7b: This is a Panel priority measure. The purpose of these grants is to build and sustain preparedness capabilities consistent with homeland security strategies. This measure demonstrates the degree to which grantees have accomplished this. The best way to determine if capabilities are truly effective is to test them through exercises and during incidents. Exercises are used to assess the readiness of capabilities systems and to identify weak points. Capabilities are not intended to, but can fail during incidents. It is standard practice that both exercises and incidents are evaluated to understand how participants and systems performed. By using an anchored, evaluative scoring system, grantees can demonstrate current capability levels as required by statute. This will allow FEMA and grantees to identify and prioritize capability gaps to target future grant priorities and investments.

While these grants are an important contribution to the development of capabilities, the outcomes are also the result of significant investments by states, tribes, territories, UASIs, and local jurisdictions. The degree to which the grants contribute to any specific preparedness capability vary by grantee over time. It is not feasible to identify the specific impact of the grant funding on preparedness capability scores. It is feasible, however, to track scores of preparedness capabilities to which these grants have contributed. This is a meaningful proxy for the grants’ effectiveness.

73 Under Section 2022(a)(4) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), states and urban areas are required to participate in exercises and report on their outcomes.
Similar charts would be developed to report the scores by states or UASIs for each mission area for exercises and each mission area for incidents.

### States’ Capability Scores for Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Area</th>
<th>Capability Evaluated</th>
<th>Number of Exercises Reported</th>
<th>Number of States Represented</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>Capability 1</td>
<td>#/##</td>
<td>###/56</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td># - #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Capability 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigate</td>
<td>:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart is provided for illustrative purposes and does not depict actual data.*

Similar charts would be developed to report the scores by states or incidents, and by UASIs for exercises and incidents.
**Issues for Implementation:** This is a new measure. FEMA needs to work with grantees and sub-grantees to develop an anchored, capabilities scoring system to evaluate performance during exercises and incidents.74

Once the preliminary capability targets identified in the National Preparedness Goal are vetted and refined and performance measures developed, a scoring system can be developed to align with them.75 This scoring system would need precise definitions for each score on the scale to allow for comparability across grantees and over time. **The Panel recommends that FEMA require grantees to report on a subset of capabilities.** The scoring of capabilities during exercises and incidents would be a new activity for FEMA and grantees.76 FEMA should focus, at least to start, on capabilities of the highest importance as determined by FEMA and its grantees and sub-grantees. The Panel’s example (above) shows a subset that uses two capabilities for each PPD-8 mission area, but another construct might be to use capabilities associated with the eight National Priorities. While this will not capture the full range of core capabilities, it will provide useful measures of preparedness outcomes.

Grantees will have to score all of the designated subset of capabilities tested in grant-funded exercises and submit the results to FEMA annually.

**The Panel recommends that FEMA require grantees to also report on a reasonable subset of incidents.** All federally declared disasters and emergencies and National Special Security Events (NSSE) should be reported as they trigger access to federal resources. However, reporting on only federally declared disasters and emergencies is insufficient as many jurisdictions will experience them infrequently. **The Panel recommends that FEMA work with the grantees to identify a reasonable number and the type of incidents on which to report.**

Measuring individual capabilities is a good first step toward understanding preparedness. However, capability levels may not be uniform across a state and multiple capabilities are often called upon during any exercise or incident. Assessing how they work together would provide the nation with a more accurate picture of its preparedness. As the next step, FEMA should work with grantees and sub-grantees to develop a way to assess overall preparedness as demonstrated through exercises and incidents.

**Reporting Mechanism:** These data would be reported annually as a new data element of the State Preparedness Report.

74 Performance measures for capabilities and exercises are required by Section 649 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295) and Section 2022 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53).

75 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s *National Preparedness Goal*, September 2011, includes capability targets that will be further vetted and refined during the planning process established through PPD-8. These capability targets are defined as the performance threshold for each core capability. The *National Preparedness Goal* further states that current performance will be analyzed against intended capabilities, the defined targets, and associated performance measures that will be developed.

76 The FEMA National Exercise Program, *Base Plan*, March 2011, includes exercise evaluations conducted by peer-evaluation teams that are coordinated by FEMA.
Reporting Workload: This is a new requirement. The states and UASIs would have to submit to FEMA the results of their evaluations of exercises and incidents. FEMA would need to aggregate and analyze this information. Before this information can be reported, FEMA would need to work with grantees and sub-grantees to develop the scoring system, identify the subset of capabilities to be rated, and define the subset of incidents to be reported. The use of a secure online reporting tool may ease the reporting burden.

Measure 8a: Number of critical task corrective actions identified for which the correction was completed following grant-funded exercises within the specified timeframe.

Measure 8b: Number of critical task corrective actions identified for which the correction was completed following incidents within the specified timeframe.

Measure 8c: Number of recurring, critical task failures identified following incidents in the past three years.

Significance of Measures 8a, 8b, and 8c: This is a Panel priority measure. The best way to determine if a capability is truly effective is to test it through exercises or deployment during incidents. Exercises are used to refresh capabilities and test systems to identify weak points. Capabilities are not intended to, but can fail during incidents. It is common practice that both exercises and incidents are evaluated in an After Action Report, and corrective actions developed in an Improvement Plan. Grantees are required to participate in exercises, and to submit After Action Reports/Improvement Plans (AAR/IP) following the completion of an exercise funded by the grants. FEMA is required to track grantees’ progress in addressing corrective actions. The Panel finds that completion of corrective actions demonstrates that the preparedness system is improving.

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78 Under Section 2022(a)(4) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), states and urban areas are required to participate in exercises and report on their outcomes.
80 A remedial action management program is required under Section 650 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act (P.L. 109-295).
This measure focuses on corrective actions for critical tasks—those tasks essential to the success of the homeland security mission. This measure demonstrates the degree to which critical task corrective actions are being completed, and distinguishes between exercises and incidents because they provide different information. In an exercise, one goal may be to push to failure; therefore, it is expected that a capability will often fail when tested this way. In an incident, repeated failures of a capability point to a serious problem requiring attention. This is an intermediate outcome measure.

**Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After Action Report/ Improvement Plans</th>
<th>Corrective Actions Identified in FY20XX</th>
<th>Corrective Actions Completed in FY20XX</th>
<th>Corrective Actions Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHSGP</td>
<td>Exercises</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recurring*</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UASI</td>
<td>Exercises</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recurring*</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Recurring* is a subset of incidents.*

It is to be expected that some corrective actions may be outstanding, or the number of actions completed may exceed the number identified in a fiscal year, because not every corrective action will be scheduled for completion within the year in which it was identified.

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a new measure. Grantees are required to submit After Action Reports/Improvement Plans (AAR/IP) following grant funded exercises; however, there are no requirements for what is to be included in the AAR/IPs. Grantees are encouraged to use the

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81 Critical tasks are defined as those “prevention, protection, response, and recovery tasks that require coordination among an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental entities during a major incident in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. Participants must perform critical tasks in order to prevent occurrence of a major incident; respond and reduce loss of life or serious injuries; or mitigate significant property damage, all of which are essential to the success of a homeland security mission.” FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, *Volume I—HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program Management*, Feb 2007.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) format. While this flexibility in the reporting format may encourage innovation, the Panel recommends that FEMA take a more systematic approach and establish minimum reporting elements for the AAR/IP. This will ensure that the AAR/IP provides the information necessary to conduct comparative analyses and track improvements as expected by statute. Additionally, as part of the AAR/IP process, the Panel recommends that FEMA and grantees compare their incident or exercise performance against the capability targets and performance measures that are being defined for each core capability developed under PPD-8. This would provide additional rigor and comparability.

The Panel recommends that grantees also report to FEMA on completed, critical task corrective actions for a reasonable subset of incidents and highlight recurring problems that may require additional attention. The Panel defines a recurring problem as a critical task that fails, for the same reasons, during incidents within the past three years. This is an indication that previous corrective actions did not solve the underlying problem or that no corrective actions were taken. FEMA should work with grantees to address such recurring problems, bringing to bear their considerable technical expertise, as well as sharing the results of their analyses of the promising practices that other states and UASIs have used to overcome similar problems.

Due to the high number of emergency incidents each year, the Panel finds that it would be unduly burdensome to require the reporting of identified and completed, critical task, corrective actions for all incidents. The Panel recommends that FEMA require grantees to report on a reasonable subset of incidents. All federally declared disasters and emergencies and National Special Security Events (NSSE) should be reported as they trigger access to federal resources. However, reporting on only federally declared disasters and emergencies is insufficient as many jurisdictions will experience them infrequently. The Panel recommends that FEMA work with the grantees to identify a reasonable number and the type of incidents on which to report.

Ideally, all exercises and incidents would be subject to independent review to provide objectivity and to verify the quality of the evaluation and improvement plan. The Panel recognizes that given the high number of exercises and incidents that occur each year, requiring an independent review of each would demand more resources than is reasonable. Therefore, the Panel recommends that FEMA require an independent review, of at least one exercise or incident, for each state and UASI, each year. FEMA should work with the grantees to establish an independent review process that may include FEMA staff, experts from other agencies, peers from states and UASIs, third-party experts in academia and the private sector, or others. These reviews should alternate between exercises and incidents. Additional independent reviews should be encouraged as is feasible. The exercises would be selected based

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83 A remedial action management program is required under Section 650 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act (P.L. 109-295).
84 The FEMA National Exercise Program, Base Plan, March 2011, includes exercise evaluations conducted by peer-evaluation teams that are coordinated by FEMA.
on grantees’ Multi-year Training and Exercise Plans.\textsuperscript{85} No additional exercises would need to be conducted to fulfill the Panel’s recommendation.

\textbf{The Panel recommends that grantees design exercises to stress their capabilities in order to truly understand how people, plans, and systems operate when stressed.}\textsuperscript{86} These exercises will provide valuable insights on how to reduce the probability of failure in an actual incident. As a result, the Panel expects grantees will generate corrective actions for critical task failures. Grantees should strive for a high completion rate of critical task corrective actions; however, because these solutions may be complex and costly, they may not be easily completed. For some actions, while improvements are made, they may never be completed.

\textbf{Reporting Mechanism:} States and UASIs would submit After Action Reports/Improvement Plans (AAR/IP) via email to FEMA, and completion of corrective actions would be reported through the Corrective Action Program (CAP) System.

Reporting Workload: States and UASIs are already required to submit AAR/IPs for grant-funded exercises via email to FEMA within 90 days after the exercise. This measure would require grantees to also submit incident AAR/IPs thorough the same process established for exercises. FEMA or the grantee would enter the critical task corrective actions into the CAP System. Grantees would report completion of identified critical task corrective actions through the CAP System. FEMA will evaluate the information submitted by grantees and report aggregate numbers of critical task corrective actions identified that year, number of critical task corrective actions completed that year, and outstanding critical task corrective actions. FEMA has noted a low level of submission of AAR/IPs in the past and has emphasized the importance of this reporting requirement in the FY2011 grant guidance.

\textsuperscript{85} According to the Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, May 2011, states and urban areas are required to conduct an annual Training and Exercise Plan workshop and develop a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan.

\textsuperscript{86} The FEMA National Exercise Program, \textit{Base Plan}, March 2011, states that “exercises enable us to practice and refine our collective capacity to confront a variety of potential threats and hazards while discovering problems and identifying gaps in policies and procedures.”
PART 2: CONTEXT MEASURES

Introduction

This part provides additional context to assist with the management of the SHSGP and UASI programs. The effectiveness of the programs relies both on the grantor and the grantees as each are important contributors. The three measures the Panel recommends in this part provide context on a few aspects of particular interest to the Congress, FEMA, and grant recipients. Programmatic and financial monitoring provide opportunities to make continuous improvements in grant execution (Measure 9). Measuring the reversion of grant funds demonstrates grantees’ ability to develop grant budgets and activities that they are able to effectively execute within the period of performance (Measure 10). Measuring the allocation of grant investments between building and sustaining capabilities will help Congress and FEMA understand how funding profiles drive prioritization of investments (Measure 11). These measures capture outputs and intermediate outcomes that provide important contextual information that can be used to improve the management of the grant programs.

The Panel also recognizes that FEMA collects additional activity-level data that are used internally to measure and facilitate successful grant execution, assess the programs’ overall effectiveness, and indicate areas for improvement. The Panel finds that this is a good practice that FEMA should continue.
Grant Execution Improvement

**Measure 9a:** Number of program improvements identified during programmatic monitoring, agreed upon by FEMA and grantee, completed within the specified timeframe.

**Measure 9b:** Number of financial deficiencies identified during financial monitoring corrected within the specified timeframe.

**Significance of Measures 9a and 9b:** FEMA is required to conduct programmatic and financial monitoring of each state and UASI not less than every two years. Monitoring is part of the ongoing dialogue between grantor and grantee about performance. Monitoring is not intended to be a punitive exercise, but an opportunity to improve grant performance. Reporting on the results of this required activity will demonstrate that appropriate oversight is being conducted and grant execution will improve as a result. This is an intermediate outcome measure.

**Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring Changes</th>
<th>Number of Required Changes Completed in FY20XX</th>
<th>Number of Suggested Changes Completed in FY20XX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHSGP Programmatic</td>
<td>#/#</td>
<td>#/#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHSGP Financial</td>
<td>#/#</td>
<td>#/#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UASI Programmatic</td>
<td>#/#</td>
<td>#/#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UASI Financial</td>
<td>#/#</td>
<td>#/#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a modification of an existing FEMA measure. Programmatic and financial monitoring should yield both *required* and *suggested* changes for improvement. *Required changes* address those things required to comply with law, regulation, and grant guidance or to remedy persistent problems. By contrast, *suggested changes* address those things that are believed to provide meaningful improvements, but are not specifically required to

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Section 2022, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53) states that the reviews shall examine at a minimum, “(i) whether the funds were used in accordance with the law, program guidance, and state homeland security plans or other applicable plans; and (ii) the extent to which funds awarded enhanced the ability of a grantee to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.”
comply with law, regulation, and grant guidance. This distinction between *suggested* and *required* recognizes that FEMA and grantees may have different perspectives to approaching grant execution, and that grantees may choose to pursue alternate pathways to improvement. If a *suggested* change is not implemented and subsequent monitoring indicates that the problem it sought to address persists, a *required* change may be prescribed.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would report progress on completing program improvements and correcting financial deficiencies in the BSIR. FEMA would aggregate grantees’ information.

**Reporting Workload:** Biennial monitoring is already conducted. There is no additional reporting requirement for grantees. FEMA would aggregate the information to report.
Expenditure of Grant Funds

*Measure 10*: Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI grant funds reverted.

**Significance of Measure 10**: The purpose of this measure is to demonstrate the abilities of grantees to develop grant budgets and activities and effectively execute them within the period of performance. Absent other information, decision makers look at the grant account balance and the amounts that grantees have drawn down for reimbursement. However, rate of drawdown does not reflect the rate of work by grantees in executing their grants. Rather, it reflects how their administrative systems schedule reimbursements. Schedules vary by grantee with some waiting until the end of the period of performance to seek reimbursement. A better measure of grantees’ ability to properly budget and execute their grants is the amount of money they revert at the end of the period of performance. Communicating this information to decision makers can provide them with a better understanding of timely expenditure of grant funds. In any program, some level of reversion is to be expected. This is an output measure.

**Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant Year</th>
<th>SHSGP</th>
<th>UASI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount Reverted</td>
<td>Percentage Reverted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY20XX</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY20XX</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY20XX</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issues for Implementation**: This is a new measure based on current requirements. There can be numerous valid reasons for not spending all of the funds exactly as budgeted in a grant application, or not spending some of the funds at all. Because this measure only reports how much is reverted, not the reasons for reversion, it is important to understand the reasons for reversion before making decisions about funding levels for the grant programs or allocations to individual grantees. FEMA will need to set a reasonable target for this measure to reassure grantees of how important it is to make sound decisions about the expenditure of grant funds.

**Reporting Mechanism**: States and UASIs would report during grant closeout.

**Reporting Workload**: There is no additional reporting requirement for grantees. FEMA would aggregate and report grantees information.
Grant Funding Profile

*Measure 11a:* Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to build each core capability.

*Measure 11b:* Amount and percentage of SHSGP and UASI funding spent by states and UASIs to sustain each core capability.

**Significance of Measures 11a and 11b:** Just as it is in the national interest to build capabilities, it is also in the national interest to be able to operate these capabilities as an incident may occur at any time. This requires investments to sustain capability level over time. This measure demonstrates how SHSGP and UASI grant investments are used to build and sustain core capabilities. This information will help Congress and FEMA understand how funding profiles drive prioritization of investments in capabilities. This is an output measure.

**Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capability</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build</td>
<td>Sustain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Warning</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and Cultural Resources</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$$$$</td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar chart would be developed to report on the distribution of SHSGP investments.

**Issues for Implementation:** This is a new measure. The Panel recommends that *build* and *sustain* be defined by FEMA in guidance. For the purposes of this study, the Panel defined *build* as any investment that creates, develops, or significantly enhances a core capability. *Sustain* was defined as any investment that is used to maintain all activities needed to operate at current capability level, such as regular maintenance, refresher training, and scheduled...
replacement costs. FEMA has issued information bulletins\textsuperscript{88} to assist grantees with allowable maintenance costs; however, interviews with grantees indicate that additional guidance would be needed to implement this measure.

The Panel has heard compelling evidence that federal funding is essential to sustain capabilities built, in whole or in part, with homeland security grants. SHSGP and UASI were designed to fill the gap in homeland security capabilities between what states and urban areas would prioritize on their own and the capability levels needed to meet the national interest. It is in the national interest to be prepared for low-probability, high-consequence events. The reporting of investment information will assist FEMA in developing future budget requests sufficient to fill remaining capability gaps, and to sustain capabilities built with prior grant investments. The Panel recognizes that sustaining capabilities will be increasingly difficult in an austere budget environment.

The SHSGP and UASI programs are one of many funding sources within the National Preparedness System. Even if a preponderance of SHSGP or USAI funding is applied to build or sustain a specific capability, a grantee may also apply other funds towards building or sustaining that same capability. The Panel recognizes that a limitation of this measure is that it only demonstrates how these two grant funds are being allocated, and does not convey the total amount of funding for all sources being spent to build or sustain each capability.

**Reporting Mechanism:** States and UASIs would submit this information in their investment justifications as part of their annual grant application.

**Reporting Workload:** Grant applications consist of multiple investment justifications. Grantees already report in the investment justifications the amount of funding per capability. The FY2011 grant guidance requires grantees to identify the amount of funding used to build and/or sustain capabilities at the investment justification level; however, each investment justification may address multiple capabilities. This measure would change the reporting requirement to the capability level.

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PART 3: COLLABORATION MEASURES

Introduction

The Panel finds that collaboration is critically important to preventing, protecting, mitigating, responding, and recovering from acts of terrorism. The success of a National Preparedness System requires jurisdictions and professional disciplines to work together to provide services beyond their individual capabilities on all aspects of preparedness. Recognizing the importance of this, enhancing regional collaboration was designated as the first of eight National Priorities issued in 2007 to guide preparedness efforts.89

Development of a multi-jurisdictional governance capacity, including collaborative processes and mechanisms, to make decisions about homeland security funding is a requirement for both SHSGP and UASI grantees. The FEMA grants have provided considerable incentives to facilitate collaboration. As a result, a wide variety of approaches have been used to coordinate the efforts of public, private, non-profit, and civic interests across regions and states. This includes engaging regional organizations, such as regional councils of governments and chambers of commerce, in both metropolitan and rural areas, to build and sustain preparedness capabilities.

Measuring Collaboration

The Panel discussed multiple approaches to measuring the outputs and outcomes of collaboration. Each collaborative effort will be structured in a manner that reflects the protocols and traditions of the area, may be established to produce different results, and will include both formal and informal relationships. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a single construct to measure against without a greater understanding of what contributes to the success of preparedness collaborations. An assessment of the many different types of collaborations that have been established or strengthened would provide FEMA with an understanding of the factors that contribute to successful collaboration. Conducting such an assessment was beyond the scope of this Academy study. The Panel recommends that FEMA conduct an assessment, in coordination with local jurisdictions, states, regions, and urban areas, of collaborative approaches and use the results to develop a scoring system for future quantitative or qualitative performance measures and to assist program participants to strengthen their performance on this critical issue.

This assessment should include a variety of state, tribal, territorial, and local multi-jurisdictional partnerships. A key aspect for the assessment is to identify successful state, urban area, and homeland security regional governance practices that can serve as models for accountable collaborations. The assessment should also include an examination of how various pre-existing or subsequently created regional structures have been engaged where missions intersect. These different constructs may impact the decision-making process. The assessment should identify

promising practices for collaborative planning, investment decisions, exercise programs, incident responses, and other elements critical to successful preparedness collaboration.

The results of this assessment should be shared with grantees and Congress, used to develop quantitative and qualitative measures of collaboration, and to assist program participants to strengthen their capacities to collaborate. As part of this assessment, FEMA should also examine collaborations required under other preparedness grant programs including the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP), which has been working with major metropolitan areas to develop regional partnerships for preparedness. The RCPGP program participants have been assessing their accomplishments and may have lessons to share.

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SECTION 5
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE

Over the course of the Academy’s study, a number of challenges were identified by stakeholders that have real or perceived impacts on the effectiveness of the SHSGP and UASI grant programs. Overcoming these challenges presents FEMA with additional opportunities to improve or demonstrate the performance of these grants. This section focuses on the issues that came up repeatedly in the Academy’s discussions with administrators, grantees, sub-grantees, and other stakeholders. In addition to the Panel’s recommendations for performance measures, it offers recommendations for each of the challenges discussed in this section.

Pairing Quantitative and Qualitative Measurements

The Panel recommends that FEMA continue to use both quantitative and qualitative information to effectively capture the performance of its grant programs. Neither FEMA nor grantees should rely entirely on one type of measure. Each type of information alone has imperfections, but together they can provide FEMA and its stakeholders a more robust picture of the performance of the grant programs. In accordance with our charge, the Panel has recommended a set of quantitative measures (Section 4); FEMA should work with grantees to pair these with qualitative measures or information to accurately reflect the efforts of states, tribes, territories, and local jurisdictions. FEMA should explore how best to use case studies and illustrative examples to accompany the measures offered in this report, and the measurable core capabilities that are being developed under PPD-8.

Several of the measures presented by the Panel in this report require implementation steps that FEMA must complete in conjunction with grantees and sub-grantees. This presents an opportunity for FEMA to work with grantees and sub-grantees to identify potential qualitative measures or other information to accompany and illustrate the quantitative measures.

The Timing of the Grant Cycle

The timing of the start of the grant cycle was the challenge most often described by those interviewed. FEMA does not issue grant guidance until after the federal budget has been appropriated. This creates unrealistic timelines for the development and submission of grant applications. Grantees stated that they need to begin to develop their applications well in advance of the guidance in order to be able to submit an application on time. Absent guidance, grantees must make an estimate for planning purposes for their expected funding allocation based on previous years’ allocations and the current year’s budget request. Similarly, grantees try to intuit possible grant priorities based on various FEMA communications.

When the guidance is made available, grantees must re-evaluate and revise their pre-prepared investment justifications to comply with the new priorities identified for specific action in the guidance, as well as the funding level allocated for that fiscal year. Some grantees have very
limited staff capacity to make such changes. For example, the FY2011 submission period was so truncated—30 days—that grantees stated that they neither had enough time to fully understand the content of the guidance nor enough time to pose clarifying questions to FEMA. Additionally, some sub-grantees indicated that they chose not to participate because they could not respond within the grant application period; several indicated that they could not expect to even receive permission to apply within that short timeframe. This situation negatively impacts grantees’ ability to seek partners, and submit an application that is responsive to the guidance and presents well-developed investment justifications.

Even when appropriations are not as delayed as they were for FY2011, and guidance is issued earlier in the year, FEMA personnel and grantees expressed that the timelines are unrealistic. The Panel recommends that FEMA issue grant guidance in advance of appropriations and make it subject to availability of appropriations. FEMA indicated to the Panel that they considered doing this in FY2011. The guidance could be issued soon after the annual DHS budget request is transmitted to Congress. The guidance would identify FEMA’s priorities for the year, and share the target allocations with the caveat that this information is subject to availability of appropriations. Once appropriations have been finalized, any new requirements or funding changes made during the appropriation process could be addressed through supplemental guidance. Grantees can then modify their prioritized investments in the grant applications.

This approach enables planning to proceed in an informed, deliberative fashion with an understanding that the funding levels are still fluid. The Panel recognizes that grantees may still need to re-evaluate their plans and prioritize investments based on final allocations after the appropriations process is complete; however, this is likely to be less disruptive than first learning of FEMA’s priorities and target allocations late in the grantees’ planning processes.

**Communicating Performance**

As noted in Section 4: Performance Measure Recommendations, FEMA is already collecting considerable data from grantees that can be used to demonstrate the performance of these grant programs. Equally important to collecting and analyzing the data is communicating the results. The accomplishments under these grant programs are a shared story of performance that should be communicated by FEMA, except in instances where the data being reported are too sensitive for broad distribution. Doing so does not need to presume that FEMA is taking undue credit for the work of the grantees. FEMA should work with the grantees to determine which state- and UASI-specific statistics, case studies, and examples will be used to illustrate preparedness in public reports. The Panel recommends that FEMA share performance results more broadly in a manner tailored to specific audiences including Congress, government officials at the federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local levels, and the general public.

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90 Numerous programs across the federal government use such an approach including the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Education.
This information can be provided in an easy-to-access format online and linked to resources that allow interested parties to drill down for more information. Other federal agencies have addressed this shared performance story through the use of websites that provide information on both agency and grant-funded state and local activities.91 State and local governments have made use of scorecards and performance indicators to demonstrate performance of complex issues in a format easily understood by the public.92 The Panel urges FEMA to provide more information about grant performance online. This is an opportunity not only to demonstrate what has been accomplished, but to engage new partners that can contribute positively to preparedness.

Assessments

The Academy Panel identified some specific elements of the SHSGP and UASI program that are key to program effectiveness, but fundamentally difficult to measure. The first is planning. It is necessary for the successful development and execution of the grants as well as the functionality of the National Preparedness System. The second issue is the change to the number of UASI program participants. This change creates some unique challenges for FEMA and grantees.

Planning

Preparedness planning is the centerpiece of the SHSGP and UASI programs. The Panel finds that preparedness planning is a key element of the National Preparedness System. The Panel finds that homeland security strategies and associated operational plans might not all exist without these grant programs. Additionally, the collaborative planning conducted because of these grants has supported the coordinated, multi-jurisdictional execution of the National Preparedness System. Preparedness planning takes many forms and covers many topics. The Panel attempted to define core planning elements, or plans, for preparedness as a first step towards developing a performance measure. However, these efforts were frustrated by the variety of planning activities and the possible burdens that would be involved in reporting on planning activities at all levels of government. Furthermore, reducing this variety to a single quantitative number was of limited value when the intent was to capture the quality and sufficiency of planning efforts. Instead of a measure, the Panel finds that a periodic assessment of preparedness plans is a more efficient and effective approach.

To appropriately assess the value of preparedness planning efforts, the Panel recommends that FEMA institutionalize the Nationwide Plan Review. Two such reviews have been conducted at the direction of Congress in 2006 and 2010. The Academy’s research and interviews found that the 2010 Nationwide Plan Review was well received and served as a learning experience. It included both a self-assessment by states and an independent review by

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regional FEMA staff. A periodic assessment of the Nation’s planning efforts is the most effective way to understand their quality and utility. Therefore, the Panel finds that routine assessment of these plans will improve the performance of grantees, and of the National Preparedness System overall. A regular, Nationwide Plan Review can provide the validated evidence needed to give FEMA and its stakeholders confidence in the quality of significant planning products. As with the 2010 Nationwide Plan Review, subsequent reviews should include an independent review. FEMA should work with grantees to establish how the results of the self-assessments and the independent reviews will be incorporated into a final report that is shared with grantees and Congress.

**UASI Participation and Expectations**

Since 2003, the UASI program has experienced some significant changes in the number of participants. The list of participating UASIs grew substantially from the original 7 designated in FY2003 to 64 in FY2010. For FY2011, FEMA allocated funding to 31 UASIs. The result was that 33 urban areas that had received funding in the previous fiscal year were not included in the allocations.

The Panel finds that this situation presents a unique opportunity for FEMA to learn:

- how these homeland security partnerships adapt to changes in funding;
- if these partnerships can continue to build or sustain preparedness capabilities without these grants;
- the extent to which urban areas have already institutionalized the partnerships needed for the planning and execution of preparedness activities; and
- what capabilities the urban areas and states prioritize for continuation or reduction.

The Panel recommends that FEMA conduct an assessment of how states and urban areas adapt to the decrease in number of federally funded UASIs and its impact on preparedness collaboration and capabilities. The federal budget climate is expected to remain austere for the foreseeable future. An assessment would provide valuable insights about the level of funding needed to sustain national preparedness priorities in the future. This should be a phased assessment that examines the transition of the former UASIs out of the program in the short-term as well as a follow-up in 3-5 years. The longer-term assessment would evaluate the degree to which the working relationships and sharing of resources developed under this program have been institutionalized after the incentives provided by the grant funding have ended and there has been some turnover of political leadership and trained personnel. The insights gleaned from this assessment will be particularly helpful given the concurrent budget reductions at the state and local jurisdictional levels. With the loss of federal funding, former UASIs will neither have the resources nor the requirement to report on the changes to their programs past the close out of

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91 In FY2003, UASI funding was provided in two parts. Initial funding was allocated to 7 UASIs, and by the end of that fiscal year, funding was allocated to 23 additional UASIs.
their open grants. FEMA would need to adequately resource the assessment to facilitate participation.

One element of this assessment should specifically look at how the changes to the UASI program will affect the future of the SHSGP program. As these 33 urban areas close out their grants and exit the UASI program, they will have to be absorbed by the SHSGP program. Depending on the existing degree of coordination between a state and its UASI(s), this could be an easy or difficult transition. Additionally, it will be occurring at a time when the SHSGP program is also experiencing significant reductions in available funding. In some states, they will absorb UASIs whose prior funding exceeds the state’s current SHSGP funding.\textsuperscript{94} Situations such as these will test the limits of both programs, and an assessment will provide FEMA with indications of what its homeland security grant programs may look like over the next decade.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Panel recommends that FEMA implement this set of measures and the above additional recommendations to improve the performance of the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. FEMA should evaluate its performance measurement efforts periodically and continually adapt them as programs and priorities mature and new performance challenges emerge.

\textsuperscript{94} In FY2010, the Baton Rouge and New Orleans received UASI funding totaling $8.3M. Neither UASI received a funding allocation for FY2011. At the same time, Louisiana’s SHSGP funding dropped from $13.8M in FY2010 to $6.9M in FY2011.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
ACADEMY PANEL AND STAFF

ACADEMY PANEL

- **William Leighty,* Panel Chair** – Partner, DecideSmart, LLC, Richmond, Virginia. Former Chief of Staff to the Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia. Positions with Commonwealth of Virginia: Chief of Staff, to Governors Tim Kaine and Mark Warner; Director, Virginia Retirement System; Assistant Director, Governor’s Commission on Government Reform; Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles; Deputy Secretary of Transportation; Senior Economist and Analyst, Senate Finance Committee.

- **Beverly Cigler*** – Professor of Public Policy and Administration, Penn State Harrisburg (PSH); Received the PSH Faculty Excellence in Research Award; the Donald Stone Award for Intergovernmental Scholarship and Research from the American Society for Public Administration, and numerous awards for public service; NASPAA-FEMA Fellow (National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration-Federal Emergency Management Agency); Co-chairs the American Society for Public Administration’s Katrina Task Force. Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Keystone Research Center. Advisory committee, Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center; Board of Directors of The Bureaucrat, Inc.

- **William Dodge*** – Principal, Regional Excellence Consulting. Former Executive Director, National Association of Regional Councils. Held senior management positions in local, state and national government and directed private, academic, and civic organizations. Served as Interim Town Administrator for Silverton, Colorado. Former adjunct professor at Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh, and West Virginia University.


- **William Raub*** – Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Former positions with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation; Science Advisor, Office of the Secretary; Assistant Secretary for
Planning Policy and Evaluation. Former Science Advisor to the Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Special Assistant for Health Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy, the White House. Former positions with the National Institutes of Health: Acting Director; Deputy Director for Extramural Research; Associate Director for Extramural Research and Training.

- **Christine Springer** – Executive Director, M.S. Program in Emergency and Crisis Management, Department of Public Administration University of Nevada Las Vegas; CEO, Red Tape, Ltd., LLC. Former Manager, State-Local Government and Community Relations, Salt River Project; Manager, Economic Development Planning, State of Arizona Governor’s Office; Treasurer, Investors United Life Insurance Company.

- **Ellis Stanley** – Director, Western Emergency Management Services, Dewberry, LLC. Director, DNC Planning for the City & County of Denver, CO. General Manager, Emergency Preparedness Department, City of Los Angeles. Former Director, Atlanta-Fulton County (Georgia) – Durham County, North Carolina; Director, Emergency Management Agency, Brunswick County, North Carolina.

* Academy Fellow

**ACADEMY STAFF**

**Joseph P. Mitchell, III, Director of Project Development**—Previously served as Project Director for past Academy studies for USAID/Management Systems International, the National Park Service’s Natural Resource Stewardship and Science Directorate, and the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. Served on the study team for past Academy studies for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Centers for Disease Control, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Marine Fisheries Service, Patent and Trademark Office, National Institutes of Health, Department of the Interior, and Forest Service. Former Adjunct Professor at the Center for Public Administration and Public Policy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Holds a PhD from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, an MPA from the University of Charlotte, and a BA in History from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington.

**Stephanie Bailenson, Project Director**—Previously served as Senior Advisor for past Academy studies for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Center to End Childhood Lead Poisoning. Previously served as the Director, Office of Coastal and Aquatic Managed Areas for the Florida Department of Environmental Protection; Senior Policy Advisor at NOAA; and Professional Staff for the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Holds an MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and an AB in Biology/Political Science from Duke University.

**Mark Hertko, Project Advisor**—Previously served as Senior Research Analyst for past Academy studies for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; National Park Service; Department of Homeland Security/Coast Guard; Environmental Protection Agency;
Department of Energy; and others. Previously served as Government Relations Researcher Intern, Defenders of Wildlife; Quality Assurance/Quality Control Inspector for Indoor Mercury Contamination, Accord Enterprises; Community Relations Coordinator Intern, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency; Environmental Educator, Illinois Ecowatch. Holds an MA in Environmental Science from the University of Illinois at Springfield, and a BA in Biology from The Monmouth College.

**Brenna Isman, Senior Advisor**—Previously served as Project Director past Academy study for the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General and as Senior Advisor for past Academy studies for the U. S. Coast Guard. Previously served as Senior Consultant for the Ambit Group working with the Environmental Protection Agency Office of Information Collection and the Veteran’s Health Administration’s Chief Business Office. Holds an MBA from the Kogod School of Business at American University and BS in Human Resources the University of Delaware.

**Matthew Thomas, Research Associate**—Previously served as Research Associate for past Academy studies for the Department of Homeland Security, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Energy. Previously served as an administrative staff assistant for LogiCom Project Management and the American Association of Naturopathic Physicians. Holds a BA in Political Science from Tulane University.

**Faith Gibson, Research Associate**—Previously served in the public education and non-profit sectors. Holds an MPA from Old Dominion University and a BA in Communications/Public Relations from Georgia State University. Currently, working on a PhD at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

The Academy wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the following former Academy Staff: Wendy Haines Smith, Senior Advisor; Daniel Honker, Analyst; Callie Long, Senior Research Associate.
APPENDIX B
WORKING GROUP MEMBERS

Working Group Members:

Martha Braddock, Senior Policy Advisor, International Association of Emergency Managers
Matt Cowles, Government Relations Director, National Emergency Management Association
Nick Crossley, Director, Johnson County Emergency Management & Homeland Security
Josh Filler, President, Filler Security Strategies, Inc.
Kathleen Fox, Director, FEMA National Preparedness Assessment Division
Corey Gruber, Assistant Administrator, FEMA National Preparedness Directorate
Elizabeth Harman, Assistant Administrator, FEMA Grants Program Directorate
Hans Kallam, Director, Division of Emergency Management, Colorado Dept. of Local Affairs
David Kaufman, Director, FEMA Office of Policy and Program Analysis
J.W. Ledbetter, Director, Mississippi Office of Homeland Security
Randy Meshell, Deputy Federal Preparedness Coordinator, Region VI, FEMA
Robert Samaan, Senior Policy Advisor to the Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness, FEMA
Teresa Serata, Director of Strategy and Grant Compliance, Bay Area UASI
MaryAnn Tierney, Regional Administrator, Region III, FEMA

FEMA Working Group Coordinators:

James Mullikin, Chief, Assessments Branch, FEMA National Preparedness Assessment Division
Gary Rogers, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Administrator, FEMA Grants Program Directorate
APPENDIX C
PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to discussions with Panel and Working Group members, the study team conducted 75+ additional stakeholder interviews (through formal interviews, client update sessions, and roundtable discussions) to gain a strategic understanding of FEMA’s homeland security grants.


Jason Barnosky, Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security

Cheryl Bassett, Legislative Fellow, Office of Representative Henry Cueller


Shannon Baxevanis, Deputy Director, National Association of Regional Councils


Curtis Brown, Professional Staff Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security

Mario Cantú, Professional Staff Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security

Eric Carbone, Chief, Outcome Monitoring & Evaluation Branch, Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Ron Carlee, Chief Operating Officer, International City/County Management Association

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Kelley Coyner, Chief of Staff, Senior Policy Group, National Capitol Region USAI


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Tim Fitzsimmons, Chief, Grants Division, District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency


Josué Garcia, Emergency Management Coordinator, Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo

Jeffrey Garofalo, Assistant Director, Office of the Mayor, New York City Office of Management & Budget

Beth Grossman, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security

Heather Hogsett, Director, Public Safety and Homeland Security, National Governors Association

Robert Holden, Deputy Director, National Congress of American Indians

Jason Hutchens, Director of Planning and Assessment, Indiana Department of Homeland Security
David Kang, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

Chris Keisling, Assistant Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office


Kerry Kinirons, Professional Staff Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security

Charles Kmet, Emergency Management Administrator, Tohono O’odham Nation

Christine Kosmos, Director, Division of State and Local Readiness, Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Lara Lamprecht, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services


Thomas MacLellan, Program Director, Justice and Public Safety, National Governors Association

Charles Madden, Deputy Director of the Grants Division, District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

John Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Services


Rachel Marcus, Senior Analyst, New York City Office of Management & Budget

Caitlin McKenna, Research and Policy Development Branch Chief, Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Kelly McKinney, Deputy Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness, New York City Office of Emergency Management
Dave McMillion, Director, Department of Public Safety and Health, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments


David Munro, Director, Emergency Management, Morongo Band of Mission Indians

Brendan Murphy, Director, Grants Management, California Emergency Management Agency

Cheryl Murray, Division Manager, Mayor’s Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security, Houston, TX

Irene Navis, Emergency Manager, Clark County, NV

Robert O’Neill, Executive Director, International City/County Management Association

Cliff Puckett, Emergency Manager, Salt River Indian Community

Dave Robertson, Executive Director, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Stacy Rosenfeld, Assistant Commissioner for Administration and Finance, New York City Office of Emergency Management

John Sadler, Regional UASI Planner, Hampton Roads Planning District Commission, Norfolk, VA

Timothy Sanders, Owner, Full Circle Emergency Management Strategies

Tom Sands, Commander, Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division, Michigan State Police

Mary Beth Schultz, Associate Staff Director and Chief Counsel for Homeland Security Preparedness & Response, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security

Kevin Saupp, Branch Chief, Federal Agency Coordination, State and Local Program Office, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security.


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Sara Strizzi, Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education


Roger Tungovia, Director of Public Safety and Emergency Services, Hopi Tribe

Denise Viera, Deputy Director, Community Capacity Development Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Stephen Viña, Professional Staff Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security

Joe Wainscott, Executive Director, Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Rose Whitehair, Program Manager, Partnership for Tribal Governance, National Council of American Indians

Lynda Zambrano, Executive Director, National Tribal Emergency Management Council
APPENDIX D
FEDERAL ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY

Building Capability and Preparedness
Experiences of Staff at Four Federal Organizations
April 2011

Introduction

The National Academy of Public Administration held a roundtable with federal agencies to understand how they measure outcomes for preparedness and capability building, to understand the logic behind their development, and to identify the challenges and opportunities associated with their application. Participants from the Department of Education (Education), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) offered their experiences measuring the impact of grant programs on the development and sustainment of preparedness or capabilities. This appendix captures the approaches and issues the participants found valuable in developing performance measures.

The Importance of Establishing a Common Framework

Establishing a framework that aligns the expectations of a community of practitioners is necessary for the effective measurement of preparedness capabilities. A framework documents both capacities and capabilities, and is most effective when it is understood, adopted, and implemented by a community of practitioners. Jointly developing a framework with practitioners is preferable because it builds knowledge, confidence, and ownership of the final results. Lastly, once a community has aligned around a framework, community resilience is improved because it is easier to develop processes for the acquisition of capacity and development of capabilities. Resilience also reflects a community’s ability to maintain preparedness capabilities over time, even when facing setbacks such as funding shortfalls. Participants offered examples of frameworks that have been established to guide the operation and outcome measurement of their programs:

- The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS), and Emergency Management for Higher Education (EMHE) programs at Education are rooted in a framework.95 The framework started with development of a crisis guide and an action guide, which was based on the four phases of emergency management and all-hazard planning. All training is developed based on this framework.

- CDC issued the Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning (PHPC) to improve the Nation’s ability to know state of preparedness of public health providers.96 One reason for this undertaking was

95 http://rems.ed.gov/
96 http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities/
recognition that public health capabilities had not been well defined, and that multiple approaches were being employed to demonstrate achievements; however, these approaches could not be aggregated into a national picture. To resolve this, CDC built a framework for capabilities with evidence-based targets. It worked collaboratively to develop this anchoring document—the PHPC—that defined a set of capabilities and performance measures against which progress could be measured.

Participants agreed that development of a framework can provide a common point of agreement among diverse partners. Development of a framework and performance measures through an inclusive process can bring about better measures, create understanding among partners, and provide the basis for establishing effective processes. To illustrate this point, the HHS participant offered the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS) as an example. The NHSS was released initially without an accompanying framework. Without a framework for context, HHS found it difficult to discuss the NHSS strategy with its partners. Therefore, a framework was developed and released in March 2011. As a result, HHS’s reported that its staff’s ability to talk across the federal departments has improved. **Participants agreed that establishing a framework for capabilities and requirements was necessary to allow partners to work collaboratively as well as record the impacts from their individual contributions.**

**The Importance of Pairing Quantitative and Qualitative Measures**

A major challenge of preparedness performance measurement is identifying meaningful measures that allow a manager to determine if a program is being effective, and when that program has achieved its purpose. The roundtable participants expressed their preference for evidence-based quantitative measures when available. Yet, they also acknowledged it was difficult to describe the achievement of preparedness capabilities solely in quantitative terms. **Participants expressed the need for a multi-measure approach that draws on other fields, such as organizational behavior, and includes qualitative measures to complete the complex puzzle of preparedness.**

Meaningful quantitative measures are ideal, but are very difficult to develop. They are often focused on outputs, not outcomes, because outputs are more readily counted—how much was allocated, how quickly, what work was done, or how was funding spent? These outputs are weak proxies for measuring the development of capabilities; lists of equipment or trainings completed do not speak to the ability of a grantee to apply those resources effectively. Outputs do not provide significant insight into how persons interact and **apply** their knowledge, resources, and relationships to solve problems. Therefore, participants agreed that quantitative and qualitative measures need to be paired to provide a more robust picture of the effectiveness of a program in acquiring capacities and developing capabilities. Both evidence and anecdotes are needed to fully communicate a program’s accomplishments and the impact of its activities.

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Linking Capacity and Capability Measures

Individual capacities can be seen as the building blocks of a capability. Yet, it cannot be assumed that if all of the capacity building blocks are present that the capability has been obtained. Behavioral measures are an evidence-based, qualitative way to link the concepts of capacity development to capability attainment. Behavioral measures provide a logic for how people, training, and equipment come together to form a capability. Including such an approach is critical for communicating to decision makers and the community why the work of this program matters. It helps answer the question, are we better prepared? We are better prepared if a community has incorporated preparedness capabilities into their personal and professional practices, if changes in a community’s behavior results in the reduction or elimination of identified risks, or if communication of accurate preparedness information among group and individuals in the community has improved. Such measures are not causal, but they do identify key capacities and capabilities present in well prepared organizations that can be established as benchmarks for success. Therefore, behavioral measures can be established to estimate how well prepared a community is. Key questions may include the following:

1. Have the grantee and FEMA agreed to a clear set of expectations?
2. Is participation robust and representative of the community?
3. Do they work together cooperatively?
4. Does the community have an established process for making acquisition and development decisions?
5. Has the community articulated its own statement of need and risk?
6. Have they identified or dedicated needed funding streams to sustain their preparedness efforts?
7. Did the community make behavioral changes after an incident or exercise to improve their response?

The questions above describe the quality of a community’s investment of time, effort, and money in preparedness. Evaluating these interactions can help government organizations and communities effectively target investments in equipment, training, and risk evaluations to build foundations for needed capabilities. This is the approach that was taken by DOJ’s Community Capacity Development Office. In their grant applications, they asked if their grantees have the capacity to develop capabilities in their communities. Capacity means does a community have the core ability to undertake crime prevention/eradication work? As evidence, DOJ determines if the community groups are representative, work together cooperatively, and work better together? DOJ’s goal is to have quantitative measure for both categories—capacity and capability—but developing accurate measures is challenge for them because of the unique nature of individual communities and the influence of confounding factors on crime prevention/eradication work.

98 For additional information on growing high functioning communities, partnerships, or organizations see Powering the Future: High-Performance Partnerships, Annie E. Casey Foundation and the National Academy of Public Administration, April 2003. For another specific example, see how EPA is measuring community capability for the Community Action for a Renewed Environment program at http://www.epa.gov/care/publications.htm.

99 http://www.ojp.gov/ccdo/nonflash.html
Preparedness measures should also be linked to evaluation. Progress towards effective preparedness capabilities can be tested directly through incidents or exercises. A focus on and actual response is one way to determine the adequacy of preparedness measures and goals. Starting with the response and working backward, data can be collected to inform our preparedness and ability to respond. For example, it can help answer the question *did preparedness planning efforts and exercises improve response?* This feedback loop can also be established for prevention, protection, recovery, and mitigation activities. Pairing the message of the program with hard data is critical. Establishing better links between preparedness and evaluation of responses would make it easier to communicate the value of investment in these capabilities.

**Timeframes for Achievement**

Measuring a change in capability or preparedness requires a longer-term timeframe. Grants designed to develop capabilities often take multiple years to show results. In fact, some programs might show a negative trend in the short-term that reverses over a longer timeline. DOJ provided an example of one such situation. A crime prevention program that places more police directly in neighborhoods may document a rise in reported crime at the outset. Yet, this short-term result should be expected if the program is successful at fostering cooperation between the community and police, because residents will likely report more crimes. A short-term change in the number of crimes reported could be misunderstood to as an increase in the frequency of crime overall.

This time-lag is also a challenge for showing progress against national strategies. For example, HHS is developing 4-year outcomes for its NHSS implementation strategy. Although outcome measures are ideal for illustrating impacts, they are sometimes impractical for illustrating short-term progress within the annual budget cycle. Shorter-term measures, either intermediate outcomes or outputs, may be necessary to show progress. HHS is now considering adding intermediate measures based on risk status that could be indexed. These intermediate measures would help it determine if the agency’s commitments are being carried out; if the necessary processes are being conducted; and if the agency is pulling all the required pieces together. *Roundtable participants recommended that intermediate measures be used to track shorter-term expectations and results for strategies or programs with long-term timelines.*

**Building One National Story of Preparedness**

*To tell one national story, it is key to establish a baseline of capabilities against which multiple measurement approaches can be normalized.* For example, health care involves more than just the health department. It also includes the Environmental Protection Agency, the military, schools, and many other federal and state organizations. To identify its impact in among all these actors, HHS is establishing a capability baseline for its next quadrennial review. The baseline will assist it in identifying data gaps and allow it to seek data from government and nongovernmental organizations (such as the Census Bureau, National Labor Relations Board, and American Medical Association), as well as other sources to complete its analysis. Organizing diverse data sets by indexing will be a challenge, but it will build a more complete picture of HHS’s efforts.
Establishing a national baseline is important; however, it may not include the localized preparedness priorities of state and sub-state organizations. It is common to have discrepancies among priorities at all levels of government, and varying enthusiasm for achieving them. Communities prefer to invest in and measure those activities that are most relevant to their risks and anticipated outcomes. Risk at the national level is measured and prioritized by different criteria.

For communities, risk should not be measured only by the number of people who would be affected. Similarly, participants stated that a return-on-investment approach to measuring risk reduction has low resonance for the public and decision-makers regardless of the importance of the topic. The measurement question should be “how do we tell the risk story of each community,” and “how well does that community solve problems?” All national preparedness capabilities are not relevant for all communities, and their level of attainment in any one community should be based on that community’s risk. In measuring the preparedness of a community, a community’s risk-based assessment of its own needs and priorities should be respected and balanced with the national needs. Involving communities in the development of indicators most applicable to their efforts, or developing some measures from the bottom up, will increase the perceived value and the utility of these measures.

HHS is currently developing a set of performance measures for the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP). HHS is jointly developing candidate measures with associations, local and state government, representatives of the private sector, and the Institute of Medicine forum. The effort is segregated into four priority levels of health care. This continuous development process focuses on evidence-based quantitative approaches augmented with qualitative and expert testimony where evidential research is not available. Collectively, these measures will tell the story of the program.

Focusing measurement around the risks that each community identifies would help encourage grantees to say how they are going to use the grant money more precisely. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative, bottom-up measures creates ownership and incentives for grantees to report on their activity. These measures should be paired with a few top-down national priorities that have broad application to ensure that the Nation’s risks are also being reduced. These measures provide context for the progress or lack thereof on preparedness goals, and allows for sharing lessons learned and storytelling.

Conclusion
Measuring the development of capabilities is a challenging effort. Early development of a capabilities framework provides a common point of agreement among diverse stakeholders and helps provide a basis for good communication and performance measurement. Performance measures should include both quantitative and qualitative measures to provide evidence-based detail and context for describing program achievement. Preparedness measures, especially capability measures that require longer time frames to produce evidence, should be supported

100 http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/hpp/pages/default.aspx
with intermediate measures to illustrate progress against goals. A proportion of preparedness measures should be developed from the bottom up to address the specific risks to each community. Also, and a few measures with broad application across communities should be developed from a framework to stimulate the building of capabilities needed by the Nation. This approach will produce measures that are relevant, and instill a sense of ownership by all parties in their reporting and ultimate achievement.
APPENDIX E
GRANT RECIPIENTS ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY

Homeland Security Preparedness Grants
Experiences of State and Local Grant Recipients
June 28, 2011

Introduction

The National Academy of Public Administration held a virtual roundtable with grantees and sub-grantees from urban areas, states, and local jurisdictions to discuss their experiences with the application process, award, and execution of State Homeland Security Grants Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants. Individuals from Alaska, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Virginia, and the District of Columbia participated. This appendix captures the issues and approaches these states and urban areas found valuable in assessing their progress towards preparedness.

Quality of State and Urban Areas Homeland Security Strategies

The roundtable participants were asked how they ensure quality in the development and update of their homeland security strategies. Most provided examples of an intentional process to engage stakeholders and capture high quality information to inform the strategies. In their processes, each explicitly considered threat, risk, and current preparedness capabilities. A quality strategy is useful for making good investments in preparedness capabilities. Strategies reflect state and local priorities and map against federal frameworks, capabilities, and priority areas.

Development of a strategy starts with a risk profile; risk is used to inform the strategy’s goals and objectives. Many of the roundtable participants employ an “all-hazards” approach that includes terrorism preparedness, and conduct a gap analysis to identify their needs and make improvements. These gap analyses are the root of state and urban area homeland security strategies. Strategies should be coordinated and may be required to tie to one another depending on the jurisdictions. Given the peculiarities of each state and urban area, some produce simplified homeland security strategies to serve as a publically available, overarching document. Other grantees produce detailed strategies that may not be publically available based on the sensitivity of the data therein.

Recognizing that all disasters are local, grantees take various approaches to involving their stakeholders in the development of a meaningful strategy. In one state example, each region of the state identifies their threats and hazards and develops a regional homeland security strategy. The regions are required to come up with specific measurable objectives that exclude the use of vague terms such as “enhance” or “improve.” The state strategy is then developed from the regional goals and objectives. In another other example, one state conducted a state-wide hazard assessment based on ones for each homeland security region. The state strategy was developed based on the information contained in these hazard profiles.

Many grantees employ a set of committees to oversee the strategy development process and its implementation. Homeland security strategies may have high-level goals that are coupled with a
series of short-term investment plans to guide funding decisions. For example, a state could have a goal of having one of each type of response team available in every region. Their progress could be measured against this goal by tracking the area and percent of population covered by these teams. Grantees may establish outcome measures—programmatic or community based—to capture progress and accomplishments. These committees are ongoing and receive progress reports and review priorities over time.

Strategies and investment plans have to be revisited and updated. Some grantees update their investment plans annually or biennially. The investment justification describes what they will do in the next two or three years to work towards the longer term goal. For example, one state holds an annual meeting of their UASI’s to prioritize their investment justifications (e.g. grant applications) for the following year.

**Standardization of Plans and Reporting**

The roundtable participants were asked if there was value in developing more standardized forms and reporting requirements for UASI and SHSGP. They were asked if there were advantages to be gained from having comparable data across states and urban areas that could allow them to improve the quality of their programs by learning from each other. Participants suggested that templates for homeland security strategies are possible, but there should be sufficient flexibility to meet the needs of each state and urban area as each jurisdiction has different priorities. It would be useful for FEMA to provide best practices or sample strategies to serve as models for states or urban areas. Moreover, FEMA could develop a menu of performance measures from which grantees could chose, based on which are most relevant to their priorities. If there were clear standards for capabilities, the performance measures would be easier to select and the states and urban areas could focus on achieving capabilities without FEMA changing program priorities annually in the grant guidance.

**Preparing for and Developing Grant Applications**

Advanced preparation is essential to producing a quality grant application, and many states and urban areas begin writing their applications well before FEMA issues its guidance. This is necessary because of the short grant application window. They indicated that they would like to see the grant guidance as early as possible. States and urban areas often use the previous year’s allocation as an estimate for their future budgets (a flat budget), acknowledging that investments will have to be revisited once the actual allocations are announced. These pre-preparation efforts are seen by some states and urban areas as an annual opportunity to review, refresh, and determine new priorities. Once the grant guidance is released, they need to incorporate any new requirements into their draft applications. This may require making significant adjustments in plans if costly or multiple new requirements are added in the guidance, but this is seen as less disruptive than rushing the application once the guidance is released.

Participants agreed that it would be advantageous for FEMA to release its grant guidance earlier to help them effectively prepare for new requirements or a specific focus on particular capabilities (e.g. having each state prepare an investment justification for their fusion center). Another suggestion was for FEMA to consider using a simpler application process similar to the one used for the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG).
Changing priorities in the grant guidance from year to year makes it difficult to sustain capabilities if state or local funds are not available. Participants agreed that they need flexibility to make their own determinations about which capabilities to invest in to meet their individual risks and hazards. The participants highlighted that significant funding for these programs comes from state and local funds. They believe it is unreasonable to put each state or urban area into a one-sized fits all standard box of preset capabilities, but that there is room for some set of standards. They thought that if FEMA put out appropriate measurable standards, grantees could develop and leverage state and local funding to achieve them without the need to have big changes in the annual grant guidance.

**Greater Engagement with FEMA**

Most states and urban areas agreed that it would be helpful for FEMA to engage more in the process of message delivery. Developing a narrative of how the funding is spent and communicating the reasoning for the projects is an essential activity to ensure that future funding streams will be available. This is especially important when it comes to arguing for the sustainment of capabilities that were developed by the grants. Grantees have additional information about their programs that they could share with FEMA, but do not think the current State Preparedness Reports is a good communication tool. Because UASI’s do not complete their own preparedness reports, they have fewer opportunities than State’s to communicate their accomplishments. Overall, participants felt that there is not an effective mechanism for FEMA to receive input and to generate a meaningful brief to Congress. More effective engagement by FEMA, in this regard, would assist the states and urban areas in illustrating to Congress how the grants are making their areas more prepared.

**Measuring the Outcomes of Regional Collaboration**

Regional collaboration is one of the most effective outcomes of the grant programs, but since they do not all produce the same outcomes, roundtable participants did not think the results were measurable. State and urban areas employ a number of ways to determine if their collaborations are working, including several that focus on the commitment of partners. One state looks at the partners who not only come to the table, but return to the table as a sign of success. Another grantee gauges the commitment of their partners based on their willingness to enter into formal mutual aid agreements. One state has built their collaboration based on associations and organizations—not individuals—to create continuity of participation and buy-in for state initiatives. Another state views collaboration as a continuous effort that is embedded in all homeland security activities such as outreach, exercises, and planning. Lastly, one UASI described how the planning and sharing of homeland security assets across jurisdictions is evidence of high functioning regional collaboration.

**Measuring the Outcomes of Preparedness**

The ability to communicate linkages between grant dollars spent and evidence of preparedness improvements, both at the nationwide level and in specific states or jurisdictions, primarily depends on the success stories that are shared. The real proof that the grant funding is improving preparedness becomes clear when a state or jurisdiction reacts to a real-world event, but all efforts that prepare a state or jurisdiction for that reaction also can be indicators of improvement.
The prevention mission area is the one most focused on terrorism. Certain aspects of prevention efforts can be quantified; however, it is not possible to measure performance of something that “doesn’t happen.” Participants indicated that cost of a prevention effort, such as increased police presence, can be determined, but whether or not that presence prevented a hazard from occurring cannot. Prevention is a dynamic activity where many different participants and funding sources contribute to a single outcome. This makes identification of relative contributions difficult.

Roundtable participants stated that the measureable aspects of prevention activities are few. One approach is to measure the elements of a capability needed to prevent an attack, and then set goals and objectives to achieve that capability. Another is measuring how well homeland security resources are shared because timely sharing of resources can contribute to the prevention of terrorist incidents. Many participants agreed that prevention activities for homeland security should be tied to the fusion center’s core capabilities and products that lead to investigations, arrests, or prosecutions.

**Testing and Tracking Preparedness Performance**

Quantifying improvements in preparedness by looking at the target capabilities is one way to assess if the grants funds are improving preparedness (i.e., looking at overall community preparedness, investments in interoperable communication, or the development of ready response teams). The real test of preparedness is how effectively a state or urban area responds to a real-world event or exercise. These situations are an opportunity to test, learn, and improve capabilities. Preparedness indicators also can promote positive behaviors. Several of the participants agreed that it would be helpful to develop measures that recognize how this (DHS/FEMA) funding leverages a larger pool of resources in an effort to improve preparedness.

Each participant described how the homeland-security grant funding has improved his/her preparedness. Examples include:

- A phone survey was conducted after a large scale preparedness education campaign based on the target capabilities, to determine if participants used their knowledge to become more prepared.
- A repeatable gap analysis for state capabilities was developed that includes quantitative metrics to measure the gaps and a process to reassess them over time.
- Comparison of incident management outcomes between similar or recurring events (annual, decadal flooding) can be used to measure improvements in interoperability.
- Planning, training, and exercising coupled with objective assessment to track improvements in preparedness.
- Understanding and use of a common operating picture in the emergency management community and the general public.

The common aspect of these measurement approaches is that they all indicate an understanding of and activity around preparedness, and how they have changed (positive-neutral-negative) given FEMA’s, States’, and locals’ investments in homeland security.
**Challenges**

Participants were concerned that decision-makers continue to refer to delay in drawdown of grant funds as a performance issue. This has become a sort of proxy measure that does not reflect actual performance in executing the grants, and puts the programs at risk. The timing of reimbursement does not indicate when funds have been committed to projects or expended. It is essential for Congress to understand that these grant programs are on a three-year funding cycle and that States and urban areas are using the money effectively over that entire cycle to make good investments in preparedness.

Looking at the preparedness system holistically, the sustainment of capabilities over time is as important as initial development of these capabilities. This system must be able to respond to the evolving nature of terrorism and the specific threats that it poses to states and urban areas. Currently, many states and jurisdictions are in sustainment mode and use significant grant funding to sustain programs and projects that have been established. One state estimated that they use 80 percent of their total funding for sustainment. Drastic cuts to the funding stream, or total loss of funding, will leave these jurisdictions not only unable to build needed capabilities and sustain existing capabilities, but unable to respond when needed most.
APPENDIX F
INFORMATION SOURCES


http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/


APPENDIX G
GRANT PROGRAM CROSSWALK

FEMA Mission\textsuperscript{101}

To support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a Nation we work together to build, sustain and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.

FEMA Grant Programs Directorate Mission\textsuperscript{102}

Manage federal assistance to measurably improve capability and reduce the risks the Nation faces in times of man-made and natural disasters.

Purpose of the UASI and State Homeland Security Grants\textsuperscript{103}

Grants may be used to achieve target capabilities\textsuperscript{104} related to preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to acts of terrorism, consistent with a state homeland security plan and relevant local, tribal, and regional homeland security plans.

*It is the sense of Congress that,* in order to ensure that the Nation is most effectively able to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters…with respect to terrorism grants, it is necessary to ensure both that the target capabilities of the of the highest risk areas are achieved quickly and the basic levels of preparedness, as measured by the attainment of target capabilities are achieved nationwide.

\textsuperscript{101} FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2011-2014, February 2011.
\textsuperscript{102} FEMA Grant Programs Directorate Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2009-2011, October 2008.
\textsuperscript{103} Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).
\textsuperscript{104} Defined in Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53) as “guidelines to define risk-based target capabilities for federal, state, local, and tribal government preparedness that will enable the Nation to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.”
Permitted Uses of UASI and SHSGP Grant Funds

1. Developing and enhancing homeland security, emergency management, or other relevant plans, assessments, or mutual aid agreements.

2. Designing, conducting, and evaluating training and exercises.

3. Protecting a system or asset included on the prioritized critical infrastructure list.

4. Purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining equipment, including computer hardware and software.

5. Ensuring operability and achieving interoperability of emergency communications.

6. Responding to an increase in the threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System, or to the needs resulting from a National Special Security Event.

7. Establishing, enhancing, and staffing with appropriately qualified personnel state, local, and regional fusion centers.

8. Enhancing school preparedness.


10. Paying salaries and benefits for personnel to serve as qualified intelligence analysts.

11. Paying expenses directly related to administration of the grant, not to exceed 5 percent of the amount of the grant.

12. Any activity permitted under the [Fiscal Year 2007] Program Guidance for these grants or the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.

13. Any other appropriate activity, as determined by the Administrator.

14. Not less than 25 percent of the total combined funds for these grants shall be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities including:

   - Information sharing and analysis;
   - Target hardening;
   - Threat recognition;

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105 Permitted uses from Section 2008 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53). Additional uses are articulated in the annual grant guidance.
• Overtime expenses consistent with a state homeland security plan, including for the provision of enhanced law enforcement operations in support of Federal agencies, including for increased border security and border crossing enforcement;
• Establishing, enhancing, and staffing with appropriately qualified personnel state, local, and regional fusion centers;
• Salaries and benefits for personnel to serve as qualified intelligence analysts;
• Any other activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007 Program Guidance for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program; and
• Any other terrorism prevention activity authorize by the Administrator.

**UASI and SHSGP Requirements**

Some are conducted by the grantee and some are conducted by others (e.g. FEMA, DHS Office of the Inspector General).

1. Recipients coordinate, as appropriate, their prevention, preparedness, and protection efforts with neighboring state, local, and tribal governments.

2. Prepare state, local, or regional homeland security plans.

3. Any state or high-risk urban area receiving a grant shall establish a planning committee to assist in preparation of the state, regional or local homeland security plan and to assist in determining effective funding priorities for grants.

4. UASI grant application includes:
   • a plan describing the proposed division of responsibilities and distribution of funding among the local and tribal governments in the high-risk urban area;
   • the name of an individual to serve as a high-risk urban area liaison with the Department and among the various jurisdictions in the high-risk urban area;
   • such information in support of the application as the Administrator may reasonably require.

5. SHSGP grant application includes:
   • the purpose for which the state seeks grant funds and the reasons why the state needs the grant to meet the target capabilities of that state;
   • a description of how the state plans to allocate the grant funds to local governments and Indian tribes; and
   • a budget showing how the state intends to expend the grant funds.

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106 Requirements from the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), unless otherwise noted.
6. Each recipient receiving $500,000 or more shall submit a copy of the organization-wide financial and compliance audit report.

7. Not less than once every 2 years, the Administrator shall conduct, for each state and high-risk urban area receiving a grant, a programmatic and financial review.

8. The Office of the Inspector General shall conduct annual audits on a sample of states and high-risk urban areas that receive grants and by 2012 conduct at least 1 audit of each state. The IG shall report annually on:
   - audits
   - whether the funds awarded were used in accordance with the law, program guidance, and state homeland security plans and other applicable plans; and
   - the extent to which funds awarded enhanced the ability of a grantee to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.

9. Performance assessment – In order to ensure that states and high-risk urban areas are using grants appropriately to meet target capabilities and preparedness priorities, the Administrator shall:
   - ensure that any such state or high-risk urban area conducts or participates in exercises;
   - use performance metrics in accordance with the comprehensive assessment system and ensure that any such state or high-risk urban area regularly tests its progress against such metrics through exercises;
   - use the remedial action management program\textsuperscript{107}:
     - requires analysis of training, exercises, and real-world events to identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices;
     - generate and disseminate, as appropriate, after action reports to participants in exercises and real-world events; and
     - conduct remedial action tracking and long-term trend analysis.

10. Grant recipients will report quarterly:
   - the amount obligated;
   - the amount of funds received and expended; and
   - a summary description and purpose of expenditures.

11. Grant recipients will provide an end of year report:
   - amount and date of receipt of grant funds for that year;
   - identity of, and amount provided to, any sub-grantee;
   - the amount and dates of disbursements for regional coordination or mutual aid agreements; and

\textsuperscript{107} Remedial action management program required under Section 650, Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295).
• how the funds were used by each recipient or sub-grantee.

12. Any state applying for State Homeland Security Grant funds shall submit annually a state preparedness report that includes:

• an assessment of state compliance with the national preparedness system, National Incident Management System, National Response Plan, and other related plans and strategies;

• an assessment of current capability levels and a description of target capability levels; and

• a discussion of the extent to which target capabilities identified in the applicable state homeland security plan and other applicable plans remain unmet and an assessment of resources needed to meet the preparedness priorities, including:
  o an estimate of the amount of expenditures required to attain the preparedness priorities; and
  o the extent to which the use of Federal assistance during the preceding fiscal year achieved the preparedness priorities.

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109 Under Section 646(e) of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295), the Administrator shall establish preparedness priorities that appropriately balance the risk of all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, with the resources required to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the hazards. The Administrator will use these priorities in the establishment of guidelines on target capabilities.
APPENDIX H
KEY LEGISLATION AND GUIDANCE RELATED TO SHSGP AND UASI

History of the SHSGP and UASI Programs

Historically, states and local jurisdictions funded their own disaster preparedness investments. While federal funds were available for disaster recovery, the states were largely responsible for guiding and funding their own disaster preparedness capabilities. These investments tended to focus on preparing for the natural hazards that individual states responded to regularly, while terrorism preparedness was viewed as a federal responsibility. When Congress began to see a need for increased terrorism preparedness, the states and local jurisdictions had only limited resources to fund new capabilities.

_Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996_

Following a series of domestic and international terrorist incidents in the early 1990’s, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. The law required the establishment of a series of grant programs to increase preparedness for terrorism related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) at the state and local level. To comply with its AEDPA mandate, the Department of Justice (DOJ) established multiple preparedness grant programs in the late 1990’s, including the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program (SDPEP) in 1999. SDPEP provided funding to states for the purchase of equipment related to communications, and chemical, biological, and radiological response. In order to qualify for the program, SDPEP grantees were required to submit a needs assessment, and a three-year statewide domestic preparedness strategy to identify how grant funding would be spent. SDPEP would later be integrated with other DOJ preparedness programs to serve as the core of the State Homeland Security Grant Program.

_USA Patriot Act of 2001_

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress increased preparedness grant funding by creating new preparedness programs and strengthening existing ones. In October 2001, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, which empowered Federal agencies to increase their vigilance in

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110 Section 819, Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
preventing and responding to international and domestic terrorist incidents.\textsuperscript{115} Included in the law was a provision that extended the purpose of SDPEP beyond WMD-related attacks, and established a new formula for calculating the baseline percentage of preparedness grant funds to be allocated to each of the 56 states and territories: states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico were entitled to at least 0.75\%, the other four territories to 0.25\% of the program’s funding, and the rest was allocated by population.\textsuperscript{116} Following these changes, the SDPEP was renamed the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program (SDPESP) in 2002.

\textbf{Homeland Security Act of 2002}

In November of 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which established DHS as a federal department, and initiated a significant reorganization of the Federal domestic security establishment. As part of this reorganization, FEMA and the DOJ Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which managed SDPESP, were incorporated into DHS, and responsibility for FEMA terrorism preparedness grant programs was transferred to ODP.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Establishment of the SHSGP and UASI Programs}

For FY 2003, DHS established the SHSGP and UASI programs to assist states and urban areas with enhancing terrorism preparedness capabilities at the state, tribal, territorial and local levels. Initially, federal guidance was limited, and there were few requirements that states and urban areas had to meet in order to apply for the grant. In FY 2003, applicants were only required to submit a homeland security strategy, a \textit{Categorical Assistance Progress Report}, and an equipment budget worksheet; this last requirement was eliminated the following year.\textsuperscript{118} Over time, the application requirements for both programs were modified to solicit additional information on how grant funding was spent.

\textbf{Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8}

In December of 2003, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). The directive formally charged DHS with providing funding assistance to the states for the purpose of developing homeland security capabilities, and required the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a National Preparedness Goal by FY 2006.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{115} Section 1014, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (P.L. 107-56).

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Sections 430, 503, & 510, Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296).


\textsuperscript{119} Homeland Security Presidential Directive: National Preparedness (HSPD-8), December 17, 2003
**Interim National Preparedness Goal**

In March 2005, DHS released the Interim National Preparedness Goal (Interim Goal). As stated by DHS, the purpose of the document was to:

> guide federal departments and agencies, state, territorial, local and tribal officials, the private sector, non-government organizations and the public in determining how to most effectively and efficiently strengthen preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.\(^{120}\)

The Interim Goal was intended to make progress on requirements from HSPD-8 that DHS develop standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and establish a national preparedness goal.\(^ {121}\) The Interim Goal advocated a capabilities-based planning approach, using 15 National Planning Scenarios to develop a Universal Task List (UTL) and Target Capabilities List (TCL) for emergency management and response professionals.\(^ {122}\) Each capability in the TCL included associated activities that grantees could undertake to develop preparedness capabilities. However, it lacked the level of capability that each jurisdiction was expected to reach, or how that capability level should be measured. In addition, the Interim Goal established seven distinct preparedness priorities, three overarching and four capability-specific, that were linked to the target capabilities and would guide national preparedness investments.\(^ {123}\) The Interim Goal did not establish an explicit goal for national preparedness, stating that the “Final Goal” would be published in October 2005.\(^ {124}\)

**Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act**

The 2005 Gulf hurricane season demonstrated the challenges FEMA faced in executing their mission, and the need to invest in preparedness for natural and man-made disasters. In 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Act (PKEMRA), which initiated a reorganization of offices and responsibilities within the Department.\(^ {125}\) As part of this reorganization, PKEMRA reassigned DHS preparedness grant programs to FEMA, and established the Grant Programs Directorate to administer them.\(^ {126}\) Following the 2005 Gulf hurricane season, dual use of terrorism preparedness capabilities to address other hazards became more broadly accepted by the emergency management community. In 2006, the Homeland

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\(^{121}\) Interim National Preparedness Goal, 2005.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.

\(^{123}\) Ibid.

\(^{124}\) Ibid.


\(^{126}\) FEMA Grant Programs Directorate Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2009-2011, October 2008.
Security Grant Program guidance acknowledged that SHSGP- and UASI-funded activities could address natural catastrophes, provided those activities were also applicable to terrorism preparedness.\textsuperscript{127}

**Investment Justification**

In October 2005, Congress authorized the Secretary of DHS to require additional documentation from preparedness grant applicants.\textsuperscript{128} Additional application requirements for FY2006 grants included a Program and Capability Enhancement Plan and an Investment Justification, in which applicants provide information on how grant funding will be linked to their homeland security needs, goals, and objectives.\textsuperscript{129} Both the format of and the information required by the Investment Justification have been modified over time.

**Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act**

In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.\textsuperscript{130} Included in the law was a provision that modified the baseline funding formula for the SHSGP program. Baseline percentage of funding for states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico would be lowered gradually over five years to 0.35\%\textsuperscript{131} For the other four territories covered by SHSGP, the baseline percentage would be lowered to 0.8\% of the total funding beginning in FY 2008.\textsuperscript{132} In addition, the law also required that 25\% of SHSGP and UASI grant funds be invested in an approved list of activities related to law-enforcement.\textsuperscript{133}

**National Preparedness Guidelines**

In September 2007, DHS released the National Preparedness Guidelines. The purpose of the guidelines was to finalize the process of developing a National Preparedness Goal, as required by HSPD-8.\textsuperscript{134} The Guidelines were composed of four components: the National Preparedness Vision; the National Planning Scenarios; the Universal Task List; and a new iteration of the Target Capabilities List.\textsuperscript{135} Between these four components, the Guidelines provided further clarification of the capabilities necessary for national preparedness. However, like the earlier Interim Goal, it lacked a clearly articulated goal for national preparedness.

\textsuperscript{127} Fiscal Year 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, December 2005.


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} In 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States released their report, which included a number of recommendations on how to increase national terrorism preparedness. Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53) in 2007, which implemented several of these recommendations.


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Section 2006, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53).


\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
Presidential Policy Directive 8

Following a review of national preparedness initiatives under the previous administration, President Obama issued the Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) in March 2011. PPD-8 built on previous enhancements to national preparedness, and required the Homeland Security establishment to meet specific deadlines in expanding on earlier national preparedness goals. Under PPD-8, the Secretary of Homeland Security was required to submit a National Preparedness Goal (Goal) within 180 days of the Directive’s release that would be informed by the risk of specific threats and vulnerabilities – taking into account regional variations - and include concrete, measurable, and prioritized objectives to mitigate that risk. The National Preparedness Goal, First Edition, was issued September 26, 2011.

In addition, PPD-8 called on the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a National Preparedness System within 240 days of the Directive’s release, which would provide guidance, programs and processes to ensure that Federal, state and local development of preparedness activities fit within a national, integrated framework. PPD-8 also required the Secretary to submit an annual National Preparedness Report to inform the Administration’s annual budget.

Shift toward Sustainment

In recent years, there has been a shift in how federal preparedness grant funding is used by recipients. When the federal programs were first established, the goal was to build terrorism preparedness capability at the state and local level as expeditiously as possible. State and local grantees were expected to purchase equipment and train personnel to develop new preparedness capabilities and strengthen existing ones. However, as time progressed, grantees spent an increasing share of their grant funding on maintaining capabilities that had already been developed. While some in Congress believed capability sustainment was the responsibility of the state, grantees argued that terrorism preparedness was a federal responsibility, and that they lacked the resources to maintain capabilities without federal assistance. Although previous grant guidance had mentioned capability sustainment as an allowable use of UASI funding, FY 2010 was the first year the guidance stated explicitly that SHSGP and UASI funds could be used to maintain existing preparedness capabilities.

139 Ibid.
# APPENDIX I

## DEFINITIONS OF CORE CAPABILITIES

### Prevent

**Planning:** Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.

**Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

**Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

**Forensics and Attribution:** Conduct forensic analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods of terrorism) to their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and for the preparation for an attack in an effort to prevent initial or follow-on acts and/or swiftly develop counter-options.

**Intelligence and Information Sharing:** Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by Federal, state, local, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local, or private sector entities, as appropriate.

**Interdiction and Disruption:** Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards.

**Screening, Search, and Detection:** Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.

### Protect

**Planning:** Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community, as appropriate, in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.

**Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Operational Coordination:</strong></th>
<th>Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access Control and Identity Verification:</strong></td>
<td>The ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiological, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil). Such all-hazard threats include those deliberately released with criminal intent, as well as those that may be present as a result of unintentional or natural occurrences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cybersecurity:</strong></td>
<td>Protect against damage to, the unauthorized use of, and/or the exploitation of (and, if needed, the restoration of) electronic communications systems and services (and the information contained therein).</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Intelligence and Information Sharing:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Interdiction and Disruption:</strong></td>
<td>Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Protective Measures:</strong></td>
<td>Reduce or mitigate risks, including actions targeted at threats, vulnerabilities, and/or consequences, by controlling movement and protecting borders, critical infrastructure, and the homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities:</strong></td>
<td>Identify, assess, and prioritize risks to inform Protection activities and investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Screening, Search, and Detection:</strong></td>
<td>Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supply Chain Integrity and Security:</strong></td>
<td>Strengthen the security and resilience of the supply chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mitigation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning:</strong></td>
<td>Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community Resilience:</strong></td>
<td>Lead the integrated effort to recognize, understand, communicate, plan, and address risks so that the community can develop a set of actions to accomplish Mitigation and improve resilience.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Long-term Vulnerability Reduction:** Build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines so as to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused incidents by lessening the likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences related to these incidents.

**Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment:** Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed action to reduce their entity’s risk and increase their resilience.

**Threats and Hazard Identification:** Identify the threats and hazards that occur in the geographic area; determine the frequency and magnitude; and incorporate this into analysis and planning processes so as to clearly understand the needs of a community or entity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Response</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning:</strong> Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.</td>
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<td><strong>Operational Coordination:</strong> Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Transportation:</strong> Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Response/Health and Safety:</strong> Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatality Management Services:</strong> Provide fatality management services, including body recovery and victim identification, working with state and local authorities to provide temporary mortuary solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure Systems:</strong> Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Care Services:</strong> Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding, and sheltering to those who have the most need, as well as support for reunifying families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Search and Rescue Operations:</strong> Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On-scene Security and Protection: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Operational Communications: Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

Public and Private Services and Resources: Provide essential public and private services and resources to the affected population and surrounding communities, to include emergency power to critical facilities, fuel support for emergency responders, and access to community staples (e.g., grocery stores, pharmacies, and banks) and fire and other first response services.

Public Health and Medical Services: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.

Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Recover

Planning: Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.

Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Operational Coordination: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Economic Recovery: Return economic and business activities (including food and agriculture) to a healthy state and develop new business and employment opportunities that result in a sustainable and economically viable community.

Health and Social Services: Restore and improve health and social services networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.

Housing: Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience.

Infrastructure Systems: Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.

Natural and Cultural Resources: Protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties through appropriate planning, mitigation, response, and recovery actions to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore them consistent with post-disaster community priorities and best practices and in compliance with appropriate environmental and historical preservation laws and executive orders.
COVER IMAGES CREDITS

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**Top row, left to right:**

A New Mexico Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT). FEMA Photo/Marty Bahamonde
Portable communications unit deployed during an exercise. FEMA/Robert Kaufmann
Search and Rescue check on isolated residents. FEMA/Andrea Booher

**Bottom row, left to right:**

Mock explosives exercise in Solitude, UT. FEMA/Andrea Booher.
Exercise at the Center for Domestic Preparedness. FEMA/Shannon Arledge
Tennessee Urban Search and Rescue Team plan their mission. FEMA/Jocelyn Augustino